

Prairie Canada, the heartland of the Ukrainian Canadians in 1971, the year that "Multiculturalism" was first proclaimed official policy by the Canadian Government. Map courtesy of the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine.*

CANADIAN ETHNIC POLITICS AND CANADA'S POLICY TOWARD THE USSR'S "UKRAINIAN QUESTION"

Thomas M. Prymak

Across the twentieth century, the Ukrainian Canadians formed one of the country's largest and most high profile ethnic groups. In the 1890s, upon their first arrival in the British Empire's "Dominion of Canada," they clearly constituted an underprivileged "out-group." However, despite their then generally low level of education (most of them were manual workers or farmers of recent peasant background), they were still able to take advantage of Canada's liberal democratic public institutions and decentralised legal-administrative system to participate in local, provincial, and eventually federal politics; and by the latter half of the twentieth century, they had acquired an importance and political significance that could not be easily ignored, at least in matters that directly concerned them.[1]

A result of this situation was that not only did the Ukrainians influence local politics on the Canadian Prairies (which were their original region of settlement), but they also came to have some effect upon Canada's foreign policies regarding the USSR and their ancestral homeland in Europe. By that time, this homeland formed a major geographic, demographic, and economic part of the USSR, a "Union Republic" of the Soviet Union, theoretically with rights to full independence, and in fact, the second most important republic of that Union, preceded in

[1] No up-to-date synthetic history of the Ukrainian Canadians across the twentieth century yet exists. But see *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada,* (ed.) Manoly R. Lupul (Toronto-Ottawa: M&S, 1982), and S.J. Nesdoly, "The Ukrainian Canadians' Role in Canadian-Soviet Relations," in *Canadian-Soviet Relations 1939-1980*, ed. Aloysius Balawyder (Oakville: Mosaic, 1981), 107-127, which touches closely upon our topic here.

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population and importance only by Soviet Russia itself.[2] This fact was underlined in the 1970s by the geopolitical thinker Zbigniew Brzezinski, who postulated that with Ukraine "subdued" Russia automatically became an authoritarian "empire" with the population and power to dominate eastern Europe and to subdue Central Asia. But without Ukraine, as Brzezinski later added, Russia had a real chance to discard its imperial past and become a viable, normal, and prosperous "nation" and a democracy. So, across that "short twentieth century," which began in 1914 and ended in 1991, Ukraine was a low-profile but very real factor in global geopolitics.[3]

This study will demonstrate that despite this low-profile, especially in international diplomacy, the "Ukrainian Question," as it was sometimes called, or the desire of Ukrainians for national freedom, was recurrent, and sometimes exploded spectacularly onto the world stage, and that the Ukrainian Canadians played a little-known but important role in this story.

THE SETTLERS

Of course, even prior to the formation of the USSR, the Ukrainians as a people also played a part in Canadian history. Under their previous names "Galician" (a geographic/political term) and "Ruthenian" (a more ethno-religious term) in the period from 1896 to 1914, they had begun immigrating in great numbers to Canada. The Canadian government wanted skilled agriculturalists to settle Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, which had always been sparsely populated, and the native inhabitants of which had been devastated by the introduction of new European diseases, political and military setbacks in 1870 and 1885, and subsequent displacement onto reserves. At the time, the Government of Wilfrid Laurier, and her Majesty's Government in London too, feared American expansion northward into this Canadian Dominion, and they solicited and welcomed the skilled new settlers from the provinces of Galicia and Bukovina in the Habsburg Monarchy in East Central Europe. These "Galicians," as both groups were generally called in Canada, largely settled the so-called "Poplar Belt," a lightly treed area, which ran along the northern rim of the Canadian Prairie, and so they formed coherent Block Settlements, which soon made them a power in local elections.

Even before 1914, in the prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, they were electing to office, school board members, municipal reeves, and even a handful of members of the provincial legislative assemblies. In the 1890s, a few had even volunteered to join the Canadian contingent of the British Army to fight in the Boer War. But there was still no sign that they could in any way influence higher politics in the Dominion, let alone the Empire. Despite their considerable numbers in a vast country of only about five million (well over 170,000 before 1914), they were mainly of peasant stock, too little educated, and lacking a professionally trained élite. This would change somewhat in the inter-war period.[4]

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[2] Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1964).
[3] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997). In the 1970s, Brzezinski made a point of getting some Soviet Ukrainian dissidents out of the USSR and over to the West. Among them was Valentyn Moroz, who is mentioned below. See Brzezinski's *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux, 1983), 339. For Brzezinski's opinions on Ukraine as late as 2011, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnXaFMFU3v4&t=414s Accessed 5/1/2023.
[4] For a detailed history of this era, see Orest Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1991). On "Galician" Canadian immigrants and "the Transvaal War," see V.J. Kaye, *Ukrainian*

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In fact, war and revolution in Europe brought enormous changes to the Galicians in Canada. They were immediately forced to distance themselves from their former Austrian sovereigns in Europe and could not refuse loyalty to their new ones in England and British North America. But still, there were problems: on the very eve of the Empire's entry into the war against the Central Powers, the major religious leader of the Galicians in Canada, Bishop Nikita Budka, the Canadian primate of the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church of Canada, responded to Austrian custom by urging the settlers to be faithful to their Habsburg Sovereign, and when shortly later, Britain entered the war against Germany and Austria, the Bishop had to swiftly reverse policy and support "the British nation." This was deeply embarrassing to the Ruthenian bishop and his disoriented flock.

The first bishop of the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church of Canada, Nikita Budka (1877-1949). Budka was well educated and from the same south-eastern part of Galicia as most of the Ruthenians in Canada, where he arrived in 1912. A dedicated and saintly pastor but a poor administrator, his time saw both embarassment over his stance at the beginning of the war, and the Great Revolt against the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church over the issue of church property, resulting in the foundation of the breakaway Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada. He returned to Galicia (under the Republic of Poland) in 1928, was arrested upon the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine in 1944, and died in the Gulag, a martyr for his faith. Credit: Wikipedia.

Then all recently arrived immigrants from enemy countries were compelled to register as "enemy aliens" and report regularly to the authorities; several thousand Ruthenians, mostly itinerants, the unemployed, or those seeking to travel to the neutral United States (but not so much those safely ensconced on isolated homesteads) were interned in special work camps in Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia. In 1916, Anglo-Canadian nativist sentiment forced the abolition of the bilingual Ruthenian-English educational system in Manitoba, and Saskatchewan and Alberta also took some action along those same lines; in 1917 the Wartime Elections Act took the vote away from "enemy aliens" naturalized since 1902 and gave it to the mothers and wives of serving soldiers, who were mostly English. All this had a debilitating effect upon the Galician settlers and revealed how little they then mattered to "the powers that be" in Canada.[5]

FROM "GALICIAN" TO UKRAINIAN

Moreover, the politics of the war, and the revolutions in Europe that followed, put other pressures upon the Ruthenians in Canada. The collapse of the Russian and Austrian empires, and the rise of new states on their ashes, complicated matters for the former settlers, who were just beginning to move in ever larger numbers from their isolated homesteads into various Canadian towns and cities. The rapid rise and fall of new Ukrainian national governments in Kyiv and the former Galicia gave their compatriots in Canada a new sense of national identity and patriotism

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Canadians in Canada's Wars (Toronto: UCRF, 1983), 9, quoting a brief notice in the *Dauphin Press*, 3 Nov. 1899. Dauphin is a town in the Manitoba section of the Poplar Belt.

[5] Martynowych, *Formative Years*, 309-452; Stella Hryniuk, "The Bishop Budka Controversy: A New Perspective," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 23, no. 2 (1981), 154-65; and especially, *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada during the Great War* (ed.) Frances Swyripa and J.H. Thomson (Edmonton: CIUS, 1983).

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that they hitherto had not generally possessed. This was publicly marked by the change in name that then occurred among them, as they were ever more strongly identifying themselves as "Ukrainians." After all, those new national governments in Europe, though ephemeral, all bore the new name "Ukrainian," and even the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) that replaced them did as well.[6]

As most Ruthenians in Canada had originated in Austrian Galicia, it was the Western Ukrainian National Republic (WUNR), whose government by 1920 was chased into exile by a better-equipped Polish army, that most concerned them. This government-in-exile set up shop in Vienna. In the 1920s, it had two representatives in Canada, who tried to establish relations with the Dominion Government and influence Canadian opinion on the Ukrainian question. Those diplomats were the former Lviv pedagogue Ivan Bobersky (1878-1947) and the writer Osyp Nazaruk (1883-1940). Both men were talented individuals who submitted memoranda to Ottawa and tirelessly propagated the Ukrainian cause in Canada. Their effect on Canadian government policy seems to have been negligible, but there can be no doubt that the effort to raise Ukrainian national consciousness among the former settlers enjoyed some success. A great deal of money was raised for the WUNR, and by the early 1930s the old names Galician and Ruthenian were disappearing from the census and a newly designated "Ukrainian Canadian community" had been formed. Indeed, even the Canadian Communist supporters of the USSR (many of whom were of once-upon-a-time "Ruthenian" origin) were enthusiastic about the Communist "experiment" and its first successes in Ukraine, and they pointed to the national achievements of citizens of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic in literature, education, and scholarship, which from the mid-1920s were to some extent possible in the soon-to-be standardized Ukrainian language.[7]

Ivan Bobersky (left) and Osyp Nazaruk (right), were the first Ukrainian diplomats in Canada. They represented the West Ukrainian National Republic founded in 1918 on the territory of old eastern Galicia but operating in exile in Vienna from 1920. Bobersky fit well into the Prairie context of the Ukrainians in Canada and became active in the sporting movement. He is shown here in winter dress holding his snowshoes. Nazaruk returned to Europe early and became a popular writer. Both men died in Europe, Bobersky in Communist Slovenia, and Nazaruk in Warsaw during the German occupation. Credits: Oseredok via the Museum of the Ukrainian Diaspora, Kyiv (Bobersky), and Wikipedia (Nazaruk).

[6] There is no study elucidating how and why the Ruthenians in Canada adopted the new name "Ukrainian." But see the brief remarks of Vladimir J. Kaye [Kysilevskyj], "The Problem of the Ethnic Name," in his *Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada 1895-1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), xxiii-xxvi, and the even briefer remarks of Robert B. Klymasz, *The Ukrainianization of Canada's Last "Ruthenians": A Newspaper Drama 1911-1919* (Winnipeg: Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies, University of Manitoba, 2018), published in photocopy, especially 42. Kaye, a 1920s immigrant to Canada, was an eyewitness to the later part of this process.

[7] Oleh W. Gerus, "Ukrainian Diplomatic Representation in Canada 1920-3," in *Loyalties in Conflict*, 143-58; John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada* (Toronto: PMA, 1979).

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THE INTERWAR AND SECOND WORLD WAR ERAS

However, Western Ukraine (as Galicia and its immediate neighbours were by then called) now largely fell under the control of the new Republic of Poland, which, though not a totalitarian state like the USSR, remained an authoritarian polity that denied its large Ukrainian minority (about 16 percent of the total population of the Republic) the most basic national rights, even those in education and politics that had been acquired with great difficulty under the Austrians. Consequently, in Canada, the Ukrainians now sought concessions from Warsaw rather than from Vienna (as in the past). Two issues arose that then concerned them: firstly, the matter of new immigration of Ukrainians from Poland to Canada, and secondly, the issue of the activities of Ukrainian nationalists in Canada in favour of Western Ukraine's independence from Poland.

The first issue was temporarily settled in 1925 with the conclusion of the Railways Agreement between the Dominion Government and the Polish Republic (it encouraged emigration from Poland to Canada and allowed the Canadian railways to handle it); and the second issue was met by determined inaction by Ottawa on the Ukrainian question in Europe. Such inaction was typical of the government of Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King, which concerned itself as little as possible with international politics, leaving most such matters to the Imperial Government in London. In fact, even in 1938 when Poland made strong representations to Ottawa as to Ukrainian Canadian support for nationalist "terrorists" in Poland, the Canadian government rebuffed Warsaw by pointing out that Poland had reneged on its promises to respect Galician autonomy, so echoing the position of London. The outbreak of the Second World War put an abrupt end to this era of Canada's involvement (or rather non-involvement) with the Ukrainian question in Europe.[8]

The Second World War began with German and Soviet collaboration in the partition of Poland, which nearly *de facto* made these two totalitarian powers allies against the Polish Republic, (and somewhat less so) against the British Empire and against France.


Winnipeg Free Press

WINNIPEG, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1940

tion in Near East Sho

All For One—One For All

Warning by Wood

UNITED EFFORT

Ukrainian Canadian Committee Elects Kushnir to Presidency

18 Contracts

THE UKRAINIAN CANADIAN COMMITTEE

The outbreak of war in September 1939 put severe pressure upon the Ukrainian organizations in Canada to unite in favour of supporting the cause. In November 1940, most of them, quietly spurred on by government agents (who included former London lobbyist Vladimir Kaye-Kysilevsky), finally united in the formation of a Ukrainian Canadian Committee (KUK). Only the pro-Communist Labour Temple organizations were left out. They did not support the war and were repressed (with their halls confiscated and some of their leaders interned) until Hitler's surprise attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. This clip shows the front page of the Winnipeg daily, *The Free Press*, announcing the formation of KUK. Seated in the centre are the Rev. Semen Sawchuk (left) and the Rev. Wasyl Kushnir (right), of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ruthenian Greek Catholic churches respectively.

[8] See: Bohdan Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 25, no. 4 (1983), 473-500; and my *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: MHSO, 1988), 21-22, 152-53. On Mackenzie King, see: Roy MacLaren, *Mackenzie King in the Age of the Dictators: Canada's Imperial and Foreign Policies* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019).

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КАНАДІЙСЬКИЙ ФАРМЕР
THE CANADIAN FARMER
Вибухла Російсько-Німецька Війна
Британія Обіцяє Дати Совітам Поміч

Front page of the most widely read non-Communist Ukrainian newspaper in Canada, Winnipeg's *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (The Canadian Farmer) covering the surprise German attack on the Soviet Union at 6:00 AM, 22 June 1941. The headlines read: "A Russian-German War Breaks Out!" "Britain Promises to give the Soviets Help!"

This startling news is accented by pictures of Hitler, Marshal Tymoshenko (an ethnic Ukrainian and one of the few Soviet military leaders to survive the Great Purges of 1937-38), Viacheslav Molotov (Soviet Foreign Minister), and at the very bottom, Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Hitler's surprise attack on the USSR in June 1941 reversed the political situation. Suddenly the pro-Communist Ukrainian organizations in Canada vigorously supported the war, and from 1941 to 1945 the Grand Alliance to defeat Germany brought the full establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the Soviet Union. At that time, a Soviet embassy was opened in Ottawa and a Soviet consulate established in Montreal. The agreement made provisions for a Canadian embassy in Moscow with a Canadian consulate to be established elsewhere, but the latter project did not come to pass. This later became important as there eventually arose a great hope among Ukrainians in Canada that such a Canadian consulate might be established in Kyiv, the capital of the UkSSR.[9] (After 1945, various Communist-ruled East European countries such as East Germany and Poland did establish such consulates in Kyiv. Indeed, even as early as the 1920s, Poland had had an embassy in Kharkiv, then the capital of fictionally "independent" Soviet Ukraine.)

Meanwhile, Canada's loyalty to the USSR as a wartime ally was so strong that public criticism of the Soviets was barely tolerated by the Dominion government, and the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada (a major nationalist organization) was forced to retreat into purely cultural endeavours, and at that time (1944) the Federation founded its Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre (*Oseredok*) in Winnipeg.[10] However, these superficially warm relations between Canada and the USSR did not long outlast the war. They were nipped in the bud by the Igor Gouzenko spy case, which exposed widespread Soviet spying in Canada, and the Korean War that followed made certain that they would not be fully restored any time soon.[11]

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[9] See John Diefenbaker's 1970 address to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, which makes reference to this wartime Canada-USSR agreement: "Speech of the Right Honorable John Diefenbaker," printed in full in English in *Ukrainskyi holos* (The Ukrainian Voice), Winnipeg, 14 October, 1970, 4.

[10] Information from UNF activist Stephen Pawluk, Toronto, c. 1985. After loosening its connection with the UNF, *Oseredok* became one of the most important Ukrainian cultural institutions in Canada with extensive museum, art, and library holdings.

[11] On Gouzenko, see Amy Knight, *How the Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies* (Toronto: M&S, 2005). Some members of the Ukrainian community in Toronto knew Gouzenko personally and believed him to be of Ukrainian ancestry or origin, though it was generally known that he had been born in Russia and considered himself Russian. (The "enko" surname ending sounds typically Ukrainian, and not Russian.) Information from Stephen Pawluk, Toronto, c. 1985. Pawluk had some wartime security clearance and was a founder of the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans Association.

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THE 1950s

Meanwhile, the numbers, name, prestige, and renown of the Ukrainian Canadians were continually growing. By the 1950s, they had in fact grown to become the fourth largest ethnic group in the Dominion after the British groups, the French, and the Germans, and almost everyone knew who they were.[12] The role played by some 30,000 Ukrainian "boys" in the Canadian Armed forces from 1939 to 1945 had raised their prestige somewhat in Canadian society, increased their self-confidence, and helped to make possible a considerably increased participation in Canadian public life. How could they not, given that among them were veterans of the Battle of the Atlantic, D-Day, Hong Kong, and even Burma? Mackenzie King's successor, the Liberal Louis Saint Laurent, was the first Canadian Prime Minister to appoint a Ukrainian to the Senate of Canada, and on a trip to Winnipeg he even attended and took communion at the great cathedral church of Saint Vladimir and Olga of the Eastern Rite Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church of Canada, a building completed only in 1948, four years before the name of that very conservative body finally changed its name from "Ruthenian" to "Ukrainian." This visit was an unusual act for a pious Roman Catholic of that time, especially a prime minister, but was entirely within the bounds of church law, and a clear sign of things to come.[13]



THE LONG LIBERAL PARTY ACCENDENCY, 1920s-1957

Louis Saint Laurent (1882-1973) was the Quebec "lieutenant" of Prime Minister Mackenzie King (with one interruption, the longest serving PM in Canadian history) and succeeded that extremely successful politician in 1948. Saint Laurent won two more big majorities in the House of Commons and held office until 1957. Saint Laurent was a devout Catholic and strong anti-Communist, supported NATO, sent Canadian troops to fight in Korea, and welcomed the east European Displaced Persons to Canada. He also took care to cultivate the Ukrainian vote on the Prairies as that group from the 1890s had been largely loyal to the Liberal Party of Canada. But this loyalty evaporated in the late 1950s with "the Prairie Populist," Progressive Conservative John G. Diefenbaker's accession to power.

Saint Laurent as well continued the policy begun by Mackenzie King of welcoming large numbers of war refugees to Canada. These were the so-called Displaced Persons (DPs), mostly from eastern Europe, who had fled the westward march of the Red Army in 1943-45. There were numerous Poles, a significant representation from the Baltic peoples, and a great many *Volksdeutsche*, ethnic Germans, like pacifist Mennonites from Ukraine, Sudeten Germans, and many others. Over 157,000 DPs and some 30,000 to 35,000 Ukrainian DPs entered Canada between 1947 and 1952. Almost all of them were vociferously anti-Communist and unlike the earlier waves of Galician and Ukrainian immigrants, many of them had some higher education.

[12] See for example V.J. Kaye-Kysilevskyj, *Slavic Groups in Canada* (Winnipeg: UVAN, 1951), the article by J.B. Rudnyckyj on "Ukrainian origin, People of," in the *Encyclopedia Canadiana*, 10 vols. (Ottawa: Grolier, 1958), X, 168-71, and the analysis in my "Two Encyclopedias: The Difference a War Made," *Ukrainski visti/Ukrainian News* (Edmonton), April 16-29, 2009, 7, which compares the treatment of Ukrainian Canadians in the Canadian encyclopedias published in 1936 and 1958. Also see my *Gathering a Heritage: Ukrainian, Slavonic, and Ethnic Canada and the USA* (Toronto: UTP, 2015), 243-45.

[13] Jurij Darewych Interview, Toronto, April, 2019. As a boy, Darewych was an eyewitness to this event.

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They soon put their stamp upon the character of the Ukrainian community in Canada, and some quickly became leaders in the effort to influence Canadian policy towards the USSR, especially regarding the liberation of Soviet Ukraine from the Communist dictatorship and the defence of the national and then "human" rights of its Ukrainian population. In fact, the cooperation of the sons and daughters of the older "Galician" immigration (much better educated than their forefathers) with the new politically motivated DPs was to be a marked, and eventually extremely successful, characteristic of this effort.[14]

It was also during Saint Laurent's term in office that the Prime Minister appointed William Wall (Wolochatiuk) of Manitoba (like Saint Laurent, a devout Catholic and head of the Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood) to the Senate of Canada, and mayors of Ukrainian background were elected to Canada's two major prairie cities with large Ukrainian populations: Steven Juba in Winnipeg and William Hawrelak in Edmonton, while Michael Starr (Starchevsky) was elected mayor of Oshawa in Ontario. All these mayors proved popular and were repeatedly returned to office. Starr eventually shifted to federal politics and became important in the Progressive Conservative Party in eastern Canada; in fact, he was instrumental in the election of the Prairie firebrand John G. Diefenbaker to lead the Conservatives in a coming contest, shoring up support for him in the east.[15]

Left: Social Credit MP Anthony Hlynka, who strongly supported DP immigration to Canada and made a fact-finding trip to the DP camps in Germany to see what could be done. Right: Captain Gordon (Bohdan) Panchuk, who saved the lives of thousands of DPs (including historian Dmytro Doroshenko and rightist ideologist Dmytro Dontsov) and their children by passing out business cards saying that the holders were under the protection of the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association in London, so preventing their deportation to the Soviet Gulag and, in many cases, almost certain death.

Nevertheless, as late as 1952, when the umbrella organization of all the non-Communist Ukrainian political and social organizations of Canada, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee which (as mentioned above), at the quiet instigation of Ottawa had been formed during the war to promote Canadian patriotism, presented a memorandum to the federal government to aid in the integration of Ukrainians into Canadian society and speak as a moral voice for the future "liberation" of Ukraine, bureaucrats in Ottawa agreed that while the first demand was legitimate,

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[14] For a brief survey of the three major "waves" of Ukrainian immigration to Canada before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, see Vladimir Kaye and Frances Swyripa, "Settlement and Colonization," in *Heritage in Transition*, 32-58. Also see: "Arrival of Displaced Persons in Canada." https://parks.canada.ca/culture/designation/evenement-event/personnes-deplacees-displaced-persons#:~:text=While%20the%20largest%20groups%20of,%2C%20Lithuanians%2C%20Romanians%20and%20Yugoslavians. Accessed 2024/11/04. Of course, the immigration of these DPs was vociferously opposed by the pro-Communist Ukrainian Labour Temple organizations and by many left-leaning Jews. But those groups had suddenly sunk in popularity with the end of the Grand Alliance and the outbreak of the Cold War. Among the DPs, there were also significant numbers of Jews of Polish and other origin, survivors of the Holocaust.

[15] On Wall, Juba, and Hawrelak, see Mykhailo Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians: A History*, (Winnipeg: UVAN, 1970), 708-709; on Starr, see Myron Momryk, *Mike Starr of Oshawa: A Political Biography* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2017). Later, as a prominent member of the Diefenbaker government, Starr knew Gouzenko personally and seems to have had good relations with him. Information from Momryk.

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the second was "unrealistic, dangerous" and would make for "bad propaganda." The government had no interest in "dismembering" the USSR.[16]

Indeed, as late as 1957, when J.B.C. Watkins of External Affairs described a Ukrainian Canadian delegation making similar demands, stressing "liberation" of the Ukrainians under Communist rule (as was then frequently done next door in the USA by President Eisenhower and the Republican Party), he pointed out that the minister ignored their demands but politely inquired about some Ukrainian mutual acquaintances in Winnipeg, which managed to make all the delegation "feel important," and, as Watkins concluded, "as far as I could judge was the main point of their visit." Such was the typically dismissive attitude of the Ottawa bureaucrats to the concerns of Ukrainian Canadians.[17]

JOHN G. DIEFENBAKER

But the country was changing. The Conservative electoral sweep of 1958 led by John Diefenbaker produced seven Conservative MPs, mostly from the Prairie Provinces, who were of clearly Ukrainian background, and "Dief the Chief" as he quickly became known, was sympathetic to their national and ethnic aspirations. In fact, he was to make the "liberation" of Ukraine from the USSR a major plank of what he believed to be the most important speech that he was to make on international affairs. Attitudes such as that of Watkins, expressed the year before, would in future have to be voiced by the Ottawa bureaucrats in more cautious tones, at least in memoranda to the PMs Office.[18]

By contrast, Diefenbaker, who openly sympathized with prairie Canadians and Canadian "ethnics," including the Ukrainians, as two French Canadian historians put it, "embodied the democratic ideal of the Prairies as against the power of the establishment of central Canada."[19] He was of partly German ancestry on his father's side and had suffered considerable discrimination because of his family name. So, he shared something very real with those ethnic Canadians in general and Ukrainians in particular. He had begun his career as a prairie lawyer and gained some renown as a high-profile defence attorney, but long before bilingualism was accepted as federal policy, he also defended the cultural rights of French Canadians in Saskatchewan. He began practice in the little village of Wakaw in north-central Saskatchewan, which was in the heart of the Ukrainian settlement belt, and as a young lawyer had played soccer on the local Ukrainian soccer team. So, from the start, "Dief" had good relations with the Ukrainian community, and these lasted throughout his career.[20]

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[16] See Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents on the History of Ukrainians in Canada* (Kingston: Limestone, 1986), 157.

[17] *Ibid*., 166-67.

[18] On the seven MPs see Marunchak, *Ukrainian Canadians*, 707-708.

[19] Jean-François Cardin and Claude Couture, *Histoire du Canada: Espace et différences* (Quebec City : PUL, 1996), 148: "[Diefenbaker] incarnait l'idéal démocratique des Prairies face au pourvoir de l'establishment du Canada central."

[20] For a photo of the Ukrainian team, see Marunchak, *Ukrainian Canadians*, 186. On Diefenbaker more generally, see Dennis Smith, *Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker* (Toronto: Macfarlane, 1995), and "John G. Diefenbaker," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* on-line. Accessed 2/7/2021; Thomas van Dusen, *The Chief* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Peter C. Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years* (Toronto: M&S, 1963); George Bowering, *Egotists and Autocrats: The Prime Ministers of Canada* (Toronto: Viking, 1999), 325-57. Also see: *One Canada: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker* 3 vols. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975-77), especially vol. II.

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

John Diefenbaker is in the back row, third from the left and wearing a tie. Credit: Marunchak.

As to Canada-USSR relations generally, these continued to be frigid to the death of Stalin in 1953. With Stalin's demise, a power struggle ensued in the Kremlin. The entire politburo feared and loathed Lavrenty Beria, a Georgian like Stalin, who was his NKVD secret police chief. Significantly, Beria made a play for power by cultivating the support of non-Russian Soviet nationalities like the Ukrainians. But he was quickly outmanoeuvred by the former head of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), Nikita Khrushchev, who, with the support of the Soviet war hero General Zhukov, managed to oust Beria, who was immediately taken out and later shot. Within a short time, Khrushchev emerged as supreme leader of the USSR.

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

Khrushchev had been closely associated with Ukraine throughout most of his political career, and it was rumoured and believed by many, both Soviet citizens and outsiders, that he was of Ukrainian background. In fact, he had been born outside the territory that became Soviet Ukraine but close to its border, perhaps of Ukrainian parents.[21] In the 1930s, while in charge of the UkSSR he had overseen the Stalin purges there and was known as a merciless apparatchik. He had headed the Republic during the Second World War and with the advance of the Red Army in 1944 oversaw the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine and fought against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. However, his second wife was Ukrainian, and he also advocated the annexation to his fiefdom of her native Kholm or Chełm district and organized a letter-writing campaign from Kyiv to Moscow that supported this.

But such action violated Stalin's plan for the westward move of Soviet borders only as far as the Curzon Line and was rejected. When Khrushchev was transferred to Moscow, he brought with him some of his Ukrainian supporters, and he maintained close relations with those who

[21] On Khrushchev's obscure national identity, I have written: "Of Beetles and Buzzing: Reflections on Nikita Khrushchev's Surname," Unpublished MS. 7 pp.

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remained behind. These included both Nikolai Podgorny (Mykola Pidhirny in Ukrainian) and Leonid Brezhnev (an ethnic Russian, perhaps like Khrushchev himself).[22]

By 1956, Khrushchev's Secret Speech to the Party's Twentieth Congress was geared to partly dismantle the Stalin terror that had long held the population and Party as well as those in the Soviet "Satellite States" in Eastern Europe in its firm grip. But the new leader did not even remotely dismantle the Communist dictatorship: the dreaded NKVD political police, now renamed the KGB, remained intact, and the 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary were firmly put down. The world was still largely divided into a democratic West and a Communist "East Bloc" of countries; and they were to shortly face each other down at the UN General Assembly in New York City, in Germany, and in Cuba.

Nevertheless, both sides made repeated attempts to reduce international tensions and avoid a new global war, which would mean a nuclear conflagration. So, in 1959, US President Eisenhower even invited Khrushchev to visit the United States. Khrushchev accepted and toured various American cities from New York to Los Angeles. He also wished to visit Canada, but Diefenbaker was cool to the idea, and Khrushchev never stepped onto Canadian soil.[23] Still, the US visit went well, and Khrushchev managed to charm much of the American public by his outgoing and emotionally expressive personality.

KHRUSHCHEV'S FIRST AMERICAN VISIT WENT WELL

Left: Nina Petrivna Khrushcheva, American First Lady Mamie Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev, and USA President Dwight D. Eisenhower at an official banquet welcoming the Soviet couple to the USA during their state visit in 1959. Credit: US National Archives via Wikipedia. Accessed 2023/06/25.

Shortly afterwards, however, relations suddenly took a turn for the worse. The Soviets managed to shoot down an American U2 Spy Plane flying over the USSR, and the Soviet leader was determined to use the incident to embarrass the Americans on the world stage. The captured pilot was displayed on Soviet television and seen across the world, and a subsequent summit in Paris went very badly. Canada backed the Americans in this matter, which Khrushchev certainly could not have liked. Nevertheless, the parties agreed to meet again at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York in September 1960.

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[22] Roman Kabachii, "Khrushchev i Zakerzonnia," [Khrushchev and the Lands beyond the Curzon Line] *Nashe slovo*, no. 45, (Warsaw, 2012). Available on-line at: http://archive.li/ehRcL Accessed 4/6/2021. On Khrushchev more generally, see the biographies by Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev: A Career* ((New York: Viking, 1966), and William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and his Era* (New York: Norton, 2003). For a perceptive Ukrainian summary, see Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 278-82, 292-305.

[23] Jamie Glazov, *Canadian Policy toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 99-102.

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Press photo (collage/montage) of the May 1960 Commonwealth First Minsters Conference in London. It met to discuss international politics and the future of the Commonwealth, which was then seeing numerous former British colonies gaining full independence and entering the United Nations. The confrontation with the USSR was in the air. Diefenbaker is in the middle flanked by Nehru of India on the left and Menzies of Australia on the right. The Canadian Prime Minister was the only "white" commonwealth leader who wished to push South Africa into making a statement on human rights. South Africa refused, and it left the Commonwealth. Credit: Winnipeg's *Novyi shliakh* (The New Pathway), May 23, 1960.

COLD WAR CLASH

Khrushchev came to New York with a plan and a program. Many new countries, former European colonies, had acquired national independence in the years after 1945. Some of these former colonies, led by India, were beginning to form a new, more non-aligned constituency within the UN. Still others were in the process of acquiring a similar independence, and the question of colonization and decolonization was in the air. Khrushchev wished to use this situation to Soviet advantage by appealing to these countries and so gain an anti-West majority of seats in the General Assembly. He wanted decolonization to be put on the Assembly's agenda.

In September, as the world's leaders met in New York, disturbances broke out in the formerly Belgian Congo and its new leader Patrice Lumumba was killed. Khrushchev held the West, the Belgians, and the UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld responsible for this tragedy and in statements to the press and in a fiery speech to the Assembly condemned the West, demanded complete disarmament, pointed to the U2 incident, and bragged about Communist achievements in Soviet Central Asia, while Africa, as he put it, was "bubbling and seething like a volcano" in its struggles against Western colonialism/imperialism. He listed several African countries, West Irian (the western half of New Guinea), and even US-governed Puerto Rico as such oppressed nations. The speech aroused considerable applause in the hall and made headlines around the world. In Canada, it was featured in the next day's issue of Toronto's *Globe and Mail*. These bellicose accusations required an immediate Western response.[24]

[24] *Globe and Mail*, 24 September 1960. Also available on-line: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/155185.pdf?v=9f7ac7df82c2cf1162b9f845c67ef067 Accessed 2/19/2021.

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As it turned out, it was neither President Eisenhower nor Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan but rather Canada's John Diefenbaker who was the next major Western Representative to speak. It fell to him to reply to Khrushchev's vociferous harangue. He did so with relish. His speech was well-planned and set out in some detail his fundamental ideas about Soviet rule. He addressed the topic of colonialism in both the so-called "Third World" and in Eastern Europe. When preparing this speech, he had encountered considerable resistance from his officials in External Affairs, who still considered it inappropriate to question the legitimacy of Soviet rule in Ukraine and elsewhere. Those unnamed officials strongly discouraged any mention whatsoever of that burning Ukrainian question that Khrushchev had faced across his career, and which only recently had nearly cost him his life at the hands of NKVD Chief Beria. But those Canadian officials seemed to know nothing of such matters. At the same time, Diefenbaker, attuned as he was to the Ukrainian question, could clearly see through Khrushchev's ploy and was resolved to expose it and turn the whole decolonization question against the Soviet Union itself. The relevant parts of his speech read as follows:

> I turn now to a subject dealt with at great length by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR [Nikita Khrushchev on] the subject of colonialism. He asked for and advocated a declaration at this session for "the complete and final elimination of colonial regimes." I think it would be generally agreed that, whatever the experience of the past, there can no longer be a relationship of master and servant anywhere in the world. He has spoken of colonial bondage, of exploitation and of foreign yokes. Those views uttered by the master of the major colonial power in the world today [the USSR], followed by the admission of fourteen new member nations to the United Nations – all of them former colonies [of the European states] – I pause to ask this question: How many human beings have been liberated by the USSR? Do we forget how [Hungary] one of the postwar colonies of the USSR sought to liberate itself four years ago, and with what results? I say that because these facts of history in the Commonwealth and other countries invite comparison with the domination over peoples and territories sometimes gained under the guise of liberation but always accompanied by the loss of political freedom.… What of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia? What of the freedom loving Ukrainians and many other Eastern European peoples which I shall not name for fear of omitting some of them?…
>
> There can be no double standard in international affairs. I ask the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to give those nations under his domination the right of free elections under genuinely free conditions. If those conclusions were what his words meant, for they must apply universally, then indeed there will be new action to carry out the obligations of the United Nations Charter; then indeed will there be new hope for all mankind. My hope is that those words of his will be universally acceptable and that he will give the lead towards their implementation here and now.

Diefenbaker closed with a brief synopsis of Canada's modest place in the world: a middle power, responsible, but threatening to no one, a country with roots in two European nations, Britain and France, but made up of "all races of men that have come to us."[25]

[25] The speech was titled "Peoples want Peace, not Propaganda." Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, mimeographed text. 60/32, 26 September 1960. Also partly in Diefenbaker, *One Canada*, II, 132-36, and Smith, *Rogue Tory*, 374-76. For much of what follows, see my "Cold War Clash, New York City, September-October 1960: Comrade Khrushchev vs. 'Dief the Chief'," *International History Review*, 45, no. 1 (2023), 134-51.

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John G. Diefenbaker and his Foreign Minister Howard Greene at the United Nations in New York City in September 1960. The opposition to Diefenbaker's speech in the bureaucracy of the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian diplomatic corps, both much given to decorum, and much influenced by the veteran Canadian diplomat, Nobel Peace Prize winning Lester B. Pearson, was very strong. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, Charles Ritchie, ignored both Diefenbaker's speech and the vociferous Soviet response in his diary of those times. The omission is certainly very striking.

REACTION TO THE DIEFENBAKER SPEECH

The speech aroused general applause in the Assembly, though the Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin walked out in the middle of it. Both Khrushchev and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had demonstratively boycotted it to attend a luncheon given by Canadian financier Cyrus Eaton, scion of one of the country's most prominent families, who was well-known for his peace-making efforts and had just received the USSR's Lenin Prize for strengthening peace.[26]

But "Dief" had succeeded in turning the Cold War aspect of the colonialism/imperialism question on its head by accusing the USSR of being imperialism's most aggressive agent. He had listed the aggrieved nations of Eastern Europe one by one and ended in a great crescendo with "the freedom loving Ukrainians," a dig that was both a direct response to Khrushchev's interference in USA internal affairs by calling Puerto Rico an oppressed colony, and by answering the demand of the Ukrainian Canadians that their government do something to state the justice of their cause and their moral superiority over their Soviet and pro-Communist ideological foes.

Joseph Slogan (1931-2024), one of the seven new Progressive Conservative MPs of Ukrainian background elected to Parliament in the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958. In his maiden speech to the Commons, he referenced the native peoples ("Indians" and Métis) and Ukrainians in his riding (Springfield), which then extended from north Winnipeg to the northern edge of the Prairie and beyond. He fought to extend hospital and other services for these constituents and took an interest in international affairs, attending the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September-October 1960.

[26] Newman, *Renegade in Power*, 259. By contrast, Joseph Slogan, a prominent Ukrainian Canadian MP from Winnipeg attended Diefenbaker's speech as member of the forty-eight member Canadian delegation and an observer from the Canadian parliament. On the Eaton luncheon, see *Khrushchev in New York: A Documentary Record of Nikita S. Khrushchev's Trip to New York, September 19th to October 13th 1960* (New York: Crosscurrents, 1960), 107-15.

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ДІФЕНБЕЙКЕРІВ "СТАТУТ ПРАВ" СТАВ ЗАКОНОМ

НОВИЙ ШЛЯХ

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ДОМАГАЮТЬСЯ КАНАДИСЬКОГО ПРАПОРУ И ГИМНУ

ЦІНА ЗБІРКИ Д-РА ГАЛТЕРА В БІБЛІОТЕЦІ УНІВЕРСИТЕТУ

ХРУЩОВ ВІДВІДАЄ МЕКСИКУ

"З НОГО МОЖЕ ПОЧАТИСЬ СВІТОВА ВІЙНА..."

ІСТОРІЯ ВИНИ З СОВ. ПЕРЕРОБКУ

ПРОВІНЦІЯЛЬНІ ВИБОРИ В Б. К.

ЕКОНОМІЧНИЙ НАСТУП МОСКВИ В АФРИЦІ

A PRIEST IN POLITICS

Left: The Front Page of Winnipeg's *Novyi shliakh* (The New Pathway) announcing the Canadian Bill of Rights promulgated by Diefenbaker. Right: The Rev. Wasyl Kushnir of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (later Congress). Diefenbaker's powerful speech at the United Nations advocating the national and political rights of the Ukrainian and other East European peoples had been strongly supported by the Rev. Wasyl Kushnir, the Committee's president, and was roundly applauded by the Ukrainian language press in both Canada and the United States. But that speech was in line with many other actions by Diefenbaker such as his "Bill of Rights," passed by the Parliament of Canada shortly before his trip to New York. It banned discrimination based on national, religious, or racial origin. His action granting "Indians" and "Eskimos" (the native peoples of Canada) the vote, his defence of the Blacks of South Africa, his previous defence of French in Saskatchewan schools, and his introduction of simultaneous French-English translation in the House of Commons were all further measures in this regard.

In fact, there is some evidence that the Rev. Wasyl Kushnir, the President of the umbrella Ukrainian Canadian Committee, and a personal friend of Diefenbaker, had been one of the strongest advocates of Diefenbaker discussing Ukraine in this historic address.[27] On the other hand, it was quite clear to all that mere mention of the Ukrainian question went down badly with the mandarins in External in Ottawa and with Canadian diplomats elsewhere, and also most probably with the former Canadian diplomat, recent Nobel Peace Prize-winner, and presently leader of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition, Lester B. Pearson, after whom those mandarins were scathingly labelled as "pearsonalities."[28]

Moreover, beyond the UN building in New York, Dief's speech met a varied reception. Although both Eisenhower and Macmillan congratulated him on it, and the latter was, as Diefenbaker later recalled, downright "glowing" in his praise, on the very same day that he delivered it, Kennedy debated Nixon on American TV. Consequently, the American media simply ignored the Canadian PM.

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[27] Darewych interview. Darewych was associated with the great Church of Saints Vladimir and Olga, of which Kushnir was a pastor. Also: O. Baran, *Pratsia dlia tserkvy i narodu: Zyttia i diialnist O. Vasylia Kushnira* [Working for Church and People: The Life and Activity of Father Wasyl Kushnir] (Winnipeg: KF, 1995), 169, 177, with a photo of the Diefenbaker and Kushnir together. For the KGB's take on Kushnir, see O. Skrypnyk, "Otets Vasyl Kushnir: Pershyi presydent Komitetu ukraintsiv Kanady," in *Ukrainska Pravda* (Kyiv), Nov. 4, 2024. With photos of KGB documents. On-line at: https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2024/11/6/164445/ Accessed 2024/11/07.

[28] John F. Hilliker, "The Politicians and the 'Pearsonalities': The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations," *Historical Papers*, 19, no. 1 (1984), 151-67.

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By contrast, Canadian newspapers and the Ukrainian language press in both the USA and Canada were exuberant in their praise. New York's *Ukrainian Weekly*, Winnipeg's *Novyi shliakh* (The New Pathway), and Toronto's *Vilne slovo* (The Free Word) all agreed that the speech was a bombshell that strove to break the silence over the Ukrainian question. Toronto's *Globe and Mail* too was positive.[29] Munich-based Radio Free Europe immediately broadcast it into Eastern Europe in both Ukrainian and Russian, where, judging by the Soviet government's vociferous response, it instantly became a sensation. The text even filtered across the USSR to the snows of Siberia and reached across the barbed wire fences of the Gulag to echo among the numerous prisoners there, becoming, as one of its most prominent inmates, the Ukrainian churchman Joseph Cardinal Slipyj, was later quoted as saying, "…the greatest moral support ever received by political prisoners in Soviet Russia."[30]



Nikita Khrushchev flanked by a young Andrei Gromyko at the United Nations in September-October 1960. Khrushchev's shoe lies on his desk in front of him. The Spanish delegation sat immediately in front of the Soviet delegations (the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR both had delegations of their own), and when the Spaniards (representatives of Generalissimo Francisco Franco's regime) snickered at one of Khrushchev's provocative speeches, the Communist leader verbally burst out at them so violently that UN security was called in to protect the Spanish representatives. Credit: Wikipedia.

THE SOVIETS REACT TOO

Khrushchev, of course, had the exact opposite reaction to Diefenbaker than did Ukrainians in the West. His behaviour suddenly became more boisterous, erratic, and more abusive of decorum than ever. His major American biographer William Taubman describes it as that of a "whirling dervish." He came close to physically knocking Diefenbaker by the shoulder while passing him in the hallway, repeatedly interrupted Dag Hammarskjöld and Macmillan who spoke a few days later, and simply went berserk when a later speaker repeated Diefenbaker's remarks. That was the famous incident where he took off his shoe and banged it on his desk in protest, while the entire Soviet and Communist delegations

[29] Discussion in Prymak, "Cold War Clash."

[30] "Diefenbaker Thanked for Support," *Globe and Mail*, 29 October 1976, and more extensively: Diefenbaker, *One Canada*, II, 135-36. The *Globe* may have slightly misquoted Slipyj, for (given the whole point of the speech) he most probably would have said, not "in Soviet Russia," but rather "…in the Soviet Union," that polity consisting of much more than simply "Russia." Also see Orysia Tracz, "The Release of Cardinal Slipyj: Mordovian Concentration Camp Version," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 4 March, 2012, which describes how American President John F. Kennedy and Pope John XXIII, with the reluctant co-operation of Khrushchev, managed to get Slipyj out of the Gulag and over to the West, where he visited his flock in Canada on several occasions. At the time, it was generally believed that the Morris West novel, *The Shoes of the Fisherman* (later made into a Hollywood film), was about Slipyj, though he never actually became a pope. However, two decades later, the Polish bishop Karol Wojtyła did, in part fulfill the Morris West prophesy.

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shouted and pounded their desks with their fists. But Gromyko, a stickler for decorum, was shocked and dismayed by Khrushchev's rude behaviour.[31]

In a confidential KGB newsletter that went out to various KGB offices across the USSR, KGB General-Major N. Zakharov (who was a member of the Soviet delegation) explained that Khrushchev's boisterous antics at the United Nations were meant to break through a public relations "boycott" of Khrushchev in New York. Zakharov accused the American State Department of organizing this supposed "boycott" and being behind the many anti-Communist demonstrations, especially by Ukrainians and Hungarians, that followed. But the Major-General did not dare or care to mention the shoe-banging incident or the other obtrusive antics of the Soviet and other Communist delegations in the UN assembly hall and only quoted from the Western press, when it remarked on Khrushchev's importance.[32]

Khrushchev also ordered Nikolai Podgorny, the head of the UkSSR delegation, to directly reply to Diefenbaker in the Ukrainian language and the head of the Belorussian delegation, K.T. Mazurov to do so in Belorussian, if he could. (As it turned out, Mazurov could not even speak Belorussian!) But Pidhirny (to use the Ukrainian orthography of his surname) personally attacked Diefenbaker, accused him of posing as a false "liberator" of Ukraine, referred (but only once) to the UkSSR's sovereign status, and ended by pointing to the many Ukrainian farmers and workers in Canada who had served that country well and might be a basis for improved relations between Canada and the USSR. Pidhirny's speech, in fact, seems to have been the first time that the Ukrainian language was ever spoken from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly, Russian to then being the incumbent language used by Soviet diplomats.

Nikolai Podgorny (Russ.) Mykola Pidhirny (Ukr.) (1903-1983) was head of the Ukrainian SSR delegation to the United Nations in 1960. A supporter of Khrushchev, he had long worked with him in Ukraine, but Pidhirny turned against him in 1964 and was one of the famous "Troika" (Brezhnev, "Podgorny," Kosygin) who replaced him. Pidhirny tried to promote Ukrainian elements in the CPU and was an ally of subsequent Ukrainian Party leader Petro Shelest (late 1960s and early 1970s). His 1977 removal from power in Moscow was preceded by the 1972 purges of the Ukrainian Party and intelligentsia that included the removal of Shelest and his "exile" to compulsory retirement in Moscow. It is unknown to what extent Pierre Trudeau's remarkably and unexpectedly popular 1971 Kyiv visit shook up Moscow or had any influence upon these events.

Ignored by the mainline North American press (and even by the émigré Ukrainian press), Pidhirny's pathbreaking Ukrainian language speech was however printed out in full by pro-Communist Ukrainian newspapers in Canada, that is, those of the Ukrainian Labour Temple movement. Simultaneously, authorities in Soviet Ukraine organized mass demonstrations against Diefenbaker in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, and other Ukrainian cities. There can be no doubt that the Prime Minister had made a splash that

[31] See my "Cold War Clash," and Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 475. In a private letter of September 29, 1960, Diefenbaker says that Khrushchev did not actually knock him but "nearly did." See *Personal Letters of a Public Man: The Family Letters of John G. Diefenbaker*, ed. Thad McIlroy (Toronto: Doubleday, 1985), 100-101.

[32] N. Zakharov, "O poezdke tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva na XV sessiiu Generalnoi Assamblei OON," [On the Trip of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to the Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly], *Sbornik KGB SSR*, no. 5 (8), 1960, 11-25. This article, published in a classified general magazine for KGB officers (sometimes called *The KGB Digest*), was released to me from the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) as part of their effort (begun post-2014 "Euromaidan Revolution" in Kyiv) of opening formerly secret KGB documents for public use by historians. Courtesy of archive curator Eduard Andryushchenko.

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extended well beyond the usually restrained diplomatic circles in New York, Washington, and elsewhere.[33]

However, it would be wrong to classify Diefenbaker as a "Cold Warrior" on account of his support for free elections in the Communist Bloc and for an independent Ukraine. He continued to advocate peaceful Canada-USSR trade relations, arranged for new grain sales to both Communist China and the Soviets, and was unenthusiastic about Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis that followed. In contrast to his warm admiration for Eisenhower, his relations with Kennedy thereafter became decidedly cool. Within Canada, he closed the Avro Arrow program for new RCAF fighter jets and never advocated nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Despite his reputation as a "populist" and his faith in declarative statements of principle, such as his UN speech, he remained realistic about changing world affairs. When he eventually lost re-election to Lester Pearson, the old policies of ignoring the Ukrainian question returned, and Canadian policy towards the USSR reverted to standard diplomatic decorum.[34]

Dief's sale of Canadian wheat to Red China and the USSR was an epochal event for Canada-USSR relations and also for the political loyalties of the Prairie Ukrainians, who then largely passed over from the Liberals to the Progressive Conservatives. But it was preceded by private negotiations between Diefenbaker's fellow prairie lawyer, Wasyl Swystun (1893-1964) and Khrushchev. Swystun had been a leader of the 1920s Great Orthodox Revolt against the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church of Canada, covered for the rightist Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) during the War, and drifted towards cooperation with the Soviets afterwards. After Stalin's death, he toured the USSR, had a private conference with Khrushchev in the Kremlin, and, eventually, negotiated Canadian wheat sales there with the Soviets. This picture of Swystun is dated 1919 when both lawyers were resident in north-central Saskatchewan. Credit: L. Luciuk and S. Hryniuk, *Ukrainian Canadians: Negotiating an Identity* (Toronto: UTP, 1991).

LESTER B. PEARSON

During Pearson's time, East-West relations were strained by American intervention in the Vietnam War, which grew in intensity over the course of several years. Canada, however, true to Pearsonian theories of Canadian statecraft, stood aside from the conflict and was a member of the International Commission geared to ending it peacefully. Under Pearson, Canadian wheat sales to the USSR that had been engineered by Diefenbaker were carried through. Moreover, Canada's cautious approach to Vietnam helped to make possible the USSR's significant participation in Expo 67, the World's Fair held in Montreal. The competition for the Fair had

[33] For the Pidhirny text, and articles and indignant letters attacking Diefenbaker, see the Labour Temple newspapers, Winnipeg's *Ukrainske slovo* (The Ukrainian Word) and Toronto's *Ukrainske zhyttia* (Ukrainian Life), both for 19 October, 1960. More generally, see the analysis of the former head of the Communist Party of France, a follower of Leon Trotsky, B[oris] Souvarine, "The USSR a Colonial Power," *Problems of the Peoples of the USSR*, no. 8 (Munich, 1961), 5-21, especially the subsection: "The Unprotected Flank of Khrushchev's Political Offensive: [The] Effects of Diefenbaker's Speech," 16-19.

[34] H.B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (Toronto: UTP, 1989); J. Ghent-Mallet and Don Munton, "Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba, 1962," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases* ed. D. Munton (Scarborough, Ontario: 1992), 78-100; Asa McKercher, "The Trouble with Self-Determination: Canada, Soviet Colonialism, and the United Nations, 1960-1963," *International Journal of Human Rights*, 20, no. 3 (2016), 323-64.

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been won by the USSR, but in April 1960, the Soviets withdrew their bid, citing security and financial concerns. The Diefenbaker government firmly supported Montreal's rival bid, the city won the competition, and the Fair was held in Montreal. The public quite naturally compared the American exhibit to the Soviet and found that while the Americans had the more impressive building design, the Soviets had the fuller interior, stressing their important contribution to the "space race," which was still in progress in 1967. That year, of course, marked the centenary of the Canadian Confederation and the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. The Soviet, Canadian, and American pavilions were all very popular.[35]



Expo 67: The World's Fair

1967 was the year of the centennial of the Canadian "Confederation" with celebrations all over the country. The World's Fair was held in Montreal and the Pam Am Games were held in Winnipeg. Meanwhile, in the USSR, the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution was held. So, both states wanted to put on a big show at Expo 67, the World's Fair. Not to be outdone, the Americans designed an impressive building to hold the American exhibit, which, like the Soviets, accented their achievements in the "Space Race!" This so-called "race" partly ended two years later in summer, 1969, when the Americans successfully landed on the moon.

Specifically on the Ukrainian question, under Pearson, External Affairs returned to its traditional aloofness to the whole matter. Department veterans such as George Ignatieff, a Russian émigré of aristocratic ancestry, who was a colleague of Pearson, would later paint the question as one of a simple search for peace. In his memoirs, Ignatieff was critical of Diefenbaker but absolutely scathing on Khrushchev, describing his bad manners as those of "a Ukrainian peasant."

This outrageous remark (at least in the eyes of Ukrainian Canadians, both Communist and anti-Communist) completely ignored the fact that Khrushchev had left his village as a boy and grew up as an industrial worker in the de-nationalized Donbas; but it does say something about diplomat Ignatieff's views of the Ukrainian question. More circumspect was the opinion of Canada's UN Ambassador Charles Ritchie, who in his account of September-October 1960 at the UN, hardly mentioned the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev clash. Ritchie also ignored Pidhirny's follow-up, which was aimed directly at Diefenbaker, Canada, and its Ukrainian communities, both "nationalist" and pro-Communist. Pidhirny had suggested that the latter would be a good bridge between the two countries. But his speech was ignored at the time and diplomatic historians have forgotten it ever since.[36]

The year 1968 augured many changes, though few of them seemed to directly affect Canada-USSR relations and Ukrainian affairs. The Vietnam War reached its climax that year, demonstrations against it shook university campuses across the USA, in Czechoslovakia the Prague Spring sought to give socialism "a human face," there was a general strike in France, the socialist student leader Rudy Deutschke was assassinated in West Germany, first the human

[35] See, for example, Pierre Berton, *1967: The Last Good Year* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1997), especially 276-77. Also see the Russian and English versions of the Wikipedia article on "Expo 67." Accessed 23/08/2023.
[36] George Ignatieff, *Making of a Peacemonger: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); Charles Ritchie, *Undiplomatic Diaries 1937-1971* (Toronto: Emblem, 2008).

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rights leader Martin Luther King Jr, and then presidential candidate Robert Kennedy were assassinated, general elections then brought Richard Nixon to power in the US and Pierre Elliott Trudeau to power in Canada, and finally, the Soviets with their tanks invaded defiant Czechoslovakia, arrested the Czech leader, Alexander Dubcek, and by force put down "socialism with a human face."[37]

GENERATION CHANGE IN POLITICS

Press photo. In 1968, Pierre Eliott Trudeau, at 48 still a bachelor, swept to power on the crest of a wave of enthusiasm characterized by youth and new hopes for solving the national question in Canada and eliminating the serious problems raised by possible Quebec independence. His popularity was compared to that enjoyed internationally by the rock group "The Beatles," (Beatlemania). And he was admired for bravely facing down Quebec nationalists who had thrown tin cans, bottles, and glass at him at a great rally in Montreal.

"TRUDEAUMANIA"

Trudeau's election in Canada was partly a result of this centre-left move in world opinion and in Canadian politics, and a spike in "Canadian nationalism" in particular. But the new PM was theoretically opposed to nationalisms of all sorts, especially the kind that sought independence in his native Province of Quebec. Indeed, he seemed to espouse a loose sort of "internationalism" that innocently accepted Communist claims to promote such internationalism, and he wished to improve relations between the Soviet Bloc and the West. As a young man, he had visited and sympathized with Red China, not even noticing, or reporting, that Chairman Mao's Great Leap Forward was made at the cost of a massive famine modeled on Stalin's actions in Ukraine some two decades earlier. That famine, "man made" as was frequently said, had cost millions of innocent lives – at a bare minimum over four million in the case of Ukraine, probably ten times that in the case of China. In absolute terms, the Chinese instance might have been the greatest famine in human history.[38]

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[37] See the striking documentary account by H.K. Studer and David Dunsford, *World Review 1968, the Year in Pictures* (London: World Reporting, n.d.). The year 1968 seems to have been historically almost unique, the closest parallel probably 1848, which saw revolutions bubbling across almost all Europe, though then too, without much success.

[38] Foreigners visiting China at the time, who did not report on the famine, are called "dogs that did not bark" by Cormac Ó Gráda, "Great Leap, Great Famine: A Review Essay," *Population and Development Review*, 37, no. 1 (2011) 191-210. See Pierre Trudeau and Jacques Hebert, *Two Innocents in Red China*, 2nd. Edition (Vancouver-Toronto: 2007), with an introduction by Alexandre Trudeau, Pierre's son. The first edition had been published in 1961. Also see N. Vanderkloppe, "Pierre Trudeau's China Legacy Looms Large," *Globe and Mail*, 29 August 2016. There is a substantial literature on Pierre Trudeau, of which the two-volume biography by John English, *Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto: Viking, 2007-2010) is most detailed. Also see the sparkling essay on him in Bowering, *Egotists and Autocrats*, 396-449.

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So, shortly after Trudeau's election victory, Canada was almost silent about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, despite considerable sympathy for the Dubcek reforms among the Canadian public. And afterwards, when Biafra in Africa, and East Timor in the Pacific, sought national independence from Nigeria and Indonesia respectively, Trudeau remained indifferent, though pictures of starving Biafrans (the Ibo people) being blockaded by the Nigerian government aroused much compassion among Canadians, and the people of East Timor, being partly a Catholic minority in majority Muslim Indonesia, pulled at the conscience of some Canadians. At the time, there were few African or Pacific Island Canadians to protest Trudeau's inaction on these matters. The situation of the Ukrainians, however, was considerably different.[39]

From the start, Trudeau moved to improve Canada-USSR relations, and it was only the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1970 October Crisis in Quebec that delayed an exchange of state visits. But by the spring of 1971, Trudeau and his new wife Margaret stepped off their plane onto Soviet soil. Toronto Liberal MP, Walter Deakon, a Ukrainian Canadian, came along as the PM's translator. In Moscow, Trudeau had extensive conversations with the Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and that same Podgorny (or rather Pidhirny), who had earlier attacked Diefenbaker at the United Nations. Documents on trade and exchanges were signed. From Moscow, the prime ministerial couple flew on to Kyiv.[40]

MEETING IN MOSCOW

Press photo of Pierre Trudeau and the Canadian delegation negotiating with the Soviets in Moscow. Toronto Ukrainian, MP Walter Deakon, Trudeau's translator, sits next to him and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin across from Trudeau. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is fourth down the table from Kosygin. Pictures of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin decorate the wall behind the Canadians. This picture was published in the pro-Communist Ukrainian Labour Temple paper but not the Ukrainian "nationalist" press in Canada. Photo courtesy of the Toronto Public Library.

[39] David Webster, *Challenge the Strong Wind: Canada and East Timor 1975-99* (Vancouver: UBC, 2020). On Trudeau and both Timor and Biafra, see Asa McKercher, "Reason over Passion: Pierre Trudeau, Human Rights, and Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, 73, no. 1 (2018), 129-45. For a brief critique of Trudeau's perceived "pro-Communist" tendencies, see Bob Plamondon, *The Truth about Trudeau* (Ottawa: Great River, 2013), especially 33-44, which begins with a youthful Trudeau in the USSR confessing to the wife of an American diplomat that he was "a Communist and a Catholic."

[40] For much of what follows, see my "Ukrainian Canadians along the Bumpy Road to Official Multiculturalism," forthcoming.

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PIERRE TRUDEAU IN UKRAINE

Meanwhile, Ukrainian Canadians discussed how these warming relations between Canada and the USSR could benefit their interests. The mere fact that Trudeau was to go to Kyiv was obviously a concession to the fact of a large Ukrainian presence in Canada. But what else could be got out of this situation? The Ukrainian Canadian press suggested several points: 1) The Prime Minister could speak to the Soviets about the plight of Ukrainian political prisoners and dissidents in the USSR, especially those such as the history teacher Valentyn Moroz, believed to have been imprisoned merely for their political beliefs. This was a matter of simple human rights. 2) The PM could acknowledge the aspirations of the Ukrainian community in Canada by establishing a process for family reunification between Ukrainian Canadians and their relatives in the USSR. 3) Canada could set up a consulate in Kyiv to help with such reunifications, and perhaps (though this generally went unsaid) give some official acknowledgement of the existence of a very real Ukrainian nationality or nation. After all, the UkSSR, in which the Ukrainians were officially the "state" nationality, already existed with its own seat in the United Nations. (Ukraine had been a founding member of that organization.) None of these points seemed extravagant or unreasonable to most Ukrainian Canadians, but they were met cooly or plainly rejected by the Trudeau government.[41]

As to the Trudeaus in Kyiv, they were very warmly greeted in the Ukrainian capital, in fact, more warmly than in Moscow, though the tour went well there too. In Kyiv, Trudeau met Moscow's local proxies led by Ukrainian Premier Vladimir Shcherbytsky, had a tour of the city, laid a wreath to the victims of the Great Patriotic War (as the Soviets called the Second World War), and with his wife Margaret and translator Walter Deakon attended a large banquet in his honour.

The Trudeaus Arrive to Springtime in Kyiv

A fashionable Pierre Trudeau and his beautiful wife Margaret (only recently married) made a great impression upon the Soviets. Here they are seen exiting a plane from one unnamed Soviet city to another. Pierre sports a red rose on this jacket and Margaret is wearing a headscarf (*hustka* or *babushka*) typical for traditional Ukrainian and Russian women of that time, and this identification doubtlessly was meant to create some kind of bond between her and them, though Margaret herself was completely non-political, only vaguely representing Western youth. Photo courtesy of the Toronto Public Library.

[41] See, for example, "Polychnyk ukraintsiam Kanady," [A Blow to the Ukrainians of Canada], *Ukrainskyi holos*, 19 May, 1971. This Winnipeg newspaper was generally pro-Liberal in its sympathies. Within Trudeau's cabinet, Foreign Minister Mitchel Sharp was the strongest supporter of family reunions in Soviet-Canada relations. He was a Winnipeg native and seemingly aware of Ukrainian concerns on this score, being "keen to win back for the Liberals the ethnic voters who had been lured away" by Diefenbaker. So: Peyton Lyon with Geoffrey Nimmo, "Re-Working European Security in the 1970s: The CSCE," in Munton, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 259-72, especially 260-61.

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However, Trudeau did not meet with the First Secretary of the CPU, Petro Shelest, and when Deakon translated the Prime Minister's words into Ukrainian for the Ukrainians, the Soviet Ukrainians (according to Moscow's rules) dutifully replied only in Russian. Though Trudeau seemed to be completely unaware of it, this was roughly the equivalent of replying to French-speaking President Charles de Gaulle only in English on his state visit to French-speaking Quebec City. It was hardly conducive to favouring "local' interests over "central" ones. In fact, Trudeau seemed to be completely oblivious to the power struggle then going on between Shcherbytsky, who supported Moscow, and Shelest, who was a Communist but a Ukrainian patriot of sorts. In fact, the very next year, Moscow carried out a large purge of the CPU and of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Some dissidents were sent to the Gulag, others were fired from their jobs, journals were closed, and Shelest lost his position and was safely (for the russifiers in Ukraine) exiled to Moscow.[42]

Trudeau's attitude toward the Ukrainians, on the surface at least, does not seem to have helped the Kyiv Ukrainians in any way. In fact, in his Kyiv speech he even stated that he would "seize the opportunity to learn as much as I can of the way your local governments deal with the kinds of problems that face the provinces of Canada." Subsequently, of course, this was simply shocking in view of the mass purges of Ukrainian officials and intellectuals that followed. But even then, Canadian journalist Charles Lynch, who was part of the PMs entourage, reported the warm reception there and wrote that "never before had a Canadian prime minister been so sympathetic or uncritical of the USSR." [43] And later, when Trudeau visited the Soviet Arctic and praised how the Soviets had developed it, especially the city of Norilsk, he seemed to be completely innocent of the fact that that town had been constructed entirely by the slave labour of Gulag prisoners, mostly Ukrainians, and of the important "strike" or uprising of these prisoners some two decades before.[44] News of Trudeau's Norilsk remarks quickly filtered across the barbed wires into the still existing Soviet Gulag, and the Russian political dissident Andrei Amalrik (then still in captivity) later sarcastically commented on them in his memoirs.[45]

More significantly for Canadian politics, when these remarks were reported back in Canada, they caused an immediate uproar in Parliament and in the press. Later, Trudeau tried to defend himself in parliament but only got into more hot water by equating Ukrainian dissidents, who supported democratic reforms and the rule of law, with FLQ terrorists, who had already given up on parliamentary methods and had turned to political violence. In the summer of 1971

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[42] "Prem'er-ministr Kanady: Hist Kyieva" [The Prime Minister of Canada, a Guest of Kiev], *Ukraina* (Kyiv), no. 23, May 1971, 5; *Ukrainskyi holos,* 9 June, 1971, 5. More generally, see Borys Lewytzkyj, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine (*Edmonton: CIUS, 1984), and *Ukraine after Shelest* ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton: CIUS, 1983).

[43] Charles Lynch, "Laughs, Tears, Greet Trudeau in Ukraine," *Winnipeg Tribune* and syndicated in the Southam chain, as reprinted in full in *Ukrainskyi holos* 2 June, 1971, 3; "Prem'ier Trudo v Kyievi," [Prime Minister Trudeau in Kyiv] *Ukrainskyi holos* 2 June, 1971, 1 and 6; "Trudo i Ukraina," [Trudeau and Ukraine], *Novyi shliakh* (Winnipeg) 12 June, 1971.

[44] An important organizer of "the Strike," Danylo Shumuk, *Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner*, ed. Ivan Jaworsky (Edmonton: CIUS, 1984). 241-42, later wrote: "The [security] troops subjected these defenceless [striking camp] workers, who had built the city of Norilsk while subjected to cold, hunger, and extremely brutal treatment, to a steady stream of gunfire and grenades. Norilsk is the site of a very important and strategically vital non-ferrous metallurgical industry… A centre of extraordinary wealth, it has also been the site of unbelievable grief, a hell on earth in the God-forsaken and accursed Arctic North." "Norilsk Uprising," Wikipedia, gives further references. Accessed 2023/09/09.

[45] See Jaworsky's note in *Life Sentence,* 389.

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Trudeau felt compelled to meet with representatives of the Ukrainian community, where he tried to mend fences and apologized for hurting their feelings. But despite CBC and press reports to the contrary, he did not take back this scornful comparison.[46]

УКРАЇНСЬК

UKRAINIA

(LXII) ВІННІПЕҐ, МАНІТОБА, СЕРЕДА, 16-го ЧЕРВ

КОНФЕРЕНЦІЯ УКРАЇНЦІВ З ПРЕМ'ЄРОМ КАНАДИ

„Прем'єр Трудо може ще й досі не знає, хто такий Валентин Мороз, але він добре знає, коли треба заключити мир з розбурханим морем канадських українців" — пише „Вінніпеґ Трібюн" за 8 червня, інформуючи про конференцію делеґації Комітету Українців Канади з прем'єром Трудо.

Під час конференції, що відбулася 7 червня в Оттаві й тривала годину, делеґація поінформувала прем'єра про складність українських справ, вручила меморандум, з протестом проти заяв прем'єра, в яких він ототожнював український національний рух в Україні з терористичними діями ФЛК та наводив паралелю між державними системами Канади й СССР.

Після конференції голова віддділу КУК з Торонта Б. Максимець (член делеґації) заявив репортерам, що прем'єр Трудо „вибачився перед українським канадським суспільством, заявивши, що він не мав на увазі того, що остаточно вий-

...інформував, що делеґація „з приємністю прийняла перепрошення прем'єра й дуже рада, що прем'єр погодився розглянути й інші питання, порушені делеґацією".

...що його перепрошення з... інтерпретовано більше як... визнання себе невинним, ніж... визнання своєї помилки.

Прем'єр сказав:

„Я їм сказав, що я перепрошую їх, якщо я вразив їхні почування, проте я був майже певний, що їхні почування були вражені іншими

Президент Комітету Українців Канади о. д-р В. Кушнір і прем'єр Канади Пієр Е. Трудо під час конференції в Оттаві

Прем'єр Трудо в розмові з представниками преси вис-...

...людьми, які неправильно насвітлили те, що я фактично...

Sorrow, but no Regrets and no Apology

Clipping from the front page of Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos* (The Ukrainian Voice), 16 June 1971, describing the meeting between the Prime Minister and a Ukrainian delegation led by UCC President Wasyl Kushnir, who is here seen together with the PM. The press asked Kushnir what had happened at the meeting, but Kushnir was at a loss for words. It then turned to Winnipeg delegate Anthony Yaromovich but got the same reaction. Only then did a third Ukrainian delegate from Toronto step forward to oversimplify things by saying that the PM had apologized for his remarks, and the Ukrainians were satisfied with the apology.

All these events were closely followed by agents of the KGB, which reported on them to the Communist Party leadership back in Moscow and Kyiv. In his communications, the Ukrainian KGB Chief, V. Fedorchuk did not ignore Charles Lynch's positive assessment of the Trudeau visit, quoted parts, and seemed to swallow the story about Trudeau apologizing to the Ukrainian delegation to Ottawa. At least, he did not question it.[47]

In a separate report, he also quoted Lynch as writing that it would be too much to say that Trudeau was "greeted as a hero in the Soviet Union" (*Trudeau poluchil status goroia…*), but that the fact that whole country welcomed him was true. Fedorchuk added that the KGB "through secret service methods" (*chekistkie mery*) had blocked two citizens of Kyiv with letters expressing their wish to emigrate to Canada from approaching the Canadian delegation.[48]

TRUDEAU'S "MULTICULTURALISM" MOVE

Meanwhile, the national question in Canada itself was in the process of changing. In the early 1960s, Prime Minister Pearson had formed a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to examine the state of the nation, and as a concession to Canadian minorities, had appointed to it the Ukrainian Canadian linguist from the University of Manitoba, J.B. Rudnyckyj. Together with the Ukrainian Paul Yuzyk, who had previously been appointed to the

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[46] See my "Bumpy Road," and Nancy Southam, *Pierre: Colleagues and Friends Talk about the Trudeau they Knew* (Toronto: M&S, 2005), 98. While in the USSR, however, the PM did hand the Soviets a list of families that desired to be re-united.

[47] V. Fedorchuk to the Central Committee of the CPU, Council of Ministers, several letters classified as *Sovershenno sekretno* [Top Secret], dated July 1971. Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Archives, courtesy of Eduard Andryushchenko, 29 August 2023. The top of the first letter shows a penciled in addressee as "[Petro] Shelest."

[48] Fedorchuk, untitled report to the Central Committee, CPU, Council of Ministers, dated May 22, 1971. 4 pp. Courtesy of Eduard Andryushchenko, September 19, 2023.

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Senate by Diefenbaker, and to a lesser extent by a Polish representative on the Commission, a scholar of French Canadian literature, Paul Wyczynski, these colleagues laid the groundwork for a new federal policy of "multiculturalism." The Ukrainians, who had presented many important briefs to the Royal Commission, adopted the idea enthusiastically, and in fact, they quickly became by far the most outspoken Canadian ethnic group promoting it.[49]

These two different issues, multiculturalism/biculturalism, and Canadian policy towards the USSR's Ukrainian question, came together in the summer of 1971. The new Prime Minister, who had already captured the admiration of much of the country for his bravery before the threats of FLQ terrorism, had to somehow resolve both pressing problems. At the core of these stood a united Ukrainian Canadian community making clear and unequivocal demands upon him.

In fact, mass demonstrations against his "soft-on-Russia policies" were seen as a real threat to impede and disorient the planned fall visit to Canada of Soviet leader Kosygin. Trudeau decided to face the two problems simultaneously. He devised a new federal policy of "Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework" and arranged to announce it in parliament and then repeat it with some embellishments the very next day before the great Ukrainian Canadian Congress to be held in Winnipeg. This congress preceded Kosygin's Canadian state tour by a mere week or two. The Kosygin tour was geared to have been the Soviet counterpart to Trudeau's tour of the USSR. During these events, the new theme of friendly "northern neighbours" took on a firmer shape.[50]

STUDENT PROTEST IN WINNIPEG!!!

Ukrainian Canadian Student Union (SUSK) demonstrators protest in favour of Soviet Ukrainian political dissidents, including Valentyn Moroz, in Winnipeg just before Trudeau's big October speech to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. These protesters included students who later became important to Ukrainian Canadian life and politics such as Yury Bozhyk (critic of P.R. Magocsi), Andrij Bandera (son of Stepan Bandera, a famous Ukrainian nationalist leader who was assassinated in Germany), and Orest Martynowych, who later became a prolific historian of the Ukrainians in Canada.

The announcement in parliament of the new Multiculturalism policy went well, and all major Canadian political parties supported it. However, the Ukrainians kept up the pressure against the opening to the USSR, and they continued to stress the plight of political prisoners there. Confronted by Ukrainian student demonstrators in Winnipeg, Trudeau promised that he would bring up the matter with Kosygin, but only as a humanitarian and not a political matter. This somewhat ameliorated Ukrainian hostility towards his recent international moves, and when he spoke at the UCC congress in Winnipeg, his Multicultural announcement, together with a

[49] See especially Paul Yuzyk, "Canada: A Multicultural Nation," in his *For a Better Canada* (Toronto: Ukrainian National Association, 1973), 21-48, which is his maiden speech to the Senate of Canada, delivered on 3 March 1964, and my "The Royal Commission and Rudnyckyj's Mission: The Forging of Official Multiculturalism in Canada, 1963-1971," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, 88, no. 1 (2019), 43-63.

[50] Around this concept, see *Nearly Neighbours, Canada and the Soviet Union: from Cold War to Détente and Beyond* ed. J.L. Black and Norman Hillmer (Kingston: Frye, n.d.).

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statement that he would talk to Kosygin about political prisoners, were greeted enthusiastically, indeed, almost ecstatically. Of course, this did not prevent some shrewd and more experienced Ukrainian observers from concluding that his entire Multicultural policy was insincere and nothing more than an attempt to "buy off" the Ukrainians on the very eve of Kosygin's visit.[51]

On October 9, 1971, the very day after announcing to the Parliament of Canada his new government policy of "Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework," the Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who had three years before, taken over from Lester B. Pearson, as leader of the country, flew the great distance from Ottawa to Winnipeg, and spoke on the same subject to the great Tri-annual Conference of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. The photo on the left shows the PM speaking, while the President of the Congress, the Rev. Wasyl Kushnir of Winnipeg (with the eye-glasses), and another cleric are looking up at him from the head table. Former PM John Diefenbaker, Royal Commissioner Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, and Senator Paul Yuzyk too were present at this important gathering. Press photo from *Novyi shliakh/ The New Pathway*, Winnipeg, vol. XLII, no. 44, October 30, 1971.

THE "KOSYGIN CATASTROPHE" AND NORTHERN NEIGHBOURS

As it turned out, that visit went off very roughly. Anti-Communist protesters, which included large numbers of Ukrainian Canadians, Jews – chanting the slogan "Let my people go!" – and other East Europeans, demonstrated vociferously against Kosygin everywhere he went. In Ottawa, he was almost brought to his knees by a Hungarian protester who jumped on top of him before the Houses of Parliament, and in Toronto he virtually had to hide from the large crowds of protesters that tried to follow his every move. In Ottawa, bombs were discovered near the Soviet embassy. In Toronto, a great confrontation occurred before the Science Centre, where mounted city police rode into the excited crowds and caused many injuries. Arrests, lawsuits, and a well-publicised provincial inquiry ensued. During those stormy days in October 1971, on Canadian streets and the popular level, Canadian-Soviet relations, despite official government announcements, seemed to have reached a *de facto* nadir.[52]

Nevertheless, the Northern Neighbours concept enjoyed some successes: Documents were signed confirming future academic, cultural, and sporting exchanges, and most of these did touch the Ukrainian Canadians as well as many other Canadians. Perhaps the most high-profile

[51] Prymak, "Bumpy Road." Even before he spoke, *Ukrainskyi holos*, no. 4, October 6, 1971, 2, had speculated that Trudeau's entire trip to Winnipeg was probably an attempt to quiet Ukrainian protests over his recent visit to the USSR, especially Kyiv. Also see Manoly R. Lupul, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian Canadian Memoir* (Edmonton-Toronto: CIUS, 2005), 165. For Trudeau's own explanation of his seemingly "pro-Soviet" policies, see Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, *The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy 1968-1984* (Toronto: M&S, 1995), 242-52.

[52] Prymak, "Bumpy Road." Also see the caricature in the *Christian Science Monitor* as reprinted in *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (The Canadian Farmer), (Winnipeg), 28 October 1971, which depicts a battered and limping Trudeau and Kosygin staggering home together, amidst all kinds of protests, explosions, and troubles. Again, for a defence of Trudeau's Soviet policy, see his *Canadian Way*, 244-52, where with Ivan Head, he referred to the "Soviet ingenuity" in developing Norilsk, this time with full knowledge of the use of slave labour.

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exchange was the Canada-USSR hockey series of 1972, which quickly captured the imagination of the entire country. Ukrainian students protested the games but did so rather cleverly. For example, a group in Winnipeg held up signs in the stadium saying in English "Welcome Soviets" on one side and "Freedom for [political prisoner] Moroz" in Ukrainian on the other. This enraged the political minders of the Soviet team, who could read the Ukrainian but not the English, and it simply confused the stadium officials and television broadcasters, who could read the English "Welcome" but not the Ukrainian "Freedom" inscriptions. The game had to be held up for a while as the matter was straightened out. This did bring some renewed attention to the issue of Ukrainian political prisoners in the USSR.[53]

Happy faces all around!

Official press release of the signing in Ottawa of the Canada-USSR Trade and Exchange Agreement of 1971. Kosygin on the left, and Trudeau on the right. The Prime Minister wears what appears to be his usual red flower on his lapel. This photo was published in the Ukrainian Labour Temple press but not in the Ukrainian non-Communist papers. Courtesy of the Toronto Public Library.

In early 1975, a great exhibit of Soviet art toured the country. Again, it brought out some demonstrators, but again, it was a success. Acute observers, however, could notice that the exhibit featured Russian and not necessarily "Soviet" art and so ignored the Ukrainian and other non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Most noticeable, was a large portrait of Leo Tolstoy ("Tolstoy barefoot") by the Ukrainian-origin artist Ilya Repin, then generally labelled a "Russian." This could hardly have been un-premeditated. None of Repin's Ukrainian themed paintings were included, though the exhibit was shown in Winnipeg, then the unofficial capital of Ukrainian Canada, a bald fact of which the Soviets were certainly very much aware.[54]

In the academic sphere, exchanges eventually included a standing agreement between the University of Saskatchewan and Chernivtsi University in Soviet Ukraine. The locales of these institutions were significant: Saskatchewan was at the heart of the old non-political Ukrainian immigrant settlements, while Chernivtsi, traditionally Eastern Orthodox and less passionately nationalistic than old Greek Catholic Galicia, was still close to the European heartland of that same non-political immigration. This exchange agreement was to continue for at least four

[53] Interview with 1972 Hockey Series/Valentyn Moroz protester, Steppe to Prairie Archive, 1973-4, Oseredok, Ukrainian Cultural and Education Centre, Winnipeg. The Canadian public generally ignored Shcherbytsky's political purges of Ukrainian intellectuals during that year; their extent and significance only became better known afterwards.

[54] Author's personal recollection, Winnipeg.

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decades.[55] Moreover, during this period several Canadian "ethnics" entered Trudeau cabinets, and Ontario MP Norm Cafik, a Ukrainian Canadian, whom the KGB considered "a well-known anti-Soviet," was appointed the first full-fledged Minister of State for Multiculturalism. After the Conservative Mike Starr, he was the second such Ukrainian to hold a full cabinet post.[56]

ОСИГІН до ТРУДА: Із західньою демократією добре коекзистувати, але я не хотів би жити в ній
Карикатура з "Крішен Саєнс Монітор"

An outside American opinion

on the Canadian events of October 1971:

Kosygin and Trudeau, battered and bruised after a worrisome official Soviet tour of Canada, walk through a minefield of bombs and explosions, including "Hungarian Protest," "Quebec separatist movement," "Air Hijacking," "Jewish Protest," and in the top left-hand corner, "Minority Squabbles." The last of these refers somewhat disparagingly to the controversy over "bilingualism/ biculturalism" versus the emerging ideology of "multiculturalism." Kosygin says to Trudeau: "It is good to have peaceful co-existence with democracy, but I wouldn't want to live with it!" Source: *Christian Science Monitor* as reprinted in *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (The Canadian Farmer), 28 October, 1971.

Finally, in 1975, the Trudeau government signed the Helsinki Accords, which sought to preserve peace in Europe through extending the American policy of détente (or relaxation of tensions). In the view of the Soviets, this would ensure their post-war territorial gains, while in the view of the West, it confirmed the general principle of human rights across the European continent. Shortly, Helsinki monitoring groups were founded in various countries, including Soviet Ukraine, which was, of course, noted and publicized by supporting Ukrainian activists in Canada.[57]

This complemented and strengthened the work of the international human rights organization, Amnesty International (founded in Britain in 1961), which defended the rights of prisoners of conscience everywhere, including Ukraine. These included General Petro Grigorenko, Viacheslav Chornovil, and many others, who thereafter became well-known in Canada.[58] In fact, Progressive Conservative Senator Pauk Yuzyk was instrumental in publishing

[55] For several years, Roma Franko, Professor of Slavic Studies, University of Saskatchewan, oversaw this exchange from the Canadian side. Saskatoon, the university's "hometown," had also been a major locus of the 1920s great pro-Orthodox revolt against the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church of Canada.

[56] Mykhailo Marunchak, *Biohrafichnyi dovidnyk do istorii ukraintsiv Kanady* [Biographical Guide to the History of Ukrainians in Canada], (Winnipeg: UVAN, 1986), 281; "Ob ispolzovanii ounovtsami vyborov v parlament Kanady v tseliakh aktivizatsii antisovetskoi deiatalnosti," [On the use of OUN elections in the Parliament of Canada for the Activization of Anti-Soviet Activity], undated and unsigned KGB report on the government of Joe Clark. Courtesy of Eduard Andryushchenko, September 19, 2023. This report grouped Cafik with "D. Diefenbaker (sic!), D. Crombie, and others."

[57] O. Zinkevych, "Ukrainian Helsinki Group," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* 5 vols. (Toronto: UTP, 1984-93), V, 387-88; "Helsinki Accords," Wikipedia. Accessed 2023/09/09.

[58] "Amnesty International," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, I, 64. The author of these lines met General Grigorenko (Hryhorenko in Ukrainian) in the early 1980s after he had been stripped of his Soviet citizenship while in the USA

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and distributing Chornovil's documents on the suppression of Ukrainian legal rights in the USSR,[59] and Toronto resident Christina Isajiw was active in promoting such rights across the 1970s and 1980s. Isajiw notes that after 1975, she personally pushed for the inclusion of Soviet dissidents into the Amnesty International program, which had previously been centred mostly on Human Rights in Latin America.[60] But across the Trudeau era, the Ukrainian question was never a government priority.

Brian Mulroney in Kyiv in November 1989 to announce the opening of a new Canadian consulate in the capital of the Ukrainian SSR.

THE MULRONEY ERA

The retirement of Trudeau and his eventual replacement by Progressive Conservative leader Brian Mulroney finally brought a reversal of some of the pro-Soviet feeling in the Canadian government, though there was no entirely new policy shift, and exchanges such as that at the University of Saskatchewan continued. Mulroney in his youth had been an admirer of Diefenbaker, and his wife was of Slavic background, a Serbian. Like Diefenbaker, he was better attuned to East European affairs than Trudeau had been, and he was openly friendly to the Ukrainian Canadians, who, as in the cases of both Trudeau and Diefenbaker, welcomed him to their conventions. Shortly before his first federal election win, Mulroney even attended a meeting of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians in Toronto.[61]

After Mulroney won election, he acted on both the multicultural and USSR files. His idea was to shift from government grants to ethnic groups (which had been Liberal policy, though very weakly carried out) to the appointment of "ethnic" Canadians to more government positions. His cabinet contained many with Ukrainian or other East European backgrounds, the most important of which was his Justice Minister Ray Hnatyshyn from Saskatchewan, an affable Ukrainian Canadian liked by both Conservatives and Liberals, whom at the start of his second term, Mulroney advised the Queen to appoint Governor-general of Canada. As such, Hnatyshyn represented the Queen and symbolized Canadian sovereignty. Mulroney's government also seemingly bucked bureaucratic tradition in External by hiring Roman Waschuk, a talented Ukrainian Canadian educated at the University of Toronto, where he had studied Ukrainian

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for medical treatment and was visiting Toronto. At that time, he was already famous for defending the rights of the Crimean Tatars. He was also a founder of the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Groups.

[59] The Senator proudly presented me with a copy of *The Chornovil Papers* (1968), when I interviewed him in his office on Parliament Hill in April 1984, in connection with researching my book titled *Maple Leaf and Trident* (1988). Yuzyk had been appointed to the Senate of Canada by Diefenbaker in the early 1960s.

[60] She also notes that some older Ukrainians found it difficult to switch from the concentration on "national rights" to more universal "human" ones. See her *Negotiating Human Rights* (Edmonton-Toronto: CIUS, 2014).

[61] The author witnessed a CBC television broadcast of Mulroney's arrival at the congress, where he was warmly greeted, though the CBC report noted that the average age of the delegates seemed to be rather high, youth being relatively absent.

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history with Paul Robert Magocsi, and in Ottawa later worked on the staff of the Deschênes Commission.[62]

Mulroney's new moves began to be reflected in government policy when the USSR began its democratic and de-centralizing reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev, himself partly of Ukrainian ancestry from the North Caucasus, his father tracing his origins to the Kuban Cossacks. As these reforms gathered steam and Soviet-Western relations dramatically improved, Mulroney became increasingly interested in the Ukrainian question, which again began to make news, and, surely enough, the very future of the USSR was again questioned. By 1987, Canada welcomed long-time Ukrainian political prisoner Danylo Shumuk. A veteran of the Norilsk rising and Helsinki Monitoring Group member, he had relatives in Canada, and the Canadian government (at the behest of the Ukrainian community) had long pressed for his release. Shumuk later visited Washington, where he had a meeting in the Oval Office with President Ronald Reagan.[63]

In 1989, Mulroney even parted with the more cautious policies of Washington, visited Kyiv, and in autumn 1991, informed Reagan's successor, a reluctant American President George H. Bush, that Canada would recognise Ukrainian independence if it were ratified by a vote. (About this time, Bush visited Ukraine and in Kyiv delivered his infamous "Chicken Kiev Speech" urging the Ukrainians to avoid "suicidal nationalism," that is, national independence.) When in December 1991, the vote was held, and Ukraine declared its state independence, Canada was the first Western Country to recognise it, second only to formerly Communist Poland, Ukraine's immediate neighbour to the West.[64]

This recognition followed earlier moves, when shortly before, Canada had established its long-awaited Consulate-general in Kyiv and the PM appointed the quiet diplomat, Ukrainian Canadian Nestor Gayowsky its first *chargé d'affairs* in Kyiv. In this way, from the start, Canada enjoyed excellent relations with the new Ukrainian state. The USSR no longer existed, and Canadian policy towards its "Ukrainian Question" had come to an end.[65]

CONCLUSIONS

We may conclude that across the twentieth century Canada's policy towards the USSR's "Ukrainian Question" went through several phases. From early years of indifference, through the anti-Soviet and then pro-Soviet times of the Second World War, Ukrainian affairs were simply not on Canada's foreign policy agenda. This only significantly changed when in 1960 John Diefenbaker declared his support for "the freedom-loving Ukrainians" at the United Nations.

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[62] Brian Mulroney, *Memoirs*, (Toronto: M&S, 2007), *passim*., Waschuk was to serve as Canada's Ambassador to Ukraine from 2014 to 2019.

[63] O. Zinkevych, "Shumuk, Danylo," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, IV, 687-88. The Canadian political scientist, Ivan (John) Jaworsky of the University of Waterloo had long participated in this effort to get Shumuk out of the USSR.

[64] Even at this late date, Pierre Trudeau mocked Mulroney's moves, writing in his *Memoirs* (Toronto: M&S, 1993), 351, that "we in the West made sure [the USSR] would break up by rushing to recognize every Tom Dick and Harry republic that decided to proclaim its independence."

[65] See the very brief mention of these events in Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 317. Also see Mulroney's *Memoirs*, 704. On Gayowsky, see https://peoplepill.com/people/nestor-gayowsky Accessed 3/10/2021, citing *The Toronto Star*, January 27, 1992, and Isajiw, *Human Rights*, 357-60.

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Lester Pearson paid less attention to the Ukrainian question and the old attitudes of indifference returned. But his successor, Pierre Trudeau moved from indifference to admiration of the USSR and even declared that Canada could use Soviet models. Ukrainian Canadians opposed this, and on the eve of Kosygin's state visit to Canada, the PM tried to mollify that community with his new policy of "Multiculturalism." Most Ukrainian Canadians reacted enthusiastically, but this did not quiet opposition to Trudeau's "soft-on-Russia" positions.

Brian Mulroney was personally sympathetic to Ukrainian Canadians and named more Canadian ethnics to responsible government positions. Ray Hnatyshyn became Governor-general of Canada, and he remained so when (in variance to American policy) Canada was the first western state to recognise Ukraine's independence. Consequently, the general picture is one of increasing Ukrainian Canadian influence, and more sympathy towards the USSR's Ukrainians, ending with good relations between Canada and the newly independent Ukrainian state.

Feather pen and paint brush,
symbol of the Ukrainian national poet,
Taras Shevchenko, 1814-1861, who was both a painter and a writer.

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