BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN
Ukraine in World War II
The Untold Story
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This publication was conceived as a reader’s companion to the documentary film *Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in World War II, the Untold Story*, produced in 2003 by the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre (UCRDC). While this short publication is not an exhaustive treatment of this period, it provides a concise recapitulation of events that are often little known outside of the Ukrainian community or by the community’s younger generations.

Several themes are emphasized here. The text points out that Ukraine was not a passive entity during World War II. It was not just a place through which Nazi and Soviet troops marched back and forth, destroying millions of people along the way. There was a widespread, active movement that strove to protect the Ukrainian people from both Nazi and Soviet oppression and fought to gain independence for Ukraine. This struggle for independence had its roots in Ukraine’s past history. The legacy of this struggle was already well established in World War I, solidified through the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic (1917–1920), and carried through to Ukraine’s independence (24 August 1991), which was finally achieved with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, the storyline shows the tremendous suffering and devastation that World War II brought to Ukraine: millions of people killed and thousands of villages, towns, and cities destroyed.

The precursor of the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre (UCRDC) was a committee established in 1982 with the aim of producing a documentary film on the 1932–1933 Famine-Genocide in Ukraine. In 1986 the committee restructuring itself as a centre for the purpose of gathering documentation and disseminating information on the historical events of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that are important to Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the world. The UCRDC achieves this by conducting and recording interviews with witnesses of such events. To date, the UCRDC has established a large oral history archive. With the aid of these materials, the UCRDC produces or assists in the production of documentary films. It also sponsors and co-sponsors conferences, speakers, exhibits, and publications. Notable among the films produced or co-produced by the UCRDC are the documentaries *The Harvest of Despair* (1984), which deals with the Famine-Genocide of 1932–1933 in Ukraine; *Freedom Had a Price* (1994), about Canada’s
internment of Ukrainians during World War I; and Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in World War II, the Untold Story (2003).

The text of this companion book to the latter film begins with the ideological backgrounds of Hitler and Stalin. It may be said that their respective ideologies motivated their policies and were used to justify their actions. The storyline goes on to discuss the historical background of the struggle for Ukraine’s independence during World War II, recounting the attempts of the Ukrainian liberation movement to establish independence at the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. It also focuses on the destruction wreaked by the Soviets during their withdrawal from Ukraine and the destruction wrought by Nazi German rule. Also discussed are two types of Ukrainian resistance to Nazi rule: “passive” and “active.” It also looks briefly at “the war within the war,” the Polish-Ukrainian conflict that developed during the Second World War.

For Ukrainians as well as other Eastern European peoples, the war created a paradoxical situation in which the members of the Ukrainian resistance fought against Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army, “brother against brother.” This question is briefly discussed, as is the involvement of Ukrainians in the Allied military forces.

Finally, for Ukrainians, the war did not really end in 1945, as Soviet repression of Ukrainian identity continued until 1991.

This publication can also be used without the film in educational institutions and by readers who are interested in the subject.

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PROLOGUE: TWO TYRANTS, TWO IDEOLOGIES, SIMILAR CONSEQUENCES

Stalin is one of the greatest men alive because he succeeded in creating a state out of this Slav “rabbit family,” of course only under severe force.1

Adolf Hitler, 1941

The Second World War was the most violent war in history, with over fifty million killed. The violence was especially extreme in Ukraine. According to the American journalist Edgar Snow,

The whole titanic struggle … was first of all a Ukrainian war. No fewer than 10 million people had been “lost” to Ukraine since 1941…. No single European country suffered deeper wounds to its cities, its industry, its farmland and its humanity.2

In that war Ukraine was the battlefield on which two powers, one led by Hitler and the other by Stalin, clashed in a titanic struggle for absolute political domination.

In many ways Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were the embodiment of new intellectual trends of the time. Hitler embodied a combination of Darwinian and Nietzschean thought, viewing life as an eternal struggle in which the fittest survive and the strongest rule. As he explained in Mein Kampf (My Struggle), nature puts living creatures on this globe and observes the free play of forces. She confers “the master’s right on her favorite child, the strongest in courage and industry.” The stronger must dominate and not blend with the weaker; the weaker must sacrifice their own potential to the interests of the stronger. This is a fixed law of nature and only “born weaklings” will view this as cruel. Nature confers “the right to victory on the best and strongest in the world.” Hence “those who want to live, let them fight, and those who do not want to fight…do not deserve to live.”3

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Running throughout Hitler’s writings and speeches is the theme that the supreme leader is above the morality of ordinary men, and that great rulers must not be concerned if, in fulfilling their role, they crush the innocent. Hitler was convinced that it would be necessary to overcome obstacles if he was to fulfill his destiny of becoming a great leader of the German nation. The efforts of all must be directed to that end, and everything must be subordinated to achieve it.

In Hitler’s view, a great leader must lead a great nation. For him this was the German Volk, the embodiment of the “supreme” Aryan race. In turn, a great nation needed Lebensraum, room for its population to live in prosperity and to grow. Territorial expansion was thus one of the characteristics of a great nation. The territories that Hitler had in mind lay in Eastern Europe, but they were, inconveniently, already populated. The population there would have to be pushed aside, but that would be justified since, by definition, it consisted of “subhuman,” “inferior” peoples (Untermenschen). These included Jews and Slavs. The Jews were to be eliminated. The Slavs—Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians—were also to be liquidated or slated to become servants of the master race, a tool for its material prosperity. This would apply especially to Ukrainians, because they lived on the best soil of Europe, the ideal site for the coveted Lebensraum. All Ukrainians who resisted this plan, such as by striving for political independence, were to be destroyed. Logically, a policy of ruthlessness in Ukraine would be simply a matter of practical necessity.

Stalin was indebted to other new intellectual trends of the time: Marxism and Leninism. Different from Darwinism and Nietzscheanism as these theories appear to be, their application involved a course of action similar to Hitler’s. As a disciple of Marx, Stalin accepted class struggle as a necessary phase in achieving a classless society and the eventual triumph of communism. For Stalin, who was by nature an organizer and a practical man, however, this meant that those identified as hostile or as obstacles to achieving that “lofty” goal were to be eliminated. This could be done in a variety of ways, including execution, deportation, famine, and disenfranchisement. Stalin accepted Lenin’s view that truth was a bourgeois invention and therefore could not limit the actions of those dedicated to the bourgeoisie’s downfall. Stalin took this literally and turned deception into a practical tool for wielding power. Deception through constant propaganda became a way of relating to the masses and the outside world. As a result, old Bolshevik comrades-in-arms became “traitors” and “agents of imperialism”; engineers became
“wreckers” and “saboteurs”; academics were dubbed “counterrevolutionaries”; and poets, as “bourgeois nationalists,” etc. Depending on the moment, such labels could, and did, become death sentences.

The Communist Party was to be the elite that would lead the masses to socialism. In the early days of its hegemony it became clear that the masses were not predisposed to socialism. The peasants, in particular, preferred the New Economic Policy (NEP), which gave them a market economy with the promise of prosperity. Already under Lenin it had become clear that socialism would have to be implemented from above. For Stalin this meant by force. The party was to impose socialism on the masses whether they liked it or not. A “socialist state” was to be the only goal to which all should strive. Therefore, all obstacles on the road to socialism must be eliminated.

The party leaders viewed the working masses as incapable of understanding what it saw so clearly: their own true interests. The masses were unreliable and contained faltering elements against which, in Lenin’s words, revolutionary coercion was necessary. For the impatient Stalin, ruthlessness became the rule. Those who counseled a democratic approach to the masses were treated as expendable cowards. The broad masses soon came to be considered by the party leadership, and even by rank-and-file members, as a lower inferior class lacking “revolutionary consciousness,” and in dealing with them deception and force were justified if needed to implement the will of the party.

Thus, although Hitler’s and Stalin’s ideologies appeared to be dissimilar, in their application they were both based on the same general principles. Both called for an infallible and all-powerful leader with a vision of the future toward which he would lead “his” people. In this the leader would rely on the services of a loyal and ideologically-motivated elite. For Hitler this would be the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) and the Aryan Volk. Stalin would rely on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its bureaucracy. Both leaders would have some obstacles to overcome. For Hitler these obstacles were the Jews and, in his push to the East, the population of the territories he so coveted. For Stalin this was the element in the Soviet population that lacked “socialist consciousness.” For both Hitler and Stalin opposition was to be destroyed by the most expedient means.

Stalin and his associates saw the Ukrainian peasantry as the most stubborn part of the masses. Ukrainian farmers were to serve simply as a work force on collective farms, directly subordinated to the policies and
dictates of Moscow. The fact that they had refused to be collectivized in the late 1920s and that their leaders had hoped for and demanded freedom—autonomy or independence from Russia—continuously infuriated Stalin, who was determined to solve the national question in Ukraine once and for all. In his view, the peasant question was the basis, the quintessence of the national question, and the national question was the peasant question. Collectivization in Ukraine thus had a special task: to destroy the social basis of Ukrainian national consciousness, that is, independent farming. The planned famine that followed collectivization was the ultimate weapon among the various attempts to destroy it. But it was not the only one. In his secret speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev said Stalin had wanted to exile all Ukrainians to Siberia. Nikolai Tolstoy in his book *Stalin’s Secret War* suggested the theory that Stalin used World War II as a pretext to destroy Ukrainians and other “undesirable” groups of Soviet citizens.

In Ukraine in particular, the application of both ideologies led to the same result: ruthless violence. This included not only daily arrests and executions but also slavery and genocide. The Nazis introduced slavery in the form of the Ostarbeiter (Eastern workers) system, while the Soviets created the GULAG, a network of forced-labor concentration camps. Genocide by the Nazis meant the direct extermination of Jews and Roma (Gypsies), to be followed by the Slavs—Ukrainians in particular—in order to secure living space in the European east for the German *Herrenvölker* (master race). Genocide by the Soviets meant the use of state-sponsored famine and terror finally to subdue Ukraine and turn it into a “model soviet republic” (Stalin). As Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov declared in 1921, “Food is a weapon.” All this extreme violence was legitimized by the two leaders’ respective ideologies, ostensibly different in theory, but in practice producing the same effect.

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Yet, in spite of this violence, and perhaps because of it, the idea of independence persisted in Ukraine. It persisted during the war and after its formal conclusion in May 1945. Soviet Ukrainian dissidents cherished this idea in the 1960s and 1970s, as did many who strove to preserve the Ukrainian language and culture despite restrictions and punishment. The idea emerged fully on 24 August 1991, when Ukraine declared its independence, the vast majority of the population (90.32 percent) showing its approval in a referendum on 1 December 1991. As Norman Davies explained, for Ukrainians the year 1991 can be seen as the real end of the Second World War.  

7 Nazi and Soviet propaganda posters prior to World War II.

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7 Interview with Norman Davies for Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in World War II, the Untold Story, a documentary film by Slavko Novytsky. Toronto: Ukrainian Research and Documentation Centre, 2003.
INTRODUCTION

Ukraine was the prime victim of the Second World War, suffering the greatest material damage and the highest number of human losses of any country in the conflict. Edgar Snow, who visited Ukraine in 1943 and again in 1945, was so astonished at the enormous losses it had suffered that in his article “Ukraine Pays the Bill” published in The Saturday Evening Post he wrote: “The Allies won the war but Ukraine paid the bill.”

In his groundbreaking work Snow wrote:

Yet it was not till I went on a sobering journey into this twilight of war that I fully realized the price which 40,000,000 Ukrainians paid for Soviet—and Allied—victory. The whole titanic struggle, which some are apt to dismiss as “the Russian glory,” was first of all a Ukrainian war. No fewer than 10,000,000 people had been ‘lost’ to... Ukraine since 1941, I was told by a high Ukrainian official. That excluded men and women mobilized for the armed forces.

A relatively small part of the Russian Soviet Republic itself was actually invaded, but the whole Ukraine, whose people were economically the most advanced and numerically the second largest in the Soviet Union, was devastated from the Carpathian frontier to the Donets and Don rivers, where Russia proper begins. No single European country suffered deeper wounds to its cities, its industry, its farmland and its humanity.

The story of Ukraine’s role and devastation in World War II is generally unknown because the West saw the USSR as “Russia,” an image that Moscow encouraged and sought to project. The sacrifice and struggles of all the peoples of the USSR were generally presented as those of the “Russian people.” The statistics of overall Soviet losses during the war were deliberately lowered. Khrushchev initially spoke of twenty million dead, including sixteen million civilians. In fact, most of the civilian victims were not Russians but Ukrainians and Belarusians (Rus. Belorussians). The German army occupied Ukraine in its entirety for three years, while only a small part of European Russia was under occupation. In

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8 The Saturday Evening Post, 24 March 1945, p. 12.
9 Snow, Pattern of Soviet Power, p. 73.
1995 the Soviet authorities raised the losses to 27 million. According to the American scholar Zbigniew Brzezinski, “these figures cover up the Soviet genocide of its own people.”

Professor Norman Davies, criticizing Western historians, writes:

The overwhelming brunt of the Nazi occupation between 1941 and 1944, as of the devastating Soviet reoccupation, was borne not by Russia but by the Baltic States, by Belarus, by Poland, and above all by Ukraine…. Nowhere is it made clear that the largest number of civilian casualties in Europe were inflicted on the Ukrainians, millions of whom were killed both by the Nazis and by the Soviets.

The Second World War, which cost Ukraine so dearly, had its roots in the First World War. That war and its aftermath gave birth, though not at the same time, to two totalitarian states, Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Once both of these regimes became firmly established in the 1930s, they learned from each other even as each was preparing to wage war on the other. Both had come into existence in the name “of the people.” The communist regime was bolstered by an ideology of a classless society, which in the early 1920s was taken seriously by many, both in Eastern and Western Europe.

Nazi Germany emerged out of the Weimar Republic, which was a genuinely democratic system. Throughout its thirteen-year history the Weimar Republic was fraught with conflicts and difficulties, many of which resulted from the way World War I had been resolved through the Treaty of Versailles. By the mid-1930s the two states became confirmed tyrannical regimes, the Soviet Union already having established a legacy of violence and mass extermination, with Nazi Ger-

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10 Liudskie poteri SSSR v period Vtoroi mirovoi voiny: sbornik statei (St. Petersburg: Russkaia akademiia nauk, 1995).
13 The harsh reparations and the occupation of the resource-rich Rhineland by France, forced upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, ensured that the defeated country would experience extreme economic, and by extension, political, instability in the near future. Moreover, the Treaty of Versailles humiliated the Germans, forcing them to accept guilt for “starting” the war and reducing their military to a token defense force.
legacy of violence and mass extermination, with Nazi Germany closely following in its footsteps.

While not abandoning their preparations for war, by the late 1930s the two states moved closer to each other by signing the German-Soviet (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Pact of Non-Aggression on 23 August 1939. The following month, on 28 September 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Borders, according to which they recognized each other’s legitimate interests in newly-divided Poland. Ukrainians were thus caught between the two states and their future war. The Second World War, on its Eastern front, was fought in large measure on Ukrainian territory, with each power exploiting Ukraine and its people for its own purposes. However, Ukrainians did not remain passive in the war; their actions can be characterized as reflecting two essential goals: to survive and to be masters of their own fate. The second goal could only be achieved through independence.

14 The secret protocols of the German-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression revealed that the pact, signed for a ten-year period, divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Bessarabia, as well as Polish territory east of the Vistula, in the event of a political rearrangement of Poland, were to fall into the Soviet sphere. Lithuania and Polish territory west of the Vistula were to become part of the German sphere. See Norman Davies, *Europe at War, 1939–1945* (London: MacMillan, 2007), pp. 149–50.
By the end of the First World War, most nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe were at the point in their historical development where they too aspired to the liberties enjoyed by Western nations, particularly the U.S.A., and to this end they strove to create their own states. In the war’s closing days Czechs and Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Estonians, Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Poles, and others declared their independence.

Ukraine, which before the war was divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, also declared independence in 1918: eastern Ukraine in January and western Ukraine in November. Each created its own government and armed forces. On 22 January 1919 the two parts of the Ukrainian nation united to form one state. Ukraine’s neighbors that had once ruled Ukrainian lands—Russians in the east and Poles in the west—refused to recognize Ukrainian independence. The Ukrainian armies fought against the Bolsheviks (Soviet forces) and the Whites (Russian pro-tsarist forces) in the east and the Poles in the west and, in the end, lost on both fronts. After the defeat the government of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) went into exile.

Toward the end of the war U.S. President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed his Fourteen Points, the “Doctrine of Self-Determination,” as the basis for a just peace to follow once hostilities ended. After the victory this principle was applied by the Western Powers to most of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, but not to the Ukrainians. The Treaty of Versailles recognized the annexation of Ukrainian territories by its neighbors: Soviet Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary. Nevertheless, despite its lack of success, the 1917–1921 struggle for Ukrainian statehood established in the consciousness of the people the notion that Ukrainian statehood was a legitimate ideal and thus a goal of their political aspirations.

After the loss of Ukrainian independence the movement for self-determination was ruthlessly crushed by the Soviet regime and repressed on the territories controlled by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. In Soviet Ukraine, the brief period of “indigenization” of the regime and the Ukrainization of the bureaucracy and education system ceased by 1933. The Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP[B]U) was purged of its more nationally-conscious members, most of whom were executed.
Thousands of clergymen and members of the intelligentsia who had participated in the Ukrainization of society in the 1920s were also destroyed.

The culminating event of a decade of repression (1928–1938) was the 1932–1933 genocide by famine—the Holodomor, or “execution by starvation”—which was conceived by Joseph Stalin and executed by Viacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich. According to the latest research, the Holodomor resulted in the direct loss of nearly five million Ukrainians in Soviet Ukraine and the Ukrainian-populated area of the Kuban (a region in the Northern Caucasus, part of the Soviet Russian republic). The distinguished legal scholar who drafted the UN Convention on Genocide (1948), Raphael Lemkin, also estimated that some five million Ukrainians starved to death. However, the total cumulative demographic losses sustained by the Ukrainian people during that genocidal decade—which also include indirect losses, such as lost births, mass deportations, mass executions, and forced Russification—now stand at approximately ten million. According to the 1926 Soviet census, the Ukrainian ethnic population of the Soviet Union stood at 31.2 million. According to the 1937 census, however, it had dropped to 26.4 million.

Recent archival research has also revealed that the Holodomor was used by Moscow as a timely tool to suppress a widespread insurgency movement (1928–1932) against Soviet rule in eastern Ukraine.

Taking into account the UN Convention on Genocide and the above-mentioned genocidal acts, the Italian scholar Andrea Graziosi estimates that “one is therefore dealing with the loss of approximately 20 to

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15 Viacheslav Molotov, b. 1890, Viatka; d. 1986, Moscow. After the death of Lenin, Molotov became a servile supporter of Stalin. At the Third Congress of the CP(B)U in 1932, Molotov, then Chairman of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars, rejected Ukrainian requests to lower the grain delivery quotas. This was instrumental in triggering the famine of 1932–33. Molotov became foreign minister in 1939, in which post he remained until 1949.

16 Lazar Kaganovich, b. 1893, Kyiv Gubernia, d. 1991, Moscow. Because of his unconditional loyalty to Stalin, Kaganovich was often assigned to carry out the most ruthless and brutal tasks. In 1933, as director of the agricultural department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (AUCP[B]), he was responsible for assisting Molotov in carrying out the repressions of farmers who opposed collectivization.

30 percent of the Ukrainian ethnic population” of the USSR, and “that such a loss was caused by the decision, unquestionably a subjective act, to use the Famine in an anti-Ukrainian sense on the basis of the ‘national interpretation’ Stalin developed in the second half of 1932…”

The Treaty of Versailles obliged Poland and Czechoslovakia to grant autonomy to the Ukrainian populations living on their ethnographic territories. However, in Poland this obligation was violated almost immediately. Repressive measures were implemented in order to stifle attempts by Ukrainian citizens to implement their right of self-determination. This set the stage for the emergence of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in western Ukraine.

This movement had its roots in the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrainska Viiskova Orhanizatsiya, UVO), founded in 1920 by Ukrainian officers and soldiers who had fought in World War I and then with the Ukrainian army during the War of Liberation (1917–1921). Its objective was to continue the struggle for independence through revolutionary means. In 1929 the organization was incorporated into the newly-formed Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN ideology, propounded by the charismatic essayist Dmytro Dontsov, who advocated a struggle based on the inherent strength of the Ukrainian people rather than on the help of foreign powers, began to gain adherents, especially among the youth.

The organization’s first head was Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, who articulated this ideology in a letter that he sent to the British authorities


19 Dmytro Dontsov, b. 1883, Melitopil, Ukraine, d. 1973, Montreal, Canada. Political theorist, journalist, editor, and literary critic. Dontsov edited literary and political journals promoting the doctrine of “voluntaristic nationalism,” which greatly influenced the OUN’s policies.
in 1935. In anticipation of a future push eastward by Germany, Konovalets stated the OUN position succinctly:

> We, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, are fighting for complete independence of Ukraine. Today, we actively resist all alien occupiers of the Ukrainian lands. Although we consider Russia to be the most threatening of them all, we shall, nevertheless, in the future, defy with all our power all one-sided attempts by alien invaders to resolve the affairs of Eastern Europe without, or against the will, of the Ukrainian people. Because, we know, that any such solution would only lead to a new partition and enslavement of Ukraine—and not to her liberation. We stand on the principle, that our struggle to achieve full independence does not contradict in any way the political and strategic interests of Great Britain. Taking this into account, we hope that Great Britain will support our struggle for independence, for we are convinced, that only a strong and independent Ukraine can be conducive to the stabilization of the current uncertain situation and the restoration of the balance of power in Eastern Europe.  

The Soviet Union considered the OUN and its commitment to Ukrainian independence threatening enough to order the assassination of Konovalets. This was carried out on 23 May 1938, in Rotterdam, Holland. Two years later the OUN split into two separate organizations. Conservative members of the organization supported Konovalets’s successor, Colonel Andrii Melnyk, and their faction became known as OUN-M. The radical group, the OUN-B, chose as its leader Stepan Bandera, who represented the younger generation of revolutionaries. Both wings, however, were committed to Ukraine’s independence.

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20 Colonel Yevhen Konovalets to Yevhen Lachowitch, representative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in London, dated 4 June 1935, in Geneva. His letter was translated into English by Lachowitch and forwarded to the British Foreign Office. See Foreign Office Archives, Number 3017/51/38, 15 June 1935. In the letter Konovalets also expresses the opinion that the independence of Ukraine coincides with the political, economic, and strategic interests of Great Britain.

After the German occupation of Poland in 1939, the Government-in-Exile of the Ukrainian National Republic sent a memorandum to the British Foreign Office stating that it sided without reservation with the democracies: England and France. The memorandum went on to express opposition to both the Soviet Union and Germany, advocating an independent Ukraine within its ethnographic boundaries and pledging itself to strive to bring this about. To this end, it asked for the support of the Western Powers. However, these countries hoped to engage the support of the Soviet Union in their war against Germany and did not respond to the memorandum.

The culminating event of a decade of repression was the 1932–1933 genocide by famine—the Holodomor. Monument to the victims in Kyiv, Ukraine.
CARPATHO-UKRAINE

Since the Treaty of Versailles had failed to recognize Ukraine’s right to self-determination, Ukrainian political parties in western Ukraine, from monarchist to socialist, with the nationalists in the forefront, called for it to be revised.

On 11 October 1938 the Prague government established the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, formerly known as Subcarpathian Rus’ (Pidkarpatska Rus’), finally implementing the autonomy promised by the Treaty of Versailles. On 26, 1938 October Prague named Monsignor Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn premier of Carpatho-Ukraine. Ukrainians, particularly those in the West, looked upon this development as a preliminary step to independence. Many called this “the sun rising from the west.” A Czechoslovak constitutional law of November 1938 stipulated that the region would have a separate autonomous government with its own elected legislature, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet, and its seat in the city of Khust. The new government established a military force, the Carpathian Sich, to defend itself from incursions by the Hungarians from the south and their Polish allies from the north. The elections to the first parliament took place on 12 February 1939.

On 14 March 1939 Hitler agreed to the Hungarian occupation of the region. The following day, as Hitler’s troops were marching into Prague, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet declared independence, adopted a constitution, and elected Avhustyn Voloshyn president of the new state.

While Nazi Germany allowed Slovakia to gain independence from Prague, thus making it its satellite, it also permitted Hungary to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine. In this way Hitler sought to secure Hungarian support for his dealings with Czechoslovakia and to reassure Stalin that Germany was not going to support any Ukrainian move toward independence.

The 40,000-strong Hungarian army, accompanied by German military advisors, quickly invaded the fledgling republic and overwhelmed its small, ill-equipped army. More than 5,000 Carpatho-Ukrainians, along with several hundred Galician Ukrainians who had come to help,

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22 Rus’ is the name of the medieval Ukrainian state.

23 Sich: The historical name for a Ukrainian military formation dating back to Cossack Ukraine (XVI-XVIII centuries).
died in the ensuing fighting. Carpatho-Ukraine thus became the first nation to resist Hitler’s plans to rearrange the map of Eastern Europe by force of arms, becoming, albeit indirectly, the first victim of German military aggression. For Ukrainians, the Second World War in fact began on 15 March 1939. This was the first skirmish in the war that was soon to follow, bringing with it the partition of the Polish state and leading to the Second World War with all its horrors.

![Map of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic, 1939.](image)

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25 A plaque erected in the city of Khust in 2001 honors the memory of Avhustyn Voloshyn, the president of Carpatho-Ukraine and the head of the “first state in Europe that resisted with arms the aggression of the fascist occupiers.”
On 23 August 1939 Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, through their foreign ministers Joachim von Ribbentrop and Viacheslav Molotov, signed the Non-Aggression Pact between the German Reich and the USSR. It guaranteed Hitler that an invasion of Poland would not result in a war against the USSR and, in a secret protocol, assured Stalin that the Soviet army was free to occupy the eastern part of the post-Versailles Polish state, where over five million Ukrainians lived. Two additional secret protocols divided Europe into spheres of influence, with the dividing line running through Poland along the Narew, Vistula, and Sian rivers, and ceding the Baltic countries and Bessarabia to Soviet control. Nazi Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, which marked the start of the Second World War, joined by the Soviet Union on 17 September 1939.

This event was cemented by the Treaty of Friendship and Borders between the USSR and Germany signed on 28 September 1939. In it the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany recognized the legitimacy of each other’s claims to the territories of the Polish state they had just overrun and their division of Eastern Europe into respective spheres of influence. The USSR also agreed to provide Germany with essential war supplies, and it did so until the day Germany invaded the USSR in June 1941. Earlier, England and France had tried to sign their own pact with the Soviets, fearing a Soviet pact with Germany. Stalin, however, got a better deal from Hitler. Soviet newspapers now praised the Germans for their military successes in Greece and were critical of England and France. Furthermore, Germany and the Soviet Union declared that they would seek to end the war with Britain and France through a treaty, but “if the attempts of both governments are unsuccessful, then the fact will be established that Britain and France carry responsibility for the continuation of the war, and, in the event of the continuation of the war, the governments of Germany and the USSR will consult one another on essential matters.”


Nazi and Soviet troops meet in the city of Brest-Litovsk (today: Belarus) on 22 September 1939 for a joint victory parade after the defeat and partition of the Polish state.
After its invasion of Poland the German Wehrmacht, using *Blitzkrieg* (lightning war) tactics, destroyed the outmatched Polish forces in a matter of weeks. Then it pulled back from the western Ukrainian territory of Galicia, and the Red Army marched in. Lviv was occupied between 17 and 22 September, and in October western Ukraine was officially incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Soviet Union also put pressure on Romania to cede the Ukrainian ethnic territories of Bessarabia and Bukovyna. The Kholm and Lemko Ukrainian ethnographic regions remained under German rule.

In western Ukraine official propaganda presented the Soviets as national liberators, and Ukrainians were not sorry to see the end of Polish rule. At first, the Soviets gave the appearance of trying to help Ukrainians to establish their national identity. Soon, however, as was later to be the case with the Germans, the regime showed its true face by arresting Ukrainian political leaders and deporting them to the east. Pre-war social, cultural, and commercial organizations were forced to disband, and cooperatives, a source of economic strength for Ukrainians living under Polish rule, were eliminated. Ukrainian cultural community centers and village libraries were forced to cease operations.

In the spring of 1940 mass deportations began. Without warning, without formal accusation or trial, tens of thousands of people labeled “enemies of the people” were arrested by the Soviets, packed into cattle cars, and shipped to Siberia and Kazakhstan as slave laborers. Many of them disappeared without a trace. The deportees included Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews; among them were landowners, industrialists, merchants, lawyers, priests, and ordinary people. That same year, in Katyn Forest (near the Russian city of Smolensk), as well as in the vicinity of the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, over 20,000 officers of the Polish army and other Polish nationals, among them ethnic Ukrainians, were executed by the Soviets.

By 1941 the deportations became indiscriminate; anyone could be labeled a “nationalist,” with or without reason, and deported. More than one million people were deported, most of them to labor camps in Siberia. It is also estimated that by June 1941 over 40,000 people had been

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imprisoned, many of whom were later executed. In some places, for example, in Demianiv Laz, villagers, old and young, including the village priest, were taken into the forest, forced to dig a mass grave, and then shot. When the Germans attacked in June 1941, last-minute massacres took place in many cities. In Lviv thousands were arrested and killed in prison. Many were tortured first; some priests were crucified on the prison walls. Mass executions also took place in Drohobykh, Sambir, Lutsk, Ternopil, and other cities and towns. During the “Red Terror” that lasted from September 1939 to June 1941, 15,000 western Ukrainians were executed, as NKVD files attest. In June–July 1941, as the Red Army retreated from western Ukraine, another 22,000 were murdered.

In the part of the pre-war Polish state that remained occupied by the Germans, the Lemko and Kholm regions were home to more than half a million indigenous Ukrainians. After the Soviet takeover of Galicia, the Lemko and Kholm regions gained an additional 20,000 to 30,000 refugees who had left western Ukraine to escape Soviet persecution.

Poland was designated by the Germans as a General-Gouvernement, and Hitler expressly ordered Hans Frank, the Governor-General, to treat the area as a German colony, granting its inhabitants

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30 NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), the Soviet secret police from the mid-1930s to the end of World War II. The NKVD was the successor of the CheKa (Extraordinary Commission), the secret police of the civil war era in the USSR, while the OGPU (Unified State Political Administration) was the secret police of the 1920s and early 1930s. The NKVD was the primary organ of repression against the Soviet population during the Great Purges and World War II. In the postwar era the NKVD was replaced by the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and the Committee for State Security (KGB).


32 Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, s.v. “Ukraine during World War II.”

33 Hans Frank, b. 1900, d. 1946, Nuremberg. From 1939 to 1945 Frank served as Governor-General of German-occupied Poland. He was tried at Nuremberg where, despite admitting his guilt and request for leniency, he was hanged.
only the minimum of rights. Among the Ukrainian inhabitants of the General-Gouvernement a number of committees sprang up to look after the basic economic and social needs of Ukrainians in the region and to act as mediators between the people and the German authorities in order to soften, if possible, the harshness of the occupation. In the spring of 1940, with Frank’s consent, these committees formed a coordinating body in Cracow, Poland, known as the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC), headed by the well-known scholar, Professor Volodymyr Kubijovyč. Created in order to protect the interests of the Ukrainian people under German occupation, the UCC organized a social welfare agency whose mandate was to minister to the sick, the elderly, and homeless children, oversee public health and education, help prisoners of war, and represent the interests of Ukrainians sent to work in Germany. The Germans made it very clear that the UCC was not to have any political prerogatives whatsoever. The UCC organized Ukrainian schools, cooperatives, and youth groups in almost all localities where there were sufficient numbers of Ukrainians. It established a publishing house in Cracow and expanded the Ukrainian press throughout the region. After the German invasion of the USSR and the incorporation of the western Ukrainian lands into the General-Gouvernement, the UCC extended its activities into Galicia. Throughout the war it was the only civilian Ukrainian organization permitted to champion, albeit to a very limited extent, the socioeconomic interests of Ukrainians in the General-Gouvernement.

The occupation, from September 1939 and June 1941 by the two totalitarian powers, of what had previously comprised the Polish state clearly revealed the deceitful and manipulative methods used by both the Nazis and the Soviets in relation to other nations and to each other. Both displayed arrogance, racism, and cynical disregard for the national and human rights of other peoples. As Norman Davies states, real horrors had been perpetrated on the Ukrainians by the Soviets in the early 1930s, when “Hitler was still largely an unknown quantity.” 34 Paul Johnson has pointed out that Stalin and Hitler had a deep respect for each other, and

34 Interview with Norman Davies for the film Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in World War II, the Untold Story, stored in the archives of the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre in Toronto.
they also learned from each other. In many ways they matched each other move for move even as each prepared for all-out war with the other. In regard to the extermination of entire civilian populations, Hitler was already aware of the famine-genocide that had devastated Soviet Ukraine, and this calamity was used in Nazi propaganda against the USSR in the period before the Treaty of Friendship and Borders was signed.

Hans Frank, who embodied the ruthlessness underlying Germany’s wartime plans, was perfectly suited to represent and execute Nazi policies. Soon after assuming the leadership of the General-Gouvernement he declared, in the spirit of Mein Kampf, that the Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland would be the slaves of the Third Reich. He proceeded to destroy the Polish intelligentsia and educated classes, listing some 3,500 individuals as being particularly dangerous. This was followed by the removal of some 1.2 million Poles and 300,000 Jews from Germany’s “eastern regions” to the General-Gouvernement.

The wholesale persecution of Jews began, and concentration camps for those dangerous to the occupying power were created. The extermination camp at Auschwitz was established in 1940, as were other camps. Techniques for the application of terror to keep the subjugated population cowed and obedient were developed and used again when the German drive eastward began in 1941.  

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Mass graves of Ukrainians executed by the NKVD in the city of Vinnytsia, Vinnytsia region, Ukraine.

Exhumed remains from a mass grave of Ukrainian women and children executed in 1940–41 by the NKVD in Demianiv Laz, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine.
At 3:00 a.m. on 22 June 1941, without a declaration of war, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against the USSR. Another Drang nach Osten ("thrust toward the East"), a war of annihilation, had begun. The Blitzkrieg involved new concepts of warfare that called for rapid movement by mechanized and armored units supported by airpower. The racist ideas of Hitler, Himmler, and Goering called for the German "master race" to enslave and destroy the Untermenschen, sub-humans, including Jews and Ukrainians. Ukrainians were also a particular target because some 40 million of them, occupying the black earth of Ukraine, were an obstacle to Hitler’s plans, according to which their lands were to provide Lebensraum for the growth of the German nation.

On that June night 3.5 million German troops attacked Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, situated on the western borders of the USSR. On the first day the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv, Odesa (Rus. Odessa), and Lviv were bombed. Stalin was taken by surprise, even though he had been warned of the impending attack weeks before.\(^{37}\) As the powerful German forces swept eastward, they captured huge swaths of Ukrainian territory. There was little resistance. In some villages and cities German units were met with flowers or the traditional Ukrainian welcome of bread and salt. German soldiers were pleasantly surprised that they were being welcomed as liberators of Ukraine from communist Russia.

The reasons for Ukrainians’ disenchantment with the USSR were self-evident. Memories of the short-lived independence of 1917–20 still persisted. In collectivizing agriculture, the Soviets confiscated the lands and livestock of the peasants, who constituted a sizeable proportion of the Ukrainian population. (The Germans found it convenient to continue the Soviet collective farm system in the form of “cooperative farms.”) In 1932–33 the deliberately engineered famine was used to break the resist-

\(^{37}\) Soviet military doctrine on the eve of the German invasion stated that war would be fought “on foreign soil with little blood,” and Stalin was preparing the USSR for an offensive, not defensive, war. For the arguments that Stalin was planning to attack Germany but was preempted by Germany’s invasion of the USSR, see Viktor Suvorov, Icebreaker (New York: Hamish Hamilton, 1990); idem, Suicide (Moscow: ACT, 2000); idem, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008).
tance of the Ukrainian peasants, millions of whom perished. Beginning in 1928 and later in the 1930s, particularly in 1936–38, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were arrested, imprisoned, and sent to forced labor camps; and many were executed. Ukrainian writers, poets, playwrights, artists, scientists, teachers, librarians, and musicians whose Soviet patriotism was suspect were repressed and executed. In scholarly literature this elimination of the intelligentsia came to be known as the “Executed Renaissance” of Ukrainian culture. Both the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church were banned in Soviet Ukraine, and only the Russian Orthodox Church was allowed to function. Nationally-conscious cadres of the CP(B)U were purged. During the war, when the Germans invited an international commission to Vinnytsia to witness the opening of 66 graves, they found 12,000 bodies of Ukrainians shot by the NKVD in 1937–38.38 Bykivnia, a wooded area northeast of Kyiv, was also the site of up to 225,000 murders committed by the NKVD between 1936 and 1941.39 The terror turned many Ukrainians against the communist regime and so they welcomed the German army, which they thought represented a force of liberation.

Proof of popular disenchantment with the Soviet system is the fact that the largest army in the history of the world to surrender did so during the 1941 Battle of Kyiv, when 665,000 fully-equipped soldiers, out of a Red Army corps of 677,085 (all ranks), surrendered to the Germans.40 Many of these soldiers hoped that now they would be allowed to turn their weapons against the Soviet regime. Unfortunately for these men who had surrendered so willingly, the Nazi Germans’ racist plans called


40 “Kyiv itself fell on September 19, [1941]...and on the twenty-sixth the Battle of Kyiv ended with the encirclement and surrender of 665,000 Soviet soldiers. To Hitler it was ‘the greatest battle in the history of the world.’” Cited in William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 858–59.
for their destruction. They were thus starved to death or died of exposure in open-air concentration stockades in the winter of 1941–42. The starvation was intentional, for Germany had sufficient food stockpiles at the time and shortages were not a problem. Of the 6.2 million Soviet prisoners who fell into German hands, over 4 million perished in German captivity. About 1.8 million of them were Ukrainians.41

Within weeks of the invasion it became clear to the Ukrainian people that the Germans had come not as their liberators but as conquerors bent on oppressing and exploiting them.

Soviet prisoners of war in a Nazi open-air concentration stockade in Ukraine, 1941.

On 13 May 1941 the General Headquarters of the Führer (Hitler) issued the following guidelines to be followed by the German Wehrmacht (Army) in the conquered territories:

I: Crimes committed by hostile civilians:

[…]

2. *Guerilla groups* are to be liquidated pitilessly by the troops during combat or during their escape.

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3. All other attacks of hostile civilians against the Wehrmacht, its members or its escort are to be put down immediately by the troops with all means going so far as elimination of the attacker.

4. Against localities, from which the Wehrmacht is attacked by ambush or treachery... when circumstances do not allow quick identification of the perpetrators, forceful collective measures are to be taken....

II. Crimes committed by members of the Wehrmacht or its escort against the inhabitants:

1. The actions, committed by members of the Wehrmacht or its escort against hostile civilians are not to be subjected to any legal proceedings, even when the act in question is a crime or a military crime...\textsuperscript{42}

[...]

\textsuperscript{42}Kosyk, \textit{The Third Reich and Ukraine}, p. 498.
On 3 July 1941 Stalin spoke to the citizens of the USSR on the radio, breaking his silence for the first time since the outbreak of the war. In his address he condemned the perfidious actions of “such friends as Hitler and Ribbentrop.” At the same time he announced a scorched earth policy for the Soviet Union:

In case of a forced retreat ... all rolling stock must be evacuated, the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. The collective farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safe keeping of the state authorities for transportation to the rear. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel that cannot be withdrawn must be destroyed without fail. In areas occupied by the enemy, guerrilla units ... must set fire to forests, stores, and transport.43

Six million head of cattle were ordered to be shipped east from Ukraine to Russia. Also slated for evacuation were the contents of 550 large factories (including the Kharkiv Tractor Factory, which designed and built the famous T-34 tank), thousands of small factories, and 30,212 tractors. Three and a half million skilled workers from Ukraine were sent to the eastern regions of the Soviet Union. The Soviet retreat from Ukraine in 1941 left a trail of destruction of human lives and materiel. The Dniprohes Dam on the Dnipro River, the largest hydroelectric dam in Europe, was destroyed without any warning either to the military or civilians, trapping and killing all involved.44 Countless mine pits and major industrial plants were rendered useless. Khreshchatyk, the main street of Kyiv, was blown up as thousands of explosive charges laid throughout the city were detonated. Even the monument to Ukraine’s national poet, Taras Shevchenko, was mined. Luckily, the two soldiers put in charge of blowing up the monument, as well as the Museum of Western Art and Shevchenko University adjacent to the monument, decided at the last


moment not to carry out the order, and all three targets were spared. The explosives were not found until March 2001, almost sixty years later.\textsuperscript{45}

On 3 November 1941 the Dormition Cathedral, an important eleventh-century architectural monument situated on the grounds of the Kyivan Cave Monastery (\textit{Pecherska Lavra}), was destroyed. For years Soviet propaganda excoriated the Germans for this atrocity. It has now been established that the cathedral was mined by Soviet sappers before the retreat and intended for later demolition.

Moscow also ordered the government of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the personnel of major universities and institutes, scientists and scholars, skilled technicians, bureaucrats, and most of the NKVD secret police and commissars to be evacuated. The republican government and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences were relocated to Ufa, capital of the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

During the war there was no national government on the territory of Ukraine, which was simply an occupied territory of the Third Reich. Thus Ukraine was not a German collaborator like Italy, Vichy France, Slovakia, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Norway. In fact, parts of Ukraine were also occupied by Romanian, Hungarian and Italian forces.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{devastation.jpg}
\caption{Devastation wrought by the Soviets’ scorched earth policy in Ukraine.}
\end{figure}

RESTORATION OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD AND ATTEMPT AT SELF-RULE

In the spring of 1941, before the beginning of Nazi Germany’s “thrust toward the East,” the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (20,000 strong at the time), now split into two factions, the OUN-M and OUN-B, sent two separate memoranda to the German government. Both stated that the aim of their respective organizations was to establish a sovereign Ukrainian state on the Ukrainian territories now occupied by the Soviet Union. Should the German army liberate these territories from Soviet occupation, normal relations would ensue if Germany agreed to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The OUN-B memorandum demanded that the interests of the Ukrainian people be respected. Economically and strategically Ukraine was part of Europe, and thus stability and the harmonious development of Eastern Europe could be ensured only by an independent and strong Ukrainian state. The authors of the memorandum also stated that if German troops were met in Ukraine as liberators from Soviet occupation,

...this attitude may quickly change if Germany enters Ukraine without the intention of re-establishing the Ukrainian state…. The military occupation of Eastern Europe cannot last. Only a new state, built on the national principle, can ensure healthy development. Only an independent Ukrainian state can ensure this new order.  

In the wake of the advancing German armies, in 1941 both the OUN-B and OUN-M dispatched thousands of its members, organized in special task groups, to rally the Ukrainian people throughout the country for the cause of Ukraine’s independence. By the time the German occupation of Ukraine ended in 1944, close to 10,000 of these young OUN members, both men and women, had perished at the hands of the Nazis.

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47 Khochu zhyty (I Want to Live), special edition of the Ukrainian newspaper Homin Ukrainy (Toronto), 26 October 2010, pp. 2, 41.
Moreover, in February 1941 German military circles allowed the formation, under the direction of the OUN-B, of two battalions of 700 men code-named Nachtigall and Roland. These units, also known as the Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists, were created without the knowledge of the Nazi leadership and pledged allegiance only to Ukraine. They hoped to participate in the liberation of their homeland from Soviet rule and to form the nucleus of a future Ukrainian army.

During the German invasion of the USSR Nachtigall reached Lviv on 30 June 1941, the very day that a proclamation was issued restoring Ukrainian statehood. Roland reached Ukraine via Romania and Moldova on 15 July 1941. After Ukrainian commanders officially protested against the Germans’ anti-Ukrainian policies, both battalions were pulled out of the combat zone as early as August 1941, and later disarmed and its members interned. In October 1941 these units were merged into the 201st Schutzmannschaft Battalion (Guard Battalion), and its soldiers were given the choice of either signing a one year “contract” to serve or be sent as forced laborers to Germany. In November 1942, when the soldiers refused to “renew” their “contract,” the battalion was disbanded permanently and its Ukrainian officers were imprisoned by the Nazis.48

In the weeks leading up to the start of the German-Soviet war, the Ukrainian National Committee, representing various Ukrainian political factions, was formed in Cracow. In its Declaration of 14 June 1941 it called for Ukraine’s independence. On 30 June, following the Soviet withdrawal, the OUN-B convened an assembly of representatives of the Ukrainian community in Lviv, which issued the Proclamation of 30 June 1941, declaring the restoration of the Ukrainian state. Yaroslav Stetsko was appointed prime minister of the Ukrainian government.

The Germans were taken by surprise. Although they were well aware that the Ukrainians’ goal was independence, they had not anticipated a fait accompli. The groundwork for the proclamation was laid during the first weeks of the war by an eastbound wave of armed uprisings launched by OUN insurgent units, which wrested effective control from the retreating Soviets over as many as 214 counties in the western part of Ukraine. As a result, the proclamation in Lviv was supported by public meetings held in thousands of towns and cities, and it forced Germany’s

hand at the very start of the war to show its real intentions toward Ukrainian aspirations for independence. Meanwhile, at the Lviv assembly uninvited German “representatives” informed those present that independence had been proclaimed without Germany’s permission and that the Reich was not a “partner” of the Ukrainians but their conqueror. They demanded that Bandera, the head of the OUN-B, and Stetsko rescind the proclamation. The Ukrainians refused.49

Arrests of Ukrainian leaders followed. Bandera was arrested in Cracow and Stetsko in Lviv. They spent most of the war in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In September 1941 the Germans began systematically executing Ukrainian nationalists. A German document presented at the Nuremberg Trials50 referred to an order issued to the Einsatzkommando51 on 25 November 1941, which stated:

The Bandera organization is preparing an uprising in Reichkommissariat Ukraine with the aim of establishing an independent Ukrainian state. All members of Bandera’s organization must be arrested and, after rigorous interrogation, are to be secretly executed on the pretext of being looters.52

Bandera’s two brothers, Vasyl and Oleksa, and other Ukrainian leaders, were sent to Auschwitz. Both were murdered there in July


50 The most important of the Nuremberg Trials was the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, which took place in Nuremberg, Germany, from 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946. Twenty-four high-ranking Nazi German officials were charged with war crimes and executed.

51 The Einsatzkommando was formed by Reinhard Heydrich in 1938. It was later transformed into Einsatzgruppen, death squads that were responsible for the murders of more than a million people. The Einsatzgruppen were under the command of the SS, headed by Heinrich Himmler, and only ethnic Germans were allowed to join.

52 Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945–1 October 1946, vol. XXXIX, pp. 268–69. Ironically, this document (USSR-014) was presented at the Nuremberg Trials by Soviet prosecutors as proof that the Germans were persecuting the Ukrainian liberation movement.
Moreover, the OUN-B had an extensive underground network operating on the territory of the Third Reich proper. Its operatives rendered valuable assistance to the liberation struggle in Ukraine by providing important intelligence, forged documents, underground communication routes, and even helped to free important members of the resistance captured by the Nazis. In 1942 the network suffered heavy losses when as many as 210 of its members were exposed and arrested, among them one of its leaders, Wasył Bezchlibnyk. He survived the Nazi concentration camps and after the war immigrated to Canada. For details, see Ko- syk, *The Third Reich and Ukraine*, p. 267.

Other prominent Ukrainians, including members of the Ukrainian National Committee, were arrested.

Another attempt at establishing self-rule came from the OUN-M. When the Germans occupied Kyiv, members of the OUN-M assumed responsibility for the city’s administration, including public order. In November 1941 they established the Ukrainian National Council to represent the Ukrainian population in its relations with the German occupation forces and to further its economic, spiritual, and cultural welfare. The Council was headed by Mykola Velychkovsky. In January 1942, following a letter sent to Hitler by the OUN-M, the Council sent a letter to the German Chancery claiming the right of the Ukrainian people to an independent existence and the right to its own national, cultural, economic, and political development. The letter was signed by a number of distinguished Ukrainian leaders, including the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky; Andrii Livytsky, the president of the Ukrainian National Republic in Exile; Mykhailo Omelianovsky-Pavlenko, the head of the Alliance of Ukrainian Veterans’ Organizations and the former Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Galician Army that fought in the Ukrainian War of Liberation in 1917–21; Andrii Melnyk, leader of the OUN-M; and others.

These letters produced no response from the Germans. Instead, in the spring of 1942 they dissolved the Ukrainian National Council, arrested the mayor of Kyiv, who had been appointed by the Council, along with members of the OUN-M. In Babyn Yar (Babi Yar) a number of prominent OUN-M members were executed, among them Ivan Rohach,

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the editor of a Ukrainian newspaper in Kyiv and former secretary to the president of Carpatho-Ukraine, and the poet Olena Teliha, who headed the Ukrainian Writers’ Union.\textsuperscript{54}

On 5 December 1941 the following German government policy document on Ukrainian national aspirations was circulated in Berlin:

One of the department representatives (the representative of the Reichsführer of the SS), reported that, according to present instructions, the Ukrainian attempts to achieve independence are to be stopped and the Ukrainians are to be treated in the same manner as the Poles and Russians. There are no so-called loyal Ukrainians. All Ukrainians want an independent state on their national territory. It makes no difference whether they come from Eastern or Western Ukraine, or from Hungary (Carpathian Ukraine) or from Bukovyna [at the time a Ukrainian province under Romanian rule]. The so-called loyal Ukrainians are those who are cunning enough to conceal these aspirations.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54} Kosyk, \textit{The Third Reich and Ukraine}, pp. 206–8; document no.120 (pp. 561–63); \textit{Khochu zhyty}, no. 40, 26 October 2010, pp. 41–43.

\textsuperscript{55} See document no. 61 in Kosyk, \textit{The Third Reich and the Ukrainian Question}, p. 88.
Ukrainian residents of Lviv awaiting the announcement of the Proclamation of Independence on 30 June 1941.

A mass rally in Lviv marking the 50th anniversary of the event in 1991.
Germany had very specific plans for Ukraine. Many Ukrainians were unaware that in the Nazi ideology Ukrainians were classed as Untermenschen and that their lands, known as the “breadbasket of Europe,” were to provide the Lebensraum (“living space”) that Hitler needed for future German population growth.

In fact, Nazi Germany had in mind a war to annihilate the Ukrainians because they occupied a land with one of the most fertile soils in the world. Hitler planned that within one year after the end of the war the bulk of Ukraine’s population would either have “disappeared” or permitted to survive only as the slaves of German colonists. He was preparing Ukraine for “final normalization” when he issued a triple directive: Seize it, rule it, exploit it. As he wrote in Mein Kampf:

> If a German ruler conquers Slav land and dispossesses its Slavs in order to settle Germans on it, he is not doing a merely patriotic, but a highly moral act, since it is in the interest of humanity as a whole that the habitat…of the higher race…be extended.\(^{56}\)

At a meeting with his top lieutenants on 16 July 1941 Hitler faithfully instructed:

> Never allow anyone other than a German to carry weapons! This is particularly important. Even if it initially appears easier to mobilize the military assistance of the subjugated foreign peoples—this is a mistake! One day this would turn completely and unavoidably against us. Only Germans are permitted to carry weapons, not the Slavs or the Czechs or the Cossacks or the Ukrainians!\(^{57}\)

On 16 December 1942 he ordered the German army to use the “most brutal means” against all partisans in Ukraine, “even against women and children.” German policemen in Ukraine were to be allowed to use tanks and, in the case of rioting, air bombardment was to be per-

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\(^{57}\) See document no. 29 in Kosyk, *The Third Reich and the Ukrainian Question* pp. 58–60.
mitted. Hitler advised that “the best way [to pacify the population] is to execute by shooting anybody who looks askance”\(^{58}\) at German actions.

Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel gave an order to the German army in the east: “For the killing of a single German soldier we should retaliate by the execution of 50–100 persons.”\(^{59}\) The death penalty was also applied to Ukrainian hostages: up to 100 Ukrainians were executed for every German attacked by partisans.

On 2 November 1941 Major-General Friedrich-Georg Eberhardt, the German Commandant of Kyiv, issued the following announcement: “Cases of arson and sabotage are becoming more frequent in Kyiv and oblige me to take firm action. For this reason, 300 Kyiv citizens were shot today.” On 29 November Eberhardt again announced: “400 men have been executed in the city. This should serve as a warning to the population.”\(^{60}\) More executions followed.

By the end of the German occupation of Kyiv over 150,000 people had been executed in Kyiv’s Babyn Yar alone.\(^{61}\) This number included Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, partisans, Ukrainian nationalists, Roma, and anyone the Germans regarded as a threat to their authority. On the 50\(^{th}\) and 60\(^{th}\) anniversaries of these killings (1991 and 2001, respectively) the victims of Babyn Yar were commemorated by the government of Ukraine, which has also built monuments to these victims.

The Germans applied the death penalty to any Ukrainian who gave assistance to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Even owning a pigeon car-


\(^{61}\) *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, s.v. “Babyn Yar.”
ried the death penalty. Anyone who did not report or abetted the escape of a Jew was subject to execution. Many Ukrainians were executed for this “crime.” Death was the penalty for listening to a Soviet radio program or reading anti-German leaflets. For example, on 11 March 1942 Walter Blume, the chief of police and the SS in Vinnytsia, issued a warning to its inhabitants:

1. Anyone who disseminates Russian-Soviet pamphlets or leaflets will be sentenced to death.

2. Anyone who learns about the delivery of agitation-propaganda materials and does not quickly report that to the German authorities will be sentenced to death.

3. Anyone who knows about illegal printing presses and does not report them to the German authorities will be sentenced to death.

An inviolable principle of Nazi rule in Ukraine was that Germans should staff all important administrative and economic positions down to the county level. Ukrainians were allowed to hold only the lowest administrative positions, such as village elders, mayors of small towns, and auxiliary policemen.

Hitler personally appointed Erich Koch to rule Reichskommissariat Ukraine, where Koch, as a member of the German “master race,” launched a reign of terror. He maintained: “We are a master race…which must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here”; the Ukrainian people were “inferior” to the Germans; Ukrainians were “half-monkeys” and “must be handled with the whip like the Negroes”; and “no German soldiers would die for these niggers [Ukrainians].”

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62 People who owned pigeons were suspected of communicating with the partisans.

63 This document (Oholoshennia: Perestoroha do ukrains'koho mista Vinnytsi ta okolys') is shown in the film Between Hitler and Stalin. It is held in the archive of the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre.
called himself “a brutal dog” and declared that “If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the same table with me, I must have him shot.”

Koch’s brutality toward the Ukrainians was approved by Hitler, Goering, Bormann, Sauckel, and Himmler. However, Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and Joseph Goebbels, Reich Minister of Propaganda, did not approve of his methods. Although Rosenberg was Koch’s superior, he was too weak to exert control. Rosenberg’s “pro-Ukrainian” plans were shelved early in the war. Although Koch was responsible for millions of deaths in Ukraine, after the war the Soviet government did not insist that his death sentence be carried out, and instead allowed him to spend the rest of his life in a Polish prison in relatively comfortable surroundings.

Hitler saw little need for education in Ukraine. His idea was that “Instead of using the Cyrillic letters, the Ukrainians were to learn the Roman alphabet and just enough German language to understand orders.”

I expect the General Commissars to close all schools and colleges with students over 15 years of age and to send all teachers and students, irre-

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65 After fleeing west from the advancing Red Army in 1944, Koch was captured in Hamburg in 1949. He was extradited to Poland and in 1959 was sentenced to death for crimes committed against Poles. He was never tried for crimes committed against Ukrainians. His death sentence was never carried out, and it is believed that in exchange for his life he gave information to the Soviets, particularly about the whereabouts of art works looted by the Nazis during the war. He died in prison of natural causes in 1986. For a detailed description of Koch’s wartime activities, see Gerald Reitlinger, “The Last of the War Criminals,” Commentary 27, no. 1 (January 1959), and Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).

spective of sex, in a body to Germany for work... I require that no school except four-grade elementary schools should function. 67

In January 1942 all schools above grade four and all universities were closed, and SS leader Heinrich Himmler recommended that “the entire Ukrainian intelligentsia must be decimated.” 68

From the very beginning of their march eastward the Germans shipped food and natural resources from Ukraine to Germany. During the German occupation, 7.6 million head of cattle, 3.3 million horses, 9.4 million pigs, 7.3 million goats, 60 million fowl, 1 million fruit trees, and millions of tons of grain and farm produce were taken from Ukraine. 69

A Nazi official surveying land in Ukraine for the future German Lebensraum (“living space”).

Ruthlessness and destruction were the Nazis’ basic means of relating to people, punishing them for insubordination or terrorizing them to gain absolute control. One of the first examples of the Germans’ brutality was the fate that befell the village of Kortelisy, in the Volyn region. On 23 September 1942 it was burned to the ground and all 2,892 inhabitants—men, women, and children—were killed. But the largest-ever German punitive action in Europe was the total annihilation of the Ukrainian town of Kuriukivka (Chernihiv region), where the entire civilian population of 7,000 people was massacred between 1 and 9 March 1943. Approximately 459 villages in Ukraine were completely destroyed during the occupation before the Germans retreated: 97 in the Volyn region, 32 in the Zhytomyr region, 21 in the Chernihiv region, and 17 in

69 UNIAN, Ukrainian Independent News and Information Agency (Kyiv), 22 June 1999.
the Kyiv area. Of that number, there were at least 27 villages in which every inhabitant, regardless of age, was slain. If the destruction wreaked during the Germans’ retreat following their defeat at Stalingrad is added to the above figures, the number of villages in Ukraine completely or partially destroyed stands at approximately 28,000.70

As soon as German troops occupied a major city, they were followed by teams of specialists who inspected museums, art galleries, exhibition halls, and cultural and art institutions in order to evaluate their holdings and confiscate everything of value. The entire library of the Medical Research Institute in Kyiv was seized, and its equipment, research notes, and documentation were shipped to Germany.

Everything of value in the library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was looted, including unique Persian, Abyssinian, and Chinese manuscripts, the originals of Ukrainian and Russian historical chronicles, incunabula by the first printer in Ukraine Ivan Fedorovych, and rare editions of works by such writers as Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, and Adam Mickiewicz. The collections of the Kyiv-based museums of Ukrainian, Russian, Western, and Oriental art and the Taras Shevchenko Museum were sent to Berlin. From the Korolenko Library in Kharkiv the teams picked out a few thousand priceless volumes and destroyed the rest. Hundreds of paintings were removed from the Kharkiv Art Gallery, including canvases by Ivan Aivazovsky, Ilya Repin, and other renowned artists. Also stolen were sculptures, archives, embroideries, carpets, tapestries, and other items. After the war many of these were captured by the Red Army as trophies and shipped to Moscow. Only now some stolen items are beginning to be returned to Ukraine. 71

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Before World War II there were approximately three million Jews living on ethnographic Ukrainian territories: in the Ukrainian SSR and parts of Ukraine under Polish and Romanian rule. They constituted 20 percent of the total world Jewish population and 60 percent of the Jewish population of the USSR. Demographic data for the Ukrainian SSR in 1926 illustrate the high rates of Jewish urbanization: 26 percent of the total Jewish population lived in rural areas and 74 percent in urban areas.72

After the outbreak of hostilities in 1941 the Soviet government ordered the evacuation of 3.5 million key personnel to the Soviet Russian republic (RSFSR). These included highly-educated individuals, academics, scientists, skilled workers, Communist Party apparatchiks, NKVD personnel, and others. Many were of Jewish origin, and it is estimated that half of Ukraine’s Jewish population was evacuated in this way.73

As the German army swept eastward across Ukraine, over 230 death camps and ghettos were established.74 Marching together with the army were the Einsatzgruppen, special, mobile, operational units consisting of between 500 and 1,000 men, which were created to implement the “Final Solution.” Einsatzgruppe C and D, staffed only by German personnel, were assigned to Ukraine.

Ukraine had been the major region of Jewish settlement in the Russian Empire, and in the nineteenth century it was home to probably the largest Jewish population of any other country. A few days after the Germans captured the Ukrainian cities of Lviv, Lutsk, Zhytomyr, and Berdychiv in the summer of 1941, thousands of Jews were killed. Many of the executions were overseen by SS Standartenführer Paul Blobel, an officer of Einsatzgruppe C. By the end of the occupation some 1.5 mil-

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72 Encyclopedia of Ukraine, s.v. “Jews.”
73 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 61.
74 Nazarenko, Українська РСР у Великій Вітчизній Війні, 3: 148.
lion Jews had perished in Ukraine within the now-enlarged 1941 borders.75

In addition to their primary task, the Einsatzgruppen also murdered Ukrainians, particularly members of the Ukrainian resistance, including those belonging to the OUN. It was Blobel who was in command at Babyn Yar in Kyiv when 33,771 Jews were slaughtered by the Nazis in September 1941.76 The estimated total number of victims, mainly citizens of Ukraine, murdered at Babyn Yar was over 150,000. Blobel was tried at Nuremberg after the war and executed.

Ukrainian collaboration with the Germans, where it existed, usually took some form of participation in local administration or in the German-organized auxiliary police. A number of Ukrainians, especially prisoners of war from the Soviet army, were coerced into serving as guards in concentration camps. The record shows that, apart from the involvement of individuals and some of those auxiliary units, the Ukrainian population at large did not take part in any genocidal actions. Most of those who were guilty did not survive the war or were apprehended after the war and executed.

The Ukrainian people in general decried the persecution of the Jews. A German document dated 13 October 1941, referring to the Ukrainian population, stated: “Manifested anti-Semitism from racist and ideological reasons is foreign to the population.”77 The Reich Ministry of Propaganda reported from Galicia: “The methods and means of deporting Jews have not raised the population’s level of respect for the German authorities.”78 The commander of Army Group South wrote: “It is of the utmost importance that the population not see or hear about the liquida-


77 Document no. 53 in Kosyk, Ukraïna v Druhii svitovii viini, 1: 320.

78 Ibid., p. 318.
tion of Jews by the security organs.” There was a death penalty in Ukraine for helping Jews. Nevertheless, many Ukrainians risked their lives to help Jews. Many priests’ families hid their Jewish friends. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, was an outstanding example. In 1942 he sent a letter to Himmler protesting the Nazis’ treatment of the Jews. In the same year he issued a strongly-worded pastoral letter to all the faithful denouncing the killings of Jews. He also issued a directive to all monasteries and convents to hide Jews from the Nazis. In his own residence he gave refuge to a number of Jews, and in his church sermons he decried the slaughter. David Kahane, the future Chief Rabbi of the Israeli Air Force, was a prisoner in the Lviv ghetto. He and his daughter were saved by Metropolitan Sheptytsky:

Sheptytsky was known as a friend of the Jews even before the war...When the Germans came, I ended up in a ghetto. Somehow, I was able to escape in the night. I climbed over a wire fence, and keeping out of sight of the guards, I got into the Jesuit Garden and came to the gates of St. George’s. I knocked and was let in. Metropolitan Sheptytsky hid me in his library. For several weeks, I lived behind the bookcases...Then the Metropolitan led me to the Studite monastery. At that time, I didn’t know they saved Jewish children in the convents, among them my two-year-old daughter.


80 Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s pastoral letter to the clergy and faithful, entitled “Ne ubyi” (Do Not Kill), was issued on 21 November 1942. For detailed discussion of Sheptytsky’s activities during the war and his relationship with Ukrainian Jews, see Andrii Krawchuk, Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: The Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1997), esp. chap. 5; Kurt Lewin, “Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish Community in Galicia during the Second World War,” Unitas 12, no. 2 (1960): 133–42; Leo Heiman, “They Saved Jews: Ukrainian Patriots Defied Nazis,” Ukrainian Quarterly 17, no. 4 (1960): 327.

81 An interview with Rabbi David Kahane is featured in the film Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in World War Two, the Untold Story.
Among the many Jewish children saved by Metropolitan Sheptytsky was Adam Rotfeld, the future foreign minister of Poland in Alexander Kwasniewski’s government.\textsuperscript{82}

In 1943 an SS report to Himmler stated that the metropolitan was adamantly opposed to the Nazis’ anti-Jewish policies and that he had come to consider Nazism as an even greater evil than communism.

During the Nazi occupation of Lviv the future Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, General Roman Shukhevych, and his wife Natalia sheltered a Jewish girl, Irene Reichenberg, under the assumed name of Iryna Vasylivna Ryzhko. When Natalia was arrested by the Gestapo in 1943, Shukhevych arranged for Iryna’s sanctuary at a convent of the Basilian order of nuns. Iryna Reichenberg-Ryzhko survived the Holocaust, raised a family, and died in Kyiv in 2007 at the age of 72.\textsuperscript{83} Another leading member of the Ukrainian liberation movement involved in the rescue of Jews during the German occupation was Fedir (Feodor) Vovk, the Nykopil (Dnipropetrovsk region) district leader of the OUN and vice-president of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. Together with Yelizaveta Shkandel he saved Sarah Bask’s extended family, for which he was awarded posthumously in 2002 the title of “Righteous Among the Nations.”\textsuperscript{84} In a secret document entitled “Report on Events in the USSR, no.187” (Berlin, 30 March 1942), the German security services reported: “Today, it has been clearly established that the Bandera movement [OUN-B] provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews.”\textsuperscript{85}

According to the Department of the Righteous Among the Nations in Yad Vashem (Israel), out of thirty-three countries Ukraine has the


\textsuperscript{84} Igor Shchupak, “Ukrainian saviours of Jews during the Holocaust,” (Public lecture, St. Vladimir Institute, Toronto, 20 June 2013). Dr. Igor Shchupak is the director of Tkuma Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies and the Museum of Jewish Memory and Holocaust in Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine).


\textsuperscript{85} Kosyk, \textit{The Third Reich and Ukraine}, p. 565.
fourth highest number of Righteous who saved Jews during the Holocaust.

One of the many plaques honoring Ukrainian Righteous in Yad Vashem in Jerusalem.
Monument to Nazi victims at Babyn Yar in Kyiv.
Memorial to members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists executed at Babyn Yar in Kyiv.
OSTARBEITER SLAVE LABOR

In late 1941 Germany faced a manpower crisis. After it mobilized its massive armed forces, the German war industry experienced a severe labor shortage. Hermann Goering at first thought “the best thing would be to kill all males in Ukraine over fifteen years of age,” but later realized that working them to death would be more useful for the Reich. He decided to bring in workers from Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, for Germany’s war industries. They were called Ostarbeiter, or “Eastern workers.” A recruiting campaign in Ukraine was carried out in January 1942. An announcement placed by the Germans on 11 January 1942 in the Kyiv newspaper *Nove ukrajinske slovo* (The New Ukrainian Word) tempted readers with the following: “On January 28th the first special train with hot meals will leave for Germany from Kyiv, Zdobuniv, and Peremyshl.” The first train was full of volunteers. Another ad published in the newspaper on 3 March 1942, beckoned: “Germany is calling you! Go to beautiful Germany! 100,000 Ukrainians are already working in free Germany. What about you?”

Such recruiting campaigns soon proved ineffective, however, as news of the slave conditions in which Ukrainians in Germany were living and working became known in Ukraine. The number of volunteers fell drastically. In response, forcible “recruitment” became the norm. Police staged massive manhunts, rounding up young Ukrainians on the street, in market squares, or as they emerged from churches or other public places, and shipped them to Germany. Sections of towns or cities were blockaded and all able-bodied men and women seized. Villages were surrounded and all who appeared physically capable were grabbed. Wives were torn from husbands and children from parents, and sent to different parts of Germany. In some cases, villages were burned down and their inhabitants, stripped of their homes and occupations, were carted off. Those destined to work in Germany were identified by the OST (East) patch on their clothing.

Life was harsh in the labor camps: sanitary conditions were nonexistent and disease was rampant, particularly typhus spread by lice, fleas, and bedbugs. Water was often shut off for extended periods. The mortality rate from sickness, overwork, brutality, and Allied bombings was

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high. Often, those who were too sick to work were shipped back home in cattle cars. Many died on the way.

Reichskommissar Erich Koch was ordered to provide 450,000 workers a year from Ukraine. German documents stated that Ukrainian Ostarbeiter would be “worked to death,” and many were. Some indication of the mortality rate is the fact that, although 40,000 Ukrainians a month were being sent to Germany, armaments minister Albert Speer complained that his work force was dwindling.

About 80 percent of Soviet slave laborers came from Ukraine. It is estimated that between 2.4 and 2.8 million Ukrainians were sent to work in Germany. They worked mostly in the armaments industry, including the V-2 rocket factories at Peenemunde and Nordhausen, although some Ostarbeiter were assigned to railroads, mines, and agriculture.

On 3 September 1942 Hitler ordered that half a million Ukrainian women be brought to Germany to free German women from their domestic chores. Hitler justified this by saying that there was a Germanic strain in Ukraine because the Ostrogoths and Visigoths had lived in southern Ukraine 1,800 years ago, and the “chaste peasant virtues of Ukrainian women” appealed to him. In the end, about 15,000 girls were taken to Germany to work as domestics.

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87 Kondufor and Niemiatyi, *History Teaches a Lesson*, p. 139.
88 *Bezsmertia*, p. 552.
89 Ibid., p. 561.
By 1950, 1,850,000 former Ukrainian Ostarbeiter were returned to the USSR only to be subjected to persecution as “unreliable elements.” About 150,000 Ukrainian Ostarbeiter remained in the West. At least 450,000 were unaccounted for and presumed dead.\(^9^1\)

\(^9^1\) Bezmertia, pp. 216–19.
Ukrainian slave laborers in Nazi Germany were identified by the OST (East) patch.
Two types of resistance emerged in response to the repressions targeting the Ukrainian population: passive/non-confrontational and active/armed. In western Ukraine, German rule was somewhat less severe than in the eastern part. There were several reasons for this. Galicia had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1772 to 1918 and was thus seen by the Nazis to be “more civilized” than eastern Ukraine. Hitler believed “that this land…deserved more trust than the rest of Ukraine, historically subjected to the political and cultural influence of Russia.”

In order to protect the Ukrainian population from repression, the Ukrainian Central Committee adopted a policy of avoiding confrontation with the Nazis and concentrated on strengthening the Ukrainian presence in the cities and developing and maintaining the system of elementary, secondary, and vocational education that was permitted in Galicia. Still, during a German operation in February 1943 a number of western Ukrainian villages were wiped out. Volodymyr Kubijovycz, the head of the UCC, protested in a letter to Governor-General Hans Frank that the Germans, having finished executing Jews, were now beginning to execute Ukrainians.

The creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was an armed way of resisting first the German and, in time, the Soviet occupation. It was formed in October 1942 as a result of the merger of several already-active, independent guerrilla groups: the insurgents led by Taras Bulba-Borovets and insurgent groups affiliated with the OUN-B and the OUN-M. Later, the OUN-B absorbed other groups under a single leadership. In the fall of 1943 General Roman Shukhevych (nom de guerre “Taras Chuprynka”) became its commander-in-chief.

The UPA was intended to be a large-scale insurgent force that eventually was to become the nucleus of a regular Ukrainian army which would be needed once the Nazi-Soviet war came to an end. There were two pressing reasons for its creation. First, it was a response to the growing German repressions of the local population, which looked to the

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92 Andrii Bolianovs'kyi, Українські військові формування в збройних силах Німеччини (Lviv: Kanads'kyi instytut ukrain's'kykh studii, 2003), p. 344.
OUN for protection. The second reason was that by late 1942 Soviet partisan units, penetrating northwestern Ukraine from Belarus, had begun their operations. The UPA thus became a “people’s army” that opposed both the “new” and the “old” occupying power.

Benefiting from the extensive underground OUN-B network, the UPA quickly grew into a large, well-organized insurgent army in control of large parts of Volyn, Polissia, and later Galicia. In addition to frontline fighters, its numbers included youths who served as messengers and villagers who delivered food and supplies. Every village had a contact person who billeted soldiers and arranged for supplies. Among the UPA recruits were men and women who had resisted the mass deportations or collectivization, Red Army deserters, and those who had fled to the forests to avoid mobilization, preferring to fight as guerrillas rather than serve as cannon fodder at the front. Compared to other underground movements in Nazi-occupied Europe, the UPA was unique in that it had no foreign support. Its existence, growth, and strength were an indication of the support it was given by the Ukrainian people.

Western historians estimate that by 1944 there were 40,000 fighters in UPA regular combat units. German and Soviet estimates, however, place the total number of UPA personnel close to 200,000. They were organized along regular military lines with a commander-in-chief, and subordinated to the political direction of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR). The UPA’s areas of operation, designated as military districts and named UPA-North, UPA-South, UPA-West, and UPA-East, encompassed one-quarter of Ukraine’s territory. In its ten years of operations (1942–52) hundreds of thousands of men and women passed through its ranks, both its regular forces and support units. Its special operations units even penetrated the Ukrainian-populated region of the Kuban in the northwestern Caucasus, where they organized a terri-

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94 Encyclopedia of Ukraine, s.v. “Ukrainian Insurgent Army.”

95 The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukraine'ska holovna vyzvol'na rada) was formed in 1944 by members of the OUN-B and the UPA. It had a broad political and social base and provided political leadership to the UPA. The OUN-B served as the main ideological base of the UHVR.
torial fighting force against “Hitlerite-Stalinist terror” called the Kozak Insurgent Army (Kozacha povstans’ka armiia, KOPA).96

The UPA fought against both the Germans and the Soviets. Early UPA activities were aimed at protecting the population from Nazi terror. Throughout 1943 the UPA staged successful ambushes and battles against the Germans and was able to establish its control in the Volynian countryside, leaving only the towns in German hands. One of the UPA’s major military confrontations with the Germans lasted from July to September 1943. The Germans, commanded by SS General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, who in 1944 would command the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, 97 committed a massive amount of manpower and materiel to the effort.

At his disposal General von dem Bach had the following units: 10 battalions of motorized SS troops with heavy weapons and artillery; 10,000 German and Polish police; 2 regiments of the Hungarian Army; 3 battalions of Cossacks, organized from among the Soviet prisoners of war...; 50 tanks, 27 planes, and 5 armored trains. 98

Despite this commitment of resources, the operation was largely a failure for the Germans. The UPA lost 1,237 combatants, dead or wounded, in the fighting, while the Germans suffered more than 3,000 casualties. Bach-Zelewski’s brutal campaign was also responsible for the murder of more than 5,000 civilians. 99

As the German forces retreated in the spring of 1944, the UPA frequently ambushed them for their weapons and supplies. Any unauthorized contact or negotiation with the Germans was strictly prohibited by

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96 Serhii Bahrianyi and Svitlana Makovyts’ka, “UPA na Kubani,” Ukraina Moloda, 2 December 2006. The Kuban is the southernmost part of Ukrainian ethnographic territory, separated from the rest of Ukraine by the Sea of Azov and Russia’s Don region.

97 Although he had a reputation for brutality gained during the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, Bach-Zelewski testified for the prosecution at Nuremberg to avoid trial. For further details, see Norman Davies, Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw (London: Pan Macmillan, 2003).


the UPA leadership, and, if discovered, would be severely punished, including a death sentence by court-martial. The UPA was also successful in its operations against high-ranking German and Soviet military and defense officials. In 1943 SD General Viktor Lutze was killed in an ambush. In 1944 Red Army Marshal Nikolai Vatutin was killed by UPA units, as was Polish Deputy Minister of Defense General Karol Świerczewski in 1947.

In some instances areas of Ukraine that were liberated and held by the UPA were called “insurgent republics,” and in many respects they functioned as mini “underground states.” One of the best known was the “Kolky Republic,” which covered an area of roughly 2,500 km², located in the UPA-North military district, in the Volyn region. The “Kolky Republic” remained under UPA control until November 1943, when it was overrun by German troops using tanks, artillery, and aircraft.

After the Germans’ retreat, UPA operations were turned against the Soviet machine of occupation in order to disrupt the re-establishment of the Soviet system in Ukraine. The insurgency and underground leaders also considered the possibility, admittedly remote, that after Germany’s defeat a confrontation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union might ensue. This would allow Ukraine to re-establish its statehood, and the UPA would then be the nucleus of its armed forces.

100 Document no. 26 (Zaborona samostiinykh perehovoriv z nimtsiamy) in Kosyk, Ukraina v Druhi svitovii viini, 4: 142.

101 The SD (Sicherheitsdienst) was the intelligence-gathering organization of the SS, or the SS secret police.

102 The UPA attacked Lutze’s armed column in May 1943 in Klevan, near the western Ukrainian city of Rivne. Lutze’s column was riddled with heavy machine gun fire at close range. The German authorities never acknowledged how Lutze was killed, claiming that he died in an automobile accident. For more on this incident, see Tys-Krokhmal’iuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, pp. 175–77.

103 Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, pp. 368–69; Serhii Naumyk, “Poslan-nia Kolkiv'skoі respubliky,” Volyn [online periodical], no.1520 (17 April 2013).
UPA areas of operation.
An UPA battalion.

An UPA special tasks unit.
A women’s unit of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

Dutch officers from the German prison camp “Stalag 371” in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine, who were rescued by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in January 1944 and given safe passage to the Western Allies through Hungary. From left: F. J. G. Brackel, L. A. D. Kranenburg, Harteveld, H. J. Lineman, P. J. de Ruijter, J. J. Signor, E. J. C. van Hootegem, S. van der Pol, Byl de Roe, J. A. Baron Bentinck.

(UPA photo)
“What are the Ukrainian insurgents fighting for?
For a Ukraine free of Stalin and Hitler.”
A leaflet mass distributed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1943–44.
Memorial in the mausoleum to Nazi victims at the Flossenbürg concentration camp in Germany. The caption reads: “Ukraine to her sons, who gave their lives for freedom.”
GERMAN RETREAT, SOVIET ADVANCE

By February 1943, after their defeat at Stalingrad, German forces began retreating from Ukraine before the advancing Red Army. For Ukraine this meant another round of devastation. As was the case during the Soviet retreat two years earlier, the retreating German forces were ordered to leave in their wake complete destruction—scorched earth. On 5 July 1943 German forces were defeated at Kursk, on the northeastern border of Ukraine, in the greatest tank battle in history. In August Kharkiv was captured by the Red Army, followed by Kyiv in November. Stalin wanted Kyiv taken by the anniversary of the October Revolution. This cost the lives of some 260,000 soldiers, most of them Ukrainians. By July–August 1944 western Ukraine was in the hands of the Soviet army and by 28 October 1944 the new Soviet occupation of Ukraine was complete.

As it became evident that German manpower was inadequate and that the Third Reich would probably be denied victory, Berlin began to create military units of nationalities other than ethnic Germans—contrary to earlier policy. Between 1943 and 1945, 24 non-German units were formed, almost all of them designated Waffen SS divisions. The Waffen SS was the military wing of the Schutzstaffel (SS). Although under the command of Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, the Waffen SS participated in military, not police, actions. There were four Hungarian divisions; three Dutch (one of them included Danes and Norwegians); two each: Belgian, Italian, Croatian, Latvian, Russian, and Don Cossack; and one each: French, Estonian, Albanian, Bosnian-Herzegovinian, and Ukrainian. With some exceptions, all were sent to the Soviet front. Other military units were also formed of ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) living in several occupied countries of southeastern Europe. Poles also served in the German forces. There was a British unit and even a number of “honorary Aryan” Jews who served in the German armed forces. In the fall of 1943 the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) was recruited mainly from Soviet soldiers in German POW camps. This major military force,
numbering around 300,000 men, was under the command of Andrei Vlasov, a captured Red Army lieutenant-general.  

In early 1943 Otto Waechter, governor of Galicia, approached the Ukrainian Central Committee with a proposal to form a Ukrainian Waffen SS division. After much debate and despite opposition from the OUN-B, Kubijovyč, the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee, and his associates agreed. The immediate reason for the creation of such a formation was the hope that it might help improve the Germans’ treatment of Ukrainians. The specter of the 1917–20 defeat was also influential in persuading the UCC leadership. Kubijovyč and his associates, and even Metropolitan Sheptytsky, were convinced that a well-trained armed force was indispensable for the re-establishment of Ukrainian statehood should the opportunity arise. Realizing that Germany’s defeat was inevitable, they were determined that Ukrainians not be caught in the ensuing chaos without their own regular military units.

During the negotiations preceding the formation of the division the UCC insisted that the unit fight only against the Soviets. Himmler demanded that the division’s command be German and that it be called “Galician” rather than “Ukrainian,” so as not to irritate Hitler. The division, which was to be called the “14 Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS, Galizische Nr. 1,” attracted 16,000 volunteers. It was to be exclusively a military division, not connected with the special SS units engaged in policing the civilian population. According to Norman Davies,

> There was, indeed, a clear distinction between the Waffen SS, which was a military wing of the SS and various other SS formations, which had different sorts of duties.  

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The newly-formed division was recruited and trained in the fall and winter of 1943–44 and, under the command of Major-General F. Freitag, was deployed against the advancing Soviet forces in the summer of 1944. On 17–22 July it fought in the Battle of Brody, in western Ukraine, where it was surrounded by the Soviet Army and defeated. About 8,000 soldiers were lost: killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. Many escaped to join the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.\textsuperscript{106} About 3,000 survivors retreated, avoiding capture.

The attitude toward Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union on the part of the Galicia Division servicemen is well illustrated by a telling German military intelligence report from the Eastern front dated 23 October 1944:

\begin{quote}
M. is a typical representative of a nationally-conscious Ukrainian… His attitude toward Germany is, in any case, not friendly… As a service-man of the SS Division he does fight against the Russians and bandit gangs. However, he is not interested in fighting for the Germans or their interests. As a Ukrainian, he and his countrymen expected much more from the Germans, namely, he thought that the Germans will help Ukraine gain independence… With this hope, Ukrainians joined the ranks of the German army… Should the front line shift further [westward], he will no longer cooperate with the Germans. He will not cross over to the Bolshevik gang, but will join the national Ukrainian gangs [UPA], which are conducting a separate struggle against the Bolsheviks with the aim of winning an independent and free Ukraine.\textsuperscript{107}
\end{quote}

Subsequently, the Galicia Division, regrouped and reinforced with reservists and new recruits, saw action in Slovakia, where it fought against communist partisans and liberated Ukrainian refugees captured by the Soviets. It was also deployed against the Soviet Army in Slovenia and Austria. Just before the end of the war Hitler issued an order to disarm the Division. Instead, the division was reformed on 15 March 1945 and renamed the “First Division of the Ukrainian National Army,” under

\textsuperscript{106} Logusz, \textit{Galicia Division}, pp. 259–61.

\textsuperscript{107} Document no. 49 (Vyslovliuvanna chlena dyvizii SS “Halychyna” pro sytut-siui, shcho sklalasia) in Kosyk, \textit{Ukraїna v Druhii svitovii viini}, 4: 232–33
the previously-established Ukrainian National Committee,\textsuperscript{108} which intended to represent all Ukrainians and included Volodymyr Kubijovyč of the UCC. On 25 April 1945 the division swore an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people. Command was assumed by General Pavlo Shandruk.\textsuperscript{109}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\end{center}

\textbf{The departure of Galicia Division volunteers to training camps. The inscription next to the trident, the Ukrainian national emblem, reads “Glory to Ukraine!”}

\textsuperscript{108} The Ukrainian National Committee was set up in Germany in October–November 1944, after the shift in German policy toward Ukraine and the release of OUN-B leader Bandera and OUN-M leader Melnyk from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Melnyk became a member of the committee, along with A. Livytsky, head of the Ukrainian government-in-exile. The UNC sought to defend Ukrainian interests before the German authorities.

\textsuperscript{109} Pavlo Shandruk, b. 1889, Volyn region, d. 1979, New Jersey, U.S.A. Shandruk commanded a company and a battalion in the Russian Imperial Army in World War I. In 1918 he joined the army of the Ukrainian National Republic and held several posts. He later served in the Polish army, where he held the rank of colonel. He was imprisoned in German POW camps until the end of 1944, when he became chairman of the Ukrainian National Committee and appointed to command the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army.
The Galicia Division in their internment camp in Rimini, Italy, 1945-1947.
When Germany capitulated, the division surrendered to the British. The men spent almost two years as POWs of the Allied Forces in Rimini, Italy. Before their release in 1947, the division was checked and cleared of any possible war crimes by the Allied authorities. In time, many former members of the Galicia Division settled in Great Britain, Canada, the United States, Argentina, Australia, and elsewhere.

Years after the war, speaking about his role in the Second World War, Ukrainian Red Army general Petro Grigorenko said:

I fought with the Soviet Army. There are soldiers of the First Division, a Division that fought on the side of the German Army. I fought for... my country. I thought that with my war I would achieve happiness for my Fatherland. And they also thought this.110

Throughout the war the Soviet Army’s treatment of its own troops was ruthless. As Soviet troops advanced into Ukraine, new recruits, taken from territories previously occupied by the Germans, were often used as cannon fodder.111 Political motives frequently superseded tactical and strategic considerations.112 With regard to the now reconquered Ukraine, Soviet authorities considered deporting as many Ukrainians as possible to Siberia. In his secret speech denouncing Stalin’s “cult of personality” at the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev spoke of Stalin’s wish to deport Ukrainians:

In April, 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway places from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic.... The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, [Stalin] would have deported them also.113

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110 Cited in the Ukrainian-language version of the documentary film Between Hitler and Stalin.

111 Having lived under German occupation, these recruits were regarded as ideologically “contaminated.”

112 On Stalin’s orders, the Soviet recapture of Kyiv had to be accomplished by 7 November 1943, the anniversary of the October Revolution. The Red Army thus faced much more difficult strategic and tactical conditions, the result of which was over a quarter of a million casualties, most of whom were Ukrainians.

As the Red Army drove out the German forces and reoccupied western Ukraine, the UPA launched a series of offensive operations to prevent deportations and to stem oppression. Its special targets were the NKVD, Communist Party members, and their collaborators. In the spring of 1944 UPA units ambushed the famous Red Army general, Nikolai Vatutin, who was responsible for the recapture of Kyiv. He later died of his wounds. In April of the same year some 30,000 Soviet security forces fought against 5,000 UPA soldiers in the Battle of Hurby, a town near Kremianets in the Volyn region, in northwestern Ukraine.114

At this stage the UPA adapted its tactics to cope with the changing situation. It reorganized itself into fast-moving tactical units and continued its operations against the Soviets. In the fall of 1944 it carried out some 800 raids in the Volyn region alone. For the UPA, the German surrender in May 1945 did not mean the end of the war. It continued operations against the forces of occupation, and Red Army units returning from Germany were mobilized against it. The UPA avoided confrontations with Soviet troops, fighting mostly against its particular foes, the military units of the NKVD and MVD.

In July 1945, when the Soviet Union offered amnesty to UPA combatants, the UPA leadership took this opportunity to demobilize some of its personnel, among them the injured and disabled. Otherwise, it continued its operations.

A major Soviet offensive against the UPA was the “Great Blockade” in the Carpathian Mountains, which lasted from January to April 1946. Special NKVD troops were stationed in areas where UPA forces were active, in order to prevent the local population from providing food, shelter, and supplies to the insurgents. At the same time 585,000 Soviet troops were deployed on search and destroy missions. During this period the UPA fought some 1,500 engagements, facing artillery, armored units, aircraft, and even bacteriological weapons. In these battles the Ukrainian insurgents lost up to 40 percent of their fighting strength. As a result, the UPA High Command demobilized many of its regular combat units, ordering the remaining troops to continue the struggle using underground tactics.115 In his memoirs Khrushchev recalled the struggle against the

114 Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, p. 314.
UPA as particularly brutal and difficult. He pointed to the heavy losses incurred by the Soviet forces:

Ukrainian nationalists gave us more trouble than anyone else. After the war, we lost thousands of men in a bitter struggle between the Ukrainian nationalists and the forces of Soviet power.\(^{116}\)

The UPA demobilization order, however, did not apply to the Carpathian region or the Ukrainian ethnic territories annexed to Poland in 1944. There, the Sian Division of the UPA continued its fight. It defended the Ukrainian population from forced deportation to the USSR, in which the Polish security forces collaborated with the Soviets. In 1947 Poland’s Deputy Minister of Defense, General Karol Świerczewski, was killed in an ambush.

In April–July 1947 the Polish government launched Operation Vistula (Pol. Akcja Wisła) to expel the Ukrainian population from its ancestral lands in the southeastern areas of Poland to the northwest, particularly to German regions acquired after Germany’s defeat. The UPA tried to sabotage this operation, unsuccessfully, suffering heavy losses in the process. Some units crossed the Polish border back into western Ukraine. Other units joined what has been called “The Great Raid to the West.” They made their way south to Czechoslovakia and from there to West Germany, becoming living proof of Ukraine’s continuing struggle for independence.

Some UPA units continued to operate in the Carpathian region until 1949, when the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych, ordered the command structure and remaining units deactivated and transferred to underground activity. In 1950 Shukhevych was tracked down and killed in a firefight with Soviet security forces. Command of the UPA was then assumed by General Vasyl Kuk, who was captured in 1954. However, even as late as 1956 (during the Hungarian Revolution), UPA insurgents were sabotaging Soviet troop movements.

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A company of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the “Great Blockade”, 1946.
"The Great Raid to the West"

The first UPA unit to break through the Iron Curtain and reach West Germany was Company “95” from the “Sian” Division.

Photo: Surviving soldiers of UPA Company “95” moments prior to surrendering their weapons to the U.S. Army in West Germany on September 11, 1947.
In 1942–43, while the Soviet and German titans were fighting to the death, another war, bloody on its own scale, was being waged in the western regions of Ukraine, where the UPA was fighting against the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK).\(^{117}\) For the Ukrainians, the issue was straightforward: to prevent these lands from being reincorporated into a postwar Polish state. The historical background of this conflict was centuries old, but the immediate catalyst lay in the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles.

In 1919 the ethnographic Ukrainian territories of Galicia and Volyn were annexed to the new Polish state recognized by the Treaty of Versailles, whose terms included the provision that the government of Poland respect and safeguard the autonomy of its minority populations. Instead, the Polish government began a policy aimed at changing the ethnic composition of western Ukraine through Polish colonization, a form of “ethnic cleansing” in reverse.

Between 1919 and 1938 approximately 200,000 Poles were moved from Poland to villages in Eastern Galicia and Volyn; another 100,000 were settled in towns.\(^{118}\) According to the 1939 census, Poles comprised 16.6 percent (346,000) of the total population of Volyn,\(^{119}\) and 16.2 percent (947,000) of the total population of Galicia.\(^{120}\) In addition to colonization, in 1930 the Polish government began a campaign of “pacific-

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\(^{117}\) The Armia Krajowa originated from the Służba Zwycięstwa Polski (Polish Victory Service), formed in September 1939. In November of that year General Władysław Sikorski replaced this organization with the Związek Walki Zbrojnej (Union for Armed Struggle), which became the AK in February 1942, after merging with the Polski Związek Powstańczy (Polish Union of Resistance). The main goal of the AK was to resist the German occupation and prepare an armed uprising against the occupiers on Polish territories. At the height of its strength (spring 1944) the AK had a force of approximately 350,000 soldiers.


\(^{120}\) *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, s.v. “Galicia.”
tion” consisting of brutal police and military measures, in order to stem the growing unrest and resistance of the Ukrainian population in response to the government’s refusal to grant it the rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Versailles. More than 2,000 Ukrainians were arrested; community centers, libraries, and churches destroyed; and Ukrainian activists and politicians placed under house arrest or incarcerated in a Polish concentration camp. During elections Ukrainians were terrorized into voting for Polish candidates.¹²¹ Ukrainian organizations, such as the scouting association Plast, were outlawed, and the Ukrainian language was banned in government institutions. Throughout the interwar Polish occupation Ukrainian schools were routinely closed. In 1920 there were 1,050 Ukrainian schools in Volyn; by 1932–33 only 4 remained open.¹²²

Ukrainian churches were also targeted. In June 1938, 120 Orthodox churches were dismantled, demolished, or burned in the Kholm region, and a further 165 were transferred to the Roman Catholic Church.¹²³ At the Versailles negotiations Prime Minister Lloyd George of Great Britain, commented on the situation:

> It fills me with despair the way in which I have seen small nations, before they have hardly leaped into the light of freedom, beginning to oppress other races than their own.¹²⁴

In response to the actions of the Polish government, the Ukrainian people sought ways to assert their rights, ranging from writing appeals to the League of Nations to active resistance by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Sabotage of Polish-owned businesses and property, raids on Polish banks, and assassinations of Polish politicians were carried out. In 1934, for example, the OUN assassinated Bronisław Pieracki, Minister of the Interior. The Polish government’s policy toward Ukrainians, most importantly the refusal of the Polish government to honor its

¹²³ Ievhen Misio, “Trahediia Zakerzonnia” (Public lecture commemorating the victims of the Zakerzonnia region, The Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Community Centre, Etobicoke, 5 November 2005).
commitments under the Treaty of Versailles, led to a climate of hostility between Ukrainians and Poles.

There was, however, an attempt by one Polish group to avert the impending conflict. In June–July 1939 an appeal entitled “Poles!” was widely circulated among the Polish minority population of Western Ukraine by the Committee of Poles of the Eastern Borderlands. The authors of the document explained that the hostility between Ukrainians and Poles was caused by the policies of successive Polish governments, and they urged their fellow Poles to reconcile with the Ukrainians. This word of caution went unheeded by Polish politicians and the population at large. What had been a standoff became a bloody conflict in 1942–47, referred to as “the second Polish-Ukrainian war.” The first armed conflict took place in 1918–19, during Ukraine’s war of liberation in 1917–21.

In 1942 the OUN-B and the UPA proclaimed a policy of rapprochement with all forces except those of the Soviet and Nazi occupiers, and categorically expressed their support for the right of the Polish people to their own independent state.

However, the London-based Polish government-in-exile insisted that Galicia and Volyn be reincorporated into the Polish state after the war. Moreover, it forbade the AK, the main Polish resistance force, to cooperate with the UPA. For its part, the British government consistently refused to support the Ukrainian independence movement, instead assenting to Polish domination over the western Ukrainian territories.

In February 1943 Polish units were formed within the Soviet partisan movement to conduct operations in western Ukraine against both the Germans and the UPA. Meanwhile, the AK planned an operation,

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125 Komitet Polaków Kresów Wschodnich. In Polish political parlance the term “Eastern Borderlands” referred to western Ukraine.
127 Dashkevych, Istoriia ukraïns’koho viis’ka, p. 553.
129 Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, p. 319.
code-named \textit{Burza} (Storm), which was intended to prepare and carry out the seizure of Ukraine’s western territories, including the city of Lviv, as the Germans retreated, so that once the advancing Soviet forces arrived, they would be faced with a \textit{fait accompli}.\textsuperscript{130}

It became abundantly clear that, far from supporting Ukrainian independence, the Polish government-in-exile could not envision a Polish state without Galicia and Volyn. As Timothy Snyder writes:

The plans of the Armia Krajowa for a rebellion, formulated in 1942, anticipated a war with Ukrainians for the ethnographically Ukrainian territories that fell within Poland’s prewar boundaries. By 1942, the formation of sizable Polish partisan units in the east could not but remind Ukrainians of Polish territorial claims.\textsuperscript{131}

Polish actions against the Ukrainian population behind what later became known as the Curzon Line began in 1942. As historian Ievhen Misylo notes:

These killings were not random. The most conscious Ukrainian element was killed—the intelligentsia and the leadership. By spring 1943 the killings took on a mass character.\textsuperscript{132}

To defend the Ukrainian population, the UPA was left with little choice but to fight the Poles as well as the Germans and Soviets. A campaign that would lead to the “de-Polonization” of Volyn was launched in June 1943. This was met with violent resistance by both the AK and the Polish population: “Both sides spilt innocent blood and committed acts of atrocity.”\textsuperscript{133} Thus, in the Kholm region, Volyn, and Galicia Poles and the Polish auxiliary police in German service killed Ukrainians, and Ukrainians retaliated by killing Poles. Both military units and civilians participated in this bloodbath. In many cases, actions against Polish civilians were undertaken spontaneously by the Ukrainian populace. Polish


\textsuperscript{131} Timothy Snyder, “To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1942–47,” \textit{Journal of Cold War Studies} 1, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 95.

\textsuperscript{132} Misylo, “Trahediia Zakerzonnia.”

\textsuperscript{133} Iurii Kyrychuk, Ukraïns'kyi natsional'nyi rukh 40–50-ykh rokiv XX stolitтя: ideolohiia i praktyka (Lviv: Ministerstvo Osvity Ukrainy, 2003), p. 129.
villages were terrorized and their inhabitants forced to leave: “Here the explanation was that Polish villages served as staging areas for attacks against the Ukrainians.”\textsuperscript{134} In the end, both sides suffered heavy losses.

It is difficult to gauge the exact numbers killed, but it is estimated that tens of thousands were lost on each side. It must be pointed out that the occupying forces of both Nazi Germany and the USSR helped exacerbate this conflict. Erich Koch, for example, said:

We [must create a situation whereby] when a Pole meets a Ukrainian, he wants to kill him, and when a Ukrainian, seeing a Pole, also burns with a desire to kill him.\textsuperscript{135}

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the British and the Americans agreed with Stalin that the Polish-Soviet border should run along the Curzon Line. From October 1944 to June 1946, 480,000 Ukrainians were deported to the Soviet Union from ethnographic Ukrainian lands in eastern Poland.\textsuperscript{136} Neither the British nor the Americans opposed this population transfer. The British ambassador in Warsaw wrote to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin:

Henceforth apart from the small number of Ukrainian communities in North-Eastern Slovakia, there will be no Ukrainian in Europe outside the Soviet Union. Thus, the vexed Ukrainian Question should at least cease to trouble international relations in Eastern Europe and become an internal affair of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{137}

After the surrender of Nazi Germany, the UPA continued its resistance to the Soviet occupation. In response to this resistance, in April 1947 the Polish communist government, in collaboration with and under the guidance of the Soviets, launched Operation Vistula (Pol. \textit{Akcja Wisła}), whose objective was to liquidate the remaining UPA forces in

\begin{thebibliography}{136}
\bibitem{134}Peter J. Potichnyj, “‘Akcja Wisła’: The Forcible Relocation of the Ukrainian Population in Poland,” \textit{The Ukrainian Quarterly} XLIV, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Summer, 1988): 78.
\bibitem{136}Misylo, “Trahediia Zakerzonnia.”
\bibitem{137}Potichnyj, “‘Akcja Wisła,’” 78.
\end{thebibliography}
southeastern Poland (*Trans-Curzonia*), and deport the entire Ukrainian population from this region.\(^{138}\) The result of this operation, apart from the 140,000 people who were deported to the northern and western parts of Poland, was that nearly 4,000 people were sent to concentration camps, and over 300 UPA soldiers were sentenced to death.\(^{139}\) Operation Vistula “was a classic [example of] ethnic cleansing.”\(^{140}\)

It was not until the collapse of communism in the Eastern Bloc that the Polish-Ukrainian conflict began to be studied by both Poles and Ukrainians. The twenty-first century has seen a reconciliation of the two states over these issues. In 2003 the Polish and Ukrainian governments adopted resolutions of reconciliation. The Ukrainian resolution read in part:

> The tragedy of the Poles killed and expelled from their residences by paramilitary Ukrainian troops was accompanied by a like amount of suffering by the peaceful Ukrainian population killed by Polish military action. These events were a tragedy for both our nations… Let our ability to forgive become the basis for a better future of good neighborly relations and for Ukrainian-Polish friendship.\(^{141}\)

The same day the Polish *Sejm* (legislature) passed a resolution that included the following passage:

> The 60th anniversary of the tragedy of the Polish populace of Volhynia and Galicia during the German occupation encourages thought on the past and the future of Polish-Ukrainian neighborliness. The tragedy of the Poles murdered and expelled from their places of residence by armed formations of Ukrainians was also accompanied by sufferings of

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\(^{140}\) Misylo, “Trahediiia Zakerzonnia.”

the Ukrainian populace, victims of Polish armed actions. This was the tragedy for both our nations.\textsuperscript{142}

Memorial to the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict officially unveiled by the governments of Poland and Ukraine on 7 July 2003, in the town of Pavlivka, Volyn region (Ukraine).

\textsuperscript{142} “Polish Parliament Adopts Ukrainian Reconciliation Motion on 1943 Massacres in Volhynia,” \textit{PAP News Agency; BBC Monitoring Service} (Warsaw), 10 July 2003.
UKRAINIANS IN THE RED ARMY

The Second World War turned Ukraine into a battleground, on which two oppressors of the Ukrainian people strove for mastery. The result was that Ukrainian soldiers were to be found in various opposing camps, for the reality of war demanded that population submit to the power occupying its territory. This pitted brother against brother on the battlefield. The irony of Ukraine’s predicament was that while contributing the lion’s share to ending the Third Reich’s occupation of Ukraine, it thereby enabled the re-imposition of Soviet occupation. The victory for which Ukrainian soldiers of the Red Army paid so dearly was, nevertheless, a victory of the Soviet oppressor over the Nazi oppressor of the Ukrainian homeland.

As one of the witnesses appearing in the documentary film Between Hitler and Stalin states, “Ukrainians in the Red Army did not fight for an independent Ukraine, nor could they. They fought to end the brutality of Nazi occupation; they fought against Hitler and not for Stalin, just as their brothers in the Waffen SS Division Galicia fought against Stalin and not for Hitler.” Of the more than 7 million Ukrainians who served in the Red Army, 4.1 million died. However, according to recent data, up to 9 million Ukrainians were drafted into the Red Army during the war.

At least 350 generals and marshals of Ukrainian origin, though not necessarily of Ukrainian self-identification, served in the Red Army. The capture of Berlin was due in large part to the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 1st Belarusian Front of the Red Army. Many of the more than 300,000 Soviet troops killed or wounded in the Battle of Berlin, even on the last day of the war, were Ukrainians, and were buried there.

The First People’s Commissar of Defense of the Ukrainian SSR was a Ukrainian, General Vasyl Herasymenko. As the commander of the Kyiv Military District, Herasymenko attempted to reorganize the Red Army along national lines and set up separate Ukrainian army units. He

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143 Bezsmertiia, pp. 347, 561–63.

was removed from all command positions by Stalin in September 1945.  

There were many Ukrainian heroes in the ranks of the Red Army. At Stalingrad, the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front, a Ukrainian officer accepted the surrender of Field Marshal Paulus’s vaunted 6th Army; Auschwitz was liberated by Ukrainian troops of the 100th Lviv Infantry Division of the 1st Ukrainian Front of the Red Army; a Ukrainian Red Army officer was the first to shake hands with an American officer on the Rhine; the Soviet flag was raised over the Reichstag by Ukrainian soldiers of the Red Army; and, a Ukrainian general, Kuzma M. Derevianko, accepted the surrender of Japan.

When Zhukov was on the verge of taking Berlin, he promised Nikita Khrushchev, the head of the Communist Party of Ukraine, that when he captured Hitler he would first ship him in a cage to Kyiv, so that Ukraine might see him before Moscow did. However, Hitler’s suicide on 30 April 1945 left only his charred remains, which were found by a Soviet team headed by a Ukrainian, Lt. General Ivan Klimenko.

A crewman loading a bomb with the inscription “For Ukraine” onto the plane of Ukrainian World War II ace Andrii N. Vitruk, 1944. This photo was banned during the Soviet period.

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This famous World War II photo by Max Alpert shows Ukrainian officer Oleksii Yeremenko (27th Red Army Division) leading a charge in 1942 against the Germans near Zaporizhia, Ukraine. He was killed in the war.

Soldiers of the 100th Lviv Infantry Division of the 1st Ukrainian Front of the Red Army, on January 27, 1945, open the gates of Auschwitz and free thousands of prisoners.
WESTERN AID TO THE SOVIET WAR EFFORT

The American, British, and Canadian aid provided under the Lend-Lease program made a palpable difference to the Soviet Union’s capacity to cope with Hitler’s military machine. However, in the information it provided to its own population Moscow tended to underplay the significance and effectiveness of this aid. It is estimated that about 15 percent of all the mechanical and technical equipment used by Soviet forces had come via Lend-Lease, most notably 427,386 American trucks and jeeps.147

In 1943 the United States began negotiations with the Soviet Union to establish air bases in Ukraine at Poltava, Myrhorod, and Pyriatyn. The Soviet authorities, however, reflecting Stalin’s paranoid nature, delayed granting permission. The American plan was that B-17 Flying Fortress bombers from bases in England or Italy would attack targets in Germany and other enemy territory and continue east to land in Ukraine. Their bomb load would be replenished there, and they would conduct new bombing runs on German and other targets on the flight west to their home bases.

On 2 June 1944, only a few days before the Normandy invasion, Stalin finally gave his permission and U.S. bombers started the first of their shuttle bombing flights from the Ukrainian city of Poltava. American pilots and military personnel proved to be popular with the Ukrainian population, while Soviet bureaucrats were astounded by the quality and quantity of the Americans’ food supply and “high living.” In Ukraine, and generally throughout the USSR, the level of subsistence was incomparably lower. On 21–22 June 1944 a night-time German raid on Poltava destroyed forty-nine Flying Fortresses, killing thirty Ukrainians and two Americans. Some ascribe this calamity to Soviet incompetence or neglect in providing adequate air defense. Nevertheless, the base managed later to launch eighteen more vital raids against the Germans.148

General John Deane, who headed the U.S. Military Mission in the USSR, describes the shuttle bombing in his book The Strange Alliance.

147 Davies, Europe at War, p. 36.
He writes about the incredible problems the Soviet bureaucracy created to avoid allowing Americans into Ukraine:

The truth was that the presence of Americans in the Soviet Union and particularly Ukraine, which is an area of questionable loyalty, was no longer desired. … The Russians were no more relieved than I was when it was decided in April 1945 to remove the last American soldier from Ukraine. … In retrospect I feel that our shuttle-bombing venture was of immeasurable value to the United States. As a military operation it made possible eighteen strong attacks on important strategic targets in Germany, which would otherwise have been immune.  

Memorial to the Lend-Lease program in Fairbanks, Alaska (U.S.A.).

UKRAINIANS IN THE ALLIED MILITARY FORCES

Many Ukrainian Americans and Ukrainian Canadians served in the armed forces of their respective countries during the war. It is estimated that over 200,000 served in the U.S. forces, while at least 35,000, or 14 percent of Canada’s Ukrainian population, served in the Canadian military. Ukrainians in North America also contributed to the war effort in other ways. Stephen Pawluk from Canada was one of the electronics technicians who participated in the development of radar by the British at the beginning of the war. The British announced this secret, dubbed “Radio Ray” (radar), on 17 June 1941. In 1932 the Ukrainian American William Dzus developed a screw fastener that did not loosen when exposed to vibration and which proved invaluable on aircraft and military vehicles. Igor Sikorsky, born in Kyiv of Ukrainian ancestry, became the “Father of the Helicopter,” a type of aircraft that was first used during the Second World War.

Among the many Ukrainian Americans who became heroes and died in the war were Lt. Colonel Theodore Kalakuka from Scranton, Pennsylvania, and Nicholas Minue from Carteret, New Jersey. Kalakuka was the first Ukrainian graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and the “Hero of Corregidor,” in the war against Japan in the Pacific. Minue was posthumously awarded the U.S. Congressional Medal of Honor for an attack against the Germans in Tunisia. Ukrainian American Michael Strank was a sergeant in the U.S. Marines and the leader of a squad ordered to raise a large American flag during the Battle of Iwo Jima on 23 February 1945. He was killed a week later and immortalized in the famous photo of this event and in the huge Marine Monument in Arlington Cemetery, where he is buried. One Ukrainian Canadian hero was Sgt. Peter Dmytruk, an air gunner from Wynyard, Sas-

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Ukrainians served in the British forces, particularly in the Polish Army led by General Władysław Anders. They fought at Tobruk and later Monte Cassino, where many are buried in the Polish cemetery.

Besides fighting in the services abroad, Canadian and American women of Ukrainian ancestry also played a key role on the home front, where they were prominent in the armaments industry.

Among the servicewomen who left their mark on Ukrainian Canadian history are Lieutenant Ann Crapleve (Canadian Military Headquarters), Anne Cherniawsky (RCAF Headquarters in London, Gt. Bt.), and L/Cpl. Helen Kozicky and Olga Pawluk.\footnote{Thomas M. Prymak, Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1988), p. 85.}

Among the women of Ukrainian heritage who served with distinction during World War II in America’s military are First Lieutenant Evelyn Kowalchuk (U.S. Army Air Corps; served in Normandy, honored in a D-Day dedication by President George W. Bush in 2001); Captain Tillie Kuzma Decyk (U.S. Army Nurses Corps; awarded the European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal and a Bronze Star to EAME Theater Ribbon); Dorothy Sudomir Budacki (U.S. Navy); Captain Helen Comac (Kimak) Taylor (ANC; active duty in the South Pacific and Okinawa); Sergeant Mary Cancara Haluszczak (WAC); and Mary Smolley Scott (U.S. Navy).\footnote{Anna Krawczuk, “Women in Military Service for America Memorial,” Ukrainian American Veterans, 1998–2003: Registration Project Report, 29 May 2004 (New York: Ukrainian American Veterans, Inc., 2004), p. 34.}

Besides fighting a war, in 1943 Ukrainian Canadian military personnel overseas established the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen’s Association (UCSA) in Great Britain. Significantly, UCSA members were among the first to become aware of the plight of Ukrainian refugees in Europe during and after the war, and played a leading role in efforts to
prevent their forced repatriation to the Soviet Union by forming the Central Relief Bureau for this purpose.

A memorial to Ukrainian Canadian veterans in Toronto, Canada.
A memorial to Ukrainian American World War II veterans in New York City.
8–9 MAY 1945: NOT THE END OF THE WAR FOR UKRAINIANS

In Europe, the Second World War ended officially on 8–9 May 1945 with the capitulation of Germany to the Allied Powers. Yet, for Ukrainians there was no end in sight to arrests, deportations, executions, and denial of freedoms. Resistance led by the UPA continued in western Ukraine into the mid-1950s. Because western Ukraine had been under Soviet rule only briefly, the return of the Red Army had a markedly different effect than in eastern Ukraine, which had been sovietized earlier. The Soviets were determined to impose their rule on western Ukraine quickly and uncompromisingly when they arrived in 1944. Over 30,000 Communist Party workers and 3,500 specially-trained propagandists arrived to relaunch the process of sovietizing the region. Several hundred thousand Russians and eastern Ukrainians were brought to western Ukraine, where they occupied positions in government, police, industry, and education. Lviv became the largest Russian population center in the western part of the USSR. Deportations of Ukrainians, especially from western Ukraine and particularly Ukrainian Catholic priests, relatives of resistance fighters, those labeled as nationalists, and others, continued.

The USSR had now absorbed new territories with large ethnic Ukrainian populations. Transcarpathia, including the territory occupied by Hungary in 1938, became part of the Ukrainian SSR. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Polish-Soviet border was moved to the Curzon Line. From 1944 to 1947 a transfer of populations between Poland and the Ukrainian SSR took place. From western Ukraine, the majority of Poles and Polish Jews who had survived the war were moved to Poland. From Poland, about half a million Ukrainians were moved to western Ukraine and some eastern districts of the republic.

In 1946–47 the Soviets exported large quantities of wheat from Ukraine to Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and France, creating

155 The Curzon Line was a demarcation line proposed in 1920 by British Foreign Secretary Lord George Curzon, which was to constitute the eastern border of Poland and become Poland’s border with Soviet Ukraine after 1945. See Encyclopedia of Ukraine, s.v. “Curzon Line.”
famine conditions in Ukraine for the third time in the twentieth century, which resulted in the deaths of over 800,000 people.\textsuperscript{156}

From the beginning of the Soviet reoccupation of western Ukraine measures were adopted to liquidate the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In the winter of 1944–45 the authorities summoned the Ukrainian Catholic clergy to “re-education” sessions conducted by the NKVD. On 1 November 1944 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky died. Many suspected at the time that he had been poisoned by the Soviet secret police. On 5 April 1945 the Soviet media launched an anti-Catholic campaign. On 11 April 1945 the NKVD began arresting the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy of western Ukraine as well as secular and monastic clergy, a campaign of repressions that would last for the next five years. Along with Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, who succeeded Andrei Sheptytsky as the primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the NKVD arrested nine other bishops. All but Slipyj died shortly thereafter in prison or concentration camps. In Lviv alone about 800 priests were imprisoned, and some 150 priests from the district of Ternopil were deported to Siberia.

On 8–10 March 1946 the Soviet authorities convened the Synod of Lviv, an ecclesiastical council attended by the remaining clergymen, who were forced to take part in a vote to declare the “union” of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church. The fact that the council had even taken place was withheld from the public. The council was attended by 216 clergymen (out of a total of about 3,000 before deportation) and 19 laymen.\textsuperscript{157} Even clergymen who were not present at the council were also forced to join the Russian Orthodox Church. All Ukrainian Catholic schools were closed and Catholic organizations abolished. Church buildings were either closed or transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was liquidated after the war, and any clergymen or hierarchs who refused to


submit to the Russian Orthodox Church were executed or sent to concentration camps. Thus, the Russian Orthodox Church, headed by the patriarch of Moscow, again became the only acceptable church in the USSR.

In the mid-1950s and early 1960s a new generation of intelligentsia emerged in Ukraine. These were writers, painters, and intellectuals who raised the issue of culpability for the crimes of the Stalinist era and objected to the regime’s policies of Russification in Ukraine. They also introduced new trends into literature and intellectual discourse by freeing themselves of the officially-approved dogma of Socialist Realism. Among them were Lina Kostenko, Leonid Pliushch, Vasyl Symonenko, Mykola Vinhranovsky, Levko Lukianenko, Ivan Drach, Iryna Kalynets, Stefania Shabatura, Nadia Svitlychna, Vitalii Korotych, Ivan Svitlychny, Yevhen Sverstiuk, Vasyl Stus, Ihor Kalynets, Ivan Dziuba, Valentyn Moroz, Viacheslav Chornovil, Mykhailo Osadchy, Opanas Zalyvakha, Hryhorii Herchak, Alla Horska, and others.

Their period of activity was short-lived, however, lasting barely ten years. In 1963 they were officially condemned and in 1965–66 the first wave of arrests took place. To avoid arrest, some of these young writers changed their positions and began to write according to the official ideology. Many, however, were handed down lengthy sentences in the GULAG (Main Camp Administration), where some died. Those who served out their sentences and were released were forbidden to write and publish. Assessing the period from 1945 to the end of the 1980s, historian Norman Davies concluded that for Ukrainians the Second World War ended only in 1991, with the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence.

158 Socialist Realism was defined in 1932 as the guiding principle for art and literature in the Soviet Union. In essence, art and literature were supposed to depict reality in its historical-revolutionary development, producing an optimistic picture of life in the USSR for the purpose of educating the masses in the spirit of socialism. In practice, Socialist Realism was marked by strict adherence to Communist Party doctrine, according to which art and literature became simply a propaganda tool for the party.


160 Interview with Norman Davies for the film Between Hitler and Stalin. (Held in the archives of the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre, Toronto).
In the 1950s Soviet concentration camps were rocked by mass uprisings of political prisoners, the majority of whom were Ukrainians. This image shows the beginning of an uprising that took place in 1953 in the Norilsk camps, Soviet Arctic region.
The Second World War uprooted and displaced enormous numbers of people. It is estimated that over 40 million European civilians were forced to move during the war. When the war ended, approximately 8.5 million nationals of different countries found themselves on the territory of Germany and Austria. The Allies began repatriating these displaced persons as soon as the war ended. For this purpose they established several organizations: the Refugee, Displaced Persons (DP), and Welfare Branch of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), later superseded by the International Refugee Organization (IRO). 161 Most non-Soviet refugees were repatriated by the summer of 1945.

However, on the insistence of the Soviet leaders, the Yalta Agreement (concluded by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in February 1945) mandated that all Soviet citizens were to be repatriated to the USSR. By November 1945 over two million people in the zone of Soviet occupation were returned to the Soviet Union, many of them against their will. These included the Ostbeiter, the slave workers brought to Germany by the Nazis, and political refugees. In the zones occupied by the Western Allies, there was approximately a million refugees from Eastern Europe, including about a quarter of a million Ukrainians, who did not want to be repatriated for fear of repression by the Soviet regime. They came to be known as “the un-repatriable” DPs. 162 The Soviets insisted that these refugees also belonged to the USSR, regardless of whether they wanted to be repatriated or not. If they refused, they were to be sent to the USSR by force, as many were.

The Soviets formed the Soviet Repatriation Mission consisting of a number of units whose task was the repatriation of East Europeans from the occupation zones in Germany under the control of the United States


and Great Britain. It was headed first by Soviet General Filip Golikov, a former chief of military intelligence, and later by NKVD Major General Aleksandr Davidov. The repatriation units were allowed to enter refugee camps, where they held mass meetings and campaigned for the return to the Soviet Union. They screened films to convince the refugees that they had nothing to fear if they returned home. These propaganda campaigns not only failed to convince the refugees, but were met with fierce resistance. The refugees knew from experience what Soviet propaganda really meant.163

During Operation Keelhaul164 repatriation units entered refugee camps with trucks, rounded up refugees, loaded them by force on the trucks, and drove them under guard to the Soviet zone. American and British soldiers were ordered to assist in this. In a number of cases, Soviet soldiers dragged women by their hair, twisted men’s arms behind their backs, and beat refugees with the butts of their rifles to force them onto the trucks. Many refugees committed suicide before boarding or jumped out of the moving trucks. About 50,000 people were repatriated this way. Almost all of them were immediately deported to Siberia or killed.

After the war, Western officials assisted the Soviet repatriation units. They seemed not to have been fully aware of the reasons why Ukrainians and others did not want to go “home,” perhaps believing that repatriation, even if forced, was required by the Yalta Agreement. In general, this also reflected the naïveté of the Western Allies with regard to the aims, long-range policies, and methods used by the Soviets in the past. By early 1946, however, under orders from General Dwight Eisenhower, who was appointed chief commanding officer of the United States occupation forces, assistance to the process of forced repatriation was halted in the zone under American control. Nevertheless, the British

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164 Keelhauling was a form of punishment meted out to soldiers at sea. A rope was tied to both the bow and stern of the boat and run underwater under the boat. The person receiving the punishment was tied to one end of the rope, and the rope was pulled from the other side. The sailor was thus dragged under the boat, and by the time he was pulled out of the water on the other side, he had drowned.
occupation forces continued aiding the Soviets for about six more months.

Ukrainian organizations in North America, with their insight into Soviet realities, and officers of the Canadian forces grouped in the London-based Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen’s Association (and later the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau), especially its president Bohdan Panchuk, and Wasyl Kereliuk, Peter Smylski, Stanley Frolick, Michael Syrotiuk, and others, worked to end forced repatriation. Their efforts, as well as the intervention of Pope Pius XII, were instrumental in putting an end to the practice. The Soviet Repatriation Mission did not withdraw from Western Europe until 1949, where it continued to conduct propaganda and serve as a cover for Soviet espionage activities.

From 1947 onward, the care of refugees was transferred from UNRRA, which ceased operations, to the International Refugee Organization (IRO), whose mandate was to resettle rather than repatriate. The DP camps established by UNRRA were now under IRO administration. By the end of 1947 there were almost 300 DP camps in the U.S., British, and French zones of occupation, nearly 200 in the U. S. zone alone. Camp size ranged from small to large, and some camps served as hospitals. The camps housed people of practically every Eastern European nationality. In 1947 they contained over 800,000 people. Of these, some 100,000 were Ukrainian. There were, however, many DPs who lived outside the camps but who were also under the IRO’s jurisdiction. The largest camps with Ukrainians were in Regensburg, housing about 4,600; Munich, about 3,250; Mittenwald, about 3,000; Augsburg, about 2,600; Bayreuth, under 2,600; Cornberg, about 2,400; and Berchtesgaden, about 2,000.

Housing in most camps was overcrowded. Food rations, provided out of Allied military war surplus, were limited. Still, it was more than the German urban population had at the time. Although the camps were under the official administration of the UNRRA, and later the IRO, they were practically self-administered by their residents through elected camp committees that carried out official instructions, maintained order, and distributed rations.


After the repatriation scare was over, the camps tried to establish normal life under abnormal conditions. Most refugees were in the camps for less than five years. Yet, in spite of this relatively short period and inadequate living conditions, the camps became centers of Ukrainian social, political, religious, and cultural activity and developed into veritable communities, each with its own character. On an inter-camp basis they established or re-established such organizations as the Central Representation of Ukrainians in Exile, Ukrainian National Council; youth organizations (the scouting organization Plast, Ukrainian Youth Association [SUM], Ukrainian Democratic Youth Association [ODUM]); scholarly organizations (Shevchenko Scientific Society and Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences); and educational institutions (the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, previously based in Prague, and the Ukrainian Technical-Husbandry Institute). High schools, religious seminaries, vocational training, and English and other language programs were established. Sports teams were organized and a DP “Olympiad” was held. Newspapers and books were published, and theatre, art, and other cultural activities flourished.

Since the refugees had gone through a harrowing experience during the war, the camps provided an opportunity for a free exchange of feelings and ideas about the war, now without the threat of punishment. In this way, life in the camps helped to restructure their shattered world. Most active among the refugees were those who, since the First World War, had tried to establish an independent Ukrainian state. In Ukraine they had been involved in establishing new organizations, building up their membership, and developing and implementing their programs. In the interwar period they were also involved in developing Ukrainian educational, cultural, literary, artistic, scholarly, and religious institutions. Most of them saw their work as unfinished, brutally interrupted, or crushed by the invading powers. The camps thus provided an opportunity for them to continue this work. The new element in the camps that stimulated this activity was the relative freedom of expression, association, and worship.

The camps also became communities in the truest sense of the word. There were many young people in the camps. The end of the war provided an emotional release for everyone, and romance, marriage, and childbirth became an everyday pattern and preoccupation. Although the displaced persons lived in Germany and Austria, they were largely isolated from local society. Young people were socialized into a camp culture that melded Ukrainian traditional cultural values and norms with the
activities of quotidian and institutional life. The camp culture was also marked by a feeling of strong commitment to the cause of Ukrainian statehood. In many ways this culture protected the refugee youth from the anomic and cynicism that had emerged in the vanquished German society, but it also made them accept as normal many patterns of behavior and thought that were characteristic of transitional, unstable social units. Nevertheless, for many young people camp life was not an unpleasant personal growth experience.167

By the end of 1948 the IRO had made arrangements with many Western countries to resettle the refugees. Strict contracts between prospective employers and refugees were implemented. Refugees would agree to work for one or more years, and the employer would thus become an official sponsor. Many civic organizations in the countries of settlement became middlemen or sponsored refugees on their own. The largest numbers of refugees were resettled in North America: about 85,000 in the United States and about 35,000 in Canada. Over 20,000 were resettled in Australia and close to 19,000 in South America, mainly in Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. Over 49,000 refugees went to various European countries, primarily Great Britain, Belgium, and France.168

In the United States, the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee and the National Catholic Welfare Conference and in Canada, the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, sponsored by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund, became important intermediaries and sponsors. By 1951 most refugees were resettled. Some 25,000 Ukrainians, however, among them the elderly, those with medical conditions, invalids, single mothers with children, and others, whom no country was ready to accept, were left behind in West Germany and Austria.

168 *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, 2: 1102, 1153, 1195, 1205, 1212, 1214, 1216, 1227, 1259.
DP camps for Ukrainian war refugees in West Germany.

Ukrainian inscription on photo: “The Ukrainian camp at Mittenwald, 1946–47.”
THE COST OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO UKRAINE

The occupation of eastern Ukraine by the Soviets, the Soviet retreat from Ukraine, the advance of the initially victorious German army into Ukraine, its occupation of Ukraine and then its retreat, and the advance of the Red Army left Ukraine a devastated country. Sources estimate that over 28,000 villages and 714 cities and towns were partly or completely razed, leaving 10 million people without shelter. More than 16,000 industrial enterprises, more than 200,000 industrial production sites, 1,300 machine and tractor stations, approximately 18,000 hospitals and dispensaries, and 33,000 general schools, vocational secondary schools, and higher educational institutions were destroyed. The extent of the damage to the Ukrainian national economy in dollar terms has been estimated at about $60 billion in U.S. pre-war dollars, or more than $840 billion today.

The war claimed the lives of over 50 million people. Of these, 21.8 million were military personnel and 28.2 were civilians. In Ukraine 10 million people were killed, of whom 4.1 were military personnel and 5.9 were civilians. Several more million were lost through deportation, exile, and displacement, raising the total demographic losses suffered by Ukraine to 13.5 million.

During the war the largest-ever military confrontation in history took place on the Eastern Front, mainly on the territory of Ukraine. The entire country came under Nazi German occupation. From June 1941 to October 1944 many of the most decisive battles of the war between the German and Soviet armies took place in Ukraine, among them: two Battles of Kyiv (September 1941, October-November 1943), the Battle of Odesa (October 1941), four Battles of Kharkiv (October 1941, May 1942, February-March 1943, August 1943), the Battle of Crimea (November 1941-June 1942), and the Battle of Korsun-Shevchenkivsky.

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171 Bezsmertia, p. 561.
(called the “Stalingrad on the Dnieper,” January-February 1944). Ukraine suffered from two scorched earth campaigns: first, the Soviet retreat in 1941 and then the German retreat in 1944. Sixty percent of Germany’s ground forces were defeated on Ukrainian territory. Millions of soldiers on both sides took part in the bloody conflict on the Eastern Front. Out of 30 million Soviet citizens who served in the armed forces of the USSR during the Second World War, up to 9 million were from Ukraine.172

The table below (p. 108) shows the losses borne by all the countries involved in the war. It clearly indicates that Ukraine’s losses were greater than those of Russia and Poland. Yet, even these statistics do not give an accurate picture of the extent of Ukraine’s losses. To the sufferings indicated by the above figures should be added the destruction of Ukraine’s population that preceded World War II. A mere six years before the war Soviet Ukraine lost millions to the genocide by famine—the Holodomor—not to mention the losses incurred before the famine and during the Great Terror of 1936–38.

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### Population Losses in World War II by Country

Estimated Total Losses in Thousands

(In descending numerical order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (RSFSR)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>5,781</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>4,877</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The estimate of Russian losses does not include citizens of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Georgia, etc. Poland’s official figure is 6.02 million, which includes Jewish losses in western Ukraine and Belarus. The statistics for Ukraine have been updated on the basis of the figures published in the memorial publication Bezsmertia (2000).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, numerous mass graves of victims of the Great Terror have been identified. One of them, located in Bykivnia near Kyiv, is said to hold the bodies of up to 225,000 victims. Other mass graves may yet be found (it has been suggested that there may be tens of thousands throughout the former Soviet Union). The demographic, sociological, and psychological impact of these human losses on future generations has yet to be determined.

Memorial to the victims of the Soviet regime at the site of mass graves in Bykivnia near Kyiv.
CONCLUSION: INDEPENDENCE AND REBIRTH

The two main causes of the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 were the historic drive for nationhood and independence from the Russian center of the various nations comprising the USSR and the failure of communism both as an ideology and a socioeconomic and political system. By its declaration of independence in 1991, Ukraine’s separation from the USSR effectively marked the end of the Soviet empire.

With the disintegration of the USSR, the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic became an independent state. It was based on a compromise, as it were, between a revolutionary-minded people and the political and economic elites of the republic— the nomenklatura—which succeeded in retaining its position and power in the new state. Under the prevailing historic and political circumstances, Ukraine could not but become a ‘post-Soviet’ state, for the new country and its people were heirs to the social, political, economic, cultural, and spiritual traumas that were experienced by generations spent under foreign rule. These problems, however, are in a very real way the heritage left by the Soviet past. Without a doubt, this horrible legacy is the cause of many of the current problems with which the young Ukrainian state and its citizens must contend in their nation-building process.

In 1991 Ukraine became an independent state de facto and de jure. But the Ukrainian people clearly entered the phase of “inner” liberation on a human and individual level only in late 2004, during the Orange Revolution. This historic event was a cathartic milestone in the process of Ukraine’s national rebirth, and that year the people of Ukraine began emerging from the Soviet dimension of their past.

The process of national regeneration that has taken place between the turning point of 1991 and the present is characterized by several elements. A new generation of Ukrainians has come of age in the independent Ukrainian state. Ukraine, not the “Soviet fatherland,” is now their country and their homeland. As feelings of national unity and the sense of belonging to a single Ukrainian political organism have taken root in the awareness of young “new Ukrainians,” or “Euro-Ukrainians,” this generation has begun to displace the anachronistic Homo Sovieticus. The rediscovery of individual initiative and self-reliance, reawakening of civic awareness, and the refusal to fear state power have brought about a radical shift in attitudes. The emerging political and economic elites are beginning to realize that political power stems from the people.
The successful, nonviolent movement known as the Orange Revolution put Ukraine on the world map and showed that Ukraine is endeavoring to claim its rightful place in the community of democratic nations.

Ukraine’s Independence Day: Kyiv, 24 August 1991. The caption reads: “Ukraine is leaving the USSR.”

Verhovna Rada
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Documentary Films


Documentary Exhibits

- “*Holodomor: Genocide by Famine,*” CD and online version, created by the League of Ukrainian Canadians in cooperation with the Kyiv Memorial Society in Ukraine, 2008.

- “*Ukraine: A Nation at War,*” CD and online version, created by the Kyiv Memorial Society in Ukraine in cooperation with the Ucrainica Research Institute, translated by Stephen Bandera, 2013.
This book was conceived as a companion to the prize-winning documentary film *Between Hitler and Stalin*. Historians of World War II have generally been unaware of, or have intentionally neglected, the history of Ukraine in the war. This is a concise history of the Ukrainian experience in the Second World War. Ukraine suffered the greatest losses of any country in the conflict, some 10 million people, including 4.1 million military and 5.9 million civilians. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fought for Ukraine’s independence against both the German army and the Soviet army. The Ukrainian Front Armies of the Soviet armed forces captured and liberated Auschwitz, the infamous death camp, and helped capture Berlin.

The authors of this publication are: Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto; Andrew Gregorovich, Librarian Emeritus, University of Toronto; and Dr. Oleh S. Romanyschyn, editor-in-chief of the Toronto-based newspaper *Homin Ukrainy* (Ukrainian Echo).