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### The scattering of Amalek: A model for understanding the Ukrainian-Jewish conflict

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HENRY ABRAMSON

## The Scattering of Amalek: A Model for Understanding the Ukrainian-Jewish Conflict\*

Remember what Amalek did to you on your way out of Egypt, how he happened upon you on the way and attacked your train, when you were tired and hungry. . . . you shall blot out the memory of Amalek from under the Heavens, do not forget.<sup>1</sup>

Jewish tradition has always regarded the biblical nation of Amalek as the archetype of the antisemite, driven by a pathological hatred of Jews which does not admit any rational argument. The conflict between Israel and Amalek is eternal, continuing with every generation, including Haman's attempts to destroy the Jews as described in the book of Esther.<sup>2</sup> Orthodox Jews annually observe the paradoxical commandment 'not to forget' to 'blot out the memory of Amalek' with a public reading of the verses quoted above, and attendance is mandatory.<sup>3</sup> According to Maimonides, Jews are commanded to continually hate Amalek 'so that the matter will not be forgotten and the hatred will not be diminished nor decreased in [Jewish] souls with the passage of time.'<sup>4</sup> This is the traditional Jewish response to antisemitism. Jews have a long communal memory: national grievances are not easily forgotten, and reinterpretation of the time-hallowed martyrology is regarded with suspicion at best.

In this genocidal century, many nationalities are heir to the Amalekite tradition in popular Jewish mentality, and the Ukrainians are

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1 Deuteronomy 25:17-19.

2 Haman is identified in Esther 3:1 as a descendant of Agag, the Amalekite king whom Saul failed to kill despite a divine command (1 Samuel 15).

3 *Shulhan Arukh*, Orakh Haim (The Prepared Table (code of Jewish Law), volume Way of Life), 685:2, 685:7.

4 *Sefer ha-Mitsvot*, mitsvat aseh (Book of Commandments, positive commandment), 189.

prominent among them. In a recent article in a collection examining the phenomenon of pogroms in the modern history of the Russian Empire, one scholar noted that 'up to this point [1919] no nation on earth had a record comparable to the Ukrainians in killing and abusing Jews.'<sup>5</sup> While it may be possible to argue with this observation in the ancient and medieval period, there can be no doubt that it holds true for the 300 years which precede the Holocaust. During this interval two major massacres of Jews were perpetrated by Ukrainians, with deaths in the tens and possibly hundreds of thousands (1648-9 and 1919). Between these upheavals occurred several smaller instances of anti-Jewish violence (including 1768, 1881-2, 1905). Finally, the participation of Ukrainian collaborators in the Nazi extermination machine contributed to the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews.

Moreover, the centuries-old mutual history of Ukrainians and Jews is unique in that most of the heroes of the former are the villains of the latter. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the leader of the 1648 rebellion, is hailed by the Ukrainians as their great liberator from Polish oppression. To Jews he is 'Khmel the wicked', arch-pogromist.<sup>6</sup> The eighteenth-century leader of the Haidamaks, Ivan Honta (Gonta), is viewed in the same dichotomous fashion, as is Symon Petliura, one of the main figures in the failed Ukrainian revolution after the fall of tsarism.

Despite their nationalist postures, the veneration of some Ukrainian leaders was tolerated under the Soviets. The cult of Khmelnytsky, for example, was deliberately fostered with emphasis on his agreement of union with Muscovy in 1654. The well-known statue of the Hetman in Kiev's Saint Sophia Square, on horseback and pointing symbolically to the north, became an approved icon of Soviet Ukrainian nationalism. With the advent of *glasnost* and *perebudova* (Russian: *glasnost* and *perestroyka*), the popularity of anti-Communist figures of the Ukrainian nationalist movement became pronounced. Much to the dismay of the local Jewish population, the red-black colours of Stepan Bandera were openly visible on the streets of Kiev and Lviv.

#### Scholarly neglect of Ukrainian antisemitism

Viewed against this background, it seems clear that the Ukrainians may be considered among the most antisemitic of peoples in modern times. Despite this, there is a remarkable dearth of theoretical materials on the

<sup>5</sup> Peter Kenez, 'Pogroms and white ideology in the Russian Civil War', John Klier and Shomo Lambroza (eds.), *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History* (Cambridge 1992), 293.

<sup>6</sup> This dual identity is touched upon in Frank Sysyn, 'The Jewish factor in the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising', Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton 1988), 43-54. See Shmuel Ettinger's remarks on this phenomenon in his article 'Chmielnicki, Bogdan', *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Jerusalem n.d.), vol. 5, 480-4.

content of Ukrainian antisemitism, and it remains a largely unstudied phenomenon. The late Philip Friedman, in a landmark article published in the late 1950s on Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the Second World War, complained about this lack of scholarship.<sup>7</sup> Nearly forty years later, the situation has changed but little, so much so that virtually identical remarks are made in current periodicals.<sup>8</sup> Even a cursory glance at the publications in the field will bear out these assertions. The authoritative two-volume *Antisemitism: An Annotated Bibliography* produced by the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism lists 2,738 works published between 1984 and 1987, yet only twenty items are listed in the index under 'Ukraine'—0.7 per cent of the total. This makes Ukrainian antisemitism only moderately more studied than that of Brazil (fifteen entries), Greece (sixteen), and less than generally moderate Czechoslovakia (twenty-three).<sup>9</sup> Whither 'Amalek'?

What accounts for this paradoxical lacuna in the literature? It may be argued that it is due to the fact that the Ukrainian national awakening did not carry much momentum until the late nineteenth and even the early twentieth centuries and did not attract significant Jewish scholarly attention. Another contributing factor to the neglect of this topic may be linguistic difficulties. While pre-Holocaust researchers were generally proficient in most Slavic languages, the newer generation of North American and West European scholars usually had to master them in the classroom. Sources are much more plentiful in Russian and Polish, so few post-war students learned Ukrainian. Therefore, while a great deal of valuable research has been produced in the post-war era on antisemitism in the Russian and Soviet governments, comparatively few works have looked at grass-roots antisemitism, even among the Ukrainians.

In the absence of more sophisticated literature, it is tempting to simply ascribe a unique tradition of hatred to the Ukrainian people, and to thus explain the anti-Jewish violence that surfaced with terrible regularity in the modern period as an expression of a deep-rooted anti-semitism. Defining precisely the nature of this antisemitism, however, is more difficult. Unlike modern German antisemitism, for example, race is not a prominent factor in the Ukrainian animosity towards Jews.

7 'Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the Nazi occupation', *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*, vol. 12 (New York 1958-9), esp. 259, 295. Although his comments appear in the introductory section of the Yiddish version of this article (*Yivo bleter* (New York), no. 41, 1957-8, 230), the stronger remarks to this effect in his conclusion were strangely omitted.

8 See, for example, John-Paul Himka, 'Western Ukraine between the wars', *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Edmonton), vol. 34, no. 4, 1992, 411 note 50.

9 Susan Sarah Cohen (ed.), *Antisemitism: An Annotated Bibliography*, vol. 1, 1984-5 (New York 1987); vol. 2, 1986-7 (New York 1991). Entries listed under 'Ukraine' are usually cross-listed to 'Russia' and 'USSR', yet the twenty Ukrainian entries still constitute less than 10 per cent of the 244 entries under these headings.

Religious elements are also conspicuous by their relative absence. The blood libel myth, which was popular in Western Europe, largely failed to capture the imagination of Ukrainians, despite the machinations of the government in the highly publicized Beilis trial. The Ukrainians lack a well-developed literature of antisemitism, and indeed the very term was so new to Ukrainians that a 1919 popular pamphlet had to explicitly define it as 'anti-Jewish' (*proty yevreiska*).<sup>10</sup>

What then is the content of this legendary Ukrainian antisemitism? Despite its brutality and unusual longevity, the Ukrainian-Jewish conflict is in its essence a normal conflict between socio-economic groups. Unlike antisemitism in Western Europe, which is characterized by demonization of Jews, the Ukrainian hatred is based on a long-standing feud and struggle for existence. It would be a foolish mistake to underestimate the negative impact that Ukrainian violence has had on the Jews. Despite this undeniable fact, however, a closer look reveals that the use of the term 'antisemitism' to define the essentially common conflict between Ukrainians and Jews is misleading. Far from an exercise in semantics, a more precise understanding of the terminology will result in a clearer picture of the phenomenon.

#### The Langmuir model of antisemitism

Gavin Langmuir has struggled with this issue in another context and has attempted to describe the limits of what is known as 'antisemitism'. He identifies three different types of negative assertions made about outgroups.<sup>11</sup> 'Realistic' negative assertions about members of an outgroup are based on well-established empirical criteria. A facile example would be the identification of an armed man wearing the uniform of a belligerent army. While it is possible that the stranger simply found the clothes and the weapon, it is far more likely that he represents a tangible danger to the ingroup and should be treated accordingly. 'Xenophobic' negative assertions, on the other hand, are based on an improper generalization from insufficient or faulty data. An example of this type of assertion could be the improper treatment of nationals who have family origins in a belligerent country, suspecting that they may be disloyal to the host society. The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II or similar treatment of Ukrainian Canadians during World War I would be examples of such xenophobic negative assertions.

Finally, chimerical negative assertions are based on absurd premises, with absolutely no foundation in reality. The notion that Jews drink Christian blood on Passover, or that the Freemasons are party to a conspiracy to rule the world, are examples of such chimerical negative

<sup>10</sup> *Chy vorohy yevrei robotnykam ta selianam?* (Are Jews the Enemies of Workers and Peasants?) (Kiev 1919), 4.

<sup>11</sup> *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (Los Angeles 1990), 328.

assertions. Langmuir associates the term 'antisemitism' exclusively with such chimerical assertions. While Jews are also the victims of realistic and xenophobic assertions, there is nothing unique in these slanders that distinguishes them from similar statements made about non-Jewish out-groups. In another recent work Langmuir writes:

Antisemitism . . . both in its origins and in its recent most horrible manifestation, is the hostility aroused by irrational thinking about 'Jews'. But Jews have also been the object of all the more usual kinds of hostility that have been directed at other major groups, especially enduring ethnic groups that competed for scarce resources.<sup>12</sup>

For the most part, the Ukrainian-Jewish conflict in the modern era is one of the 'more usual kinds of hostility'. Viewed in this context, Ukrainian hostility to Jews has more in common with, for example, the Hindu-Muslim conflict of the late 1940s than the anti-Jewish massacres of the Crusades.

#### Langmuir model applied to Ukrainian-Jewish history

The perception that there is something unique about Ukrainian anti-semitism is sustained by the erroneous assumption that Jews must be viewed solely as victims and never as victimizers.<sup>13</sup> Prior to the 'Decree of 1648-1649', many Jews were active participants in the Polish policy of exploitation of Ukrainians. Dubnow's characterization of Jews as caught between 'hammer and anvil'—that is, between the demands of the Polish lords and the anger of the Ukrainian peasants—is simply misleading.<sup>14</sup> The Jews were very much part of the 'hammer', part of the economic machinery that executed Polish control over the Ukraine. This was obvious to the earliest chroniclers of the massacre. Nathan of Hanover's *Yeven Metsulah* describes the Polish oppression with scriptural allusions that even compared the Ukrainians to the Jews in Egyptian bondage:

. . . [the Ukrainians] were looked upon as lowly and inferior beings and became the slaves and handmaids of the Polish people and the Jews . . . 'their lives were made bitter by hard labour, in mortar and bricks . . . ' [Exodus 1:14] . . . So wretched and lowly had they become that all classes of people, even the lowliest among them [Jews], became their overlords.<sup>15</sup>

12 *History, Religion and Antisemitism* (Berkeley 1990), 275.

13 See the interesting remarks on this topic in Bohdan Vitvitsky, 'Slavs and Jews: Consistent and inconsistent perspectives on the Holocaust' in Michael Berenbaum (ed.), *A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis* (New York 1990), 103.

14 Simon Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland from the Earliest Times until the Present Day*, trans. I. Friedlander, 3 volumes (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1916), vol. 1, 142.

15 Nathan Hanover, *Abyss of Despair (Yeven Metsulah)*, translated by Abraham Mesch (New Brunswick 1983), 27-8. Mesch adds in a footnote that 'the lowliest' is a reference to the Jews.

The Ukrainian attacks on Jews during the Khmelnytsky rebellion, and similarly during Honta's uprising of the next century, must be seen as essentially anti-Polish and anti-Catholic uprisings.<sup>16</sup> The massacres of the Jews, while horrific, were epiphenominal to the central aspects of the conflict. Put in Langmuir's terms, it seems that these periods were characterized by violence based on xenophobic assertions about Jews. Certainly only a minority of the population was involved in the active exploitation of Ukrainians, yet the very existence of the Jewish community in Ukraine depended on this livelihood. Ukrainian violence was thus directed at all Jews, regardless of occupation and of any benefit Jewish commerce might have brought to the region.<sup>17</sup>

The next major occasion for Jewish bloodshed was in the context of the revolutionary era, in particular the pogroms of 1919. At this time, the anti-Jewish violence was secondary to the overall conflict with the Communists. Ukrainian pogroms were generally perpetrated under the pretext that the Jews of a given locality were plotting a 'Bolshevik rebellion' to overthrow the ruling Ukrainian officials.<sup>18</sup> The epithet 'Jew-Bolshevik' was the most common element in Ukrainian antisemitic diatribe, defining the conflict between Ukrainians and Jews in essentially political terms. Public proclamations issued by Ukrainians with anti-semitic content contain phrases such as 'Jew-Commissar . . . Soviet power in the Jew's hands'.<sup>19</sup> Another proclamation asks 'Why do our little Jews [*nashi zhydky*] wait for the Bolsheviks [to come to the] towns and

16 See Bernard Weinryb, 'The Hebrew chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge), vol. 1, no. 2, 1977, 170; Jaroslaw Pelenski, 'The Cossack insurrection in Jewish-Ukrainian relations', *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations . . .*, 37; Daniel Krochmalnik, 'Juden und Kosaken', *Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem jüdischen Lehrhaus in Frankfurt am Main* (Frankfurt am Main 1986), 88-99; Theodor Mackiw, 'Die Situation der jüdischen Bewohner in den Konflikten um die Ukraine im 17. Jahrhundert', *Studien zu Nationalitätenfragen* (Munich), no. 2, 1986, 56-69.

17 See Moshe Rosman, *The Lord's Jews: Magnate-Jewish Relations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth During the 18th Century* (Cambridge 1990), especially 48-51, 95-105.

18 The February 1919 massacre in Proskuriv (Proskurov) is the prime example of this phenomenon. See Elias Tcherikower, *Di Ukrayner pogromen in yor 1919* (The Ukrainian Pogroms in 1919) (New York 1965); *Khurbn Proskurov: Tsum andenken fun di heilige neshamos vos zaynen umgekumen in der shreklikher shkhitah, vos is angefirt gevorn durkh di haidamakem* (The Destruction of Proskurov: In Memory of the Holy Souls Which Were Taken in the Horrible Slaughter Perpetrated by the Haidamaks) (New York 1924).

19 'Novy zakony' (New decrees), Tcherikower Archive of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York (TA), 43.3595. The Ukrainian term *zhyd* (unlike the Russian *zhid*) is not necessarily derogatory. Consequently, the neutral term 'Jew' has been used to translate *zhyd*, though a more complimentary term might also be appropriate in these passages. See John Klier, 'Zhid: Biography of a Russian epithet', *Slavonic and East European Review* (London), vol. 60, no. 1, 1982, 1-15; Henrik Birnbaum, 'Some problems with the etymology and the semantics of the Slavic *zhid* "Jew"', *Slavica Hierosolymitana* (Jerusalem), vol. 7, 1985, 1-11.

townlets, and why do they agitate for the Russian Bolsheviks?' and answers that Communism 'gives the Jews lordship [*panuvannia*] over our peasants and workers.<sup>20</sup> Only very seldom were religious elements invoked, such as references to 'the anti-Christian Muscovite Jews . . . who kill [our] brothers, fathers and sons.'<sup>21</sup> The conflict with the Jews is explained almost entirely as a part of the overall war with Soviet Russia.

Naturally, the Ukrainian pogroms only added to the popularity of the Communists among Jews, particularly since the Red Army was responsible for only a small proportion of the anti-Jewish atrocities.<sup>22</sup> This helped create a self-fulfilling prophecy as more and more Jews swelled the ranks of the Red Army.<sup>23</sup> The small but growing minority of Jews among the Communists acted as the basis for Ukrainian xenophobic assertions. The same sort of xenophobic assertion, namely that the Mennonites of the Dniپر river communities were allied with Denikin, served as the pretext for similar instances of horrible violence.<sup>24</sup> These two phenomena were essentially the same and, in accordance with Langmuir's model, monocausal 'antisemitism' is insufficient to explain the pogroms against Jews.

Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust may be understood as a continuation of this xenophobic assertion to genocidal ends. Once the association of the Jews and Communists had entered the popular Ukrainian mentality, this served as both the etiology and the justification for murder. It is interesting to note that even the most collaborationist of Ukrainian nationalist organizations generally refrained from the demonization of Jews characteristic of German propaganda, and the phrase 'Jew-Bolshevik' remains the staple of Ukrainian antisemitism even in this bloody era. In the article mentioned above, Friedman notes the surprisingly weak anti-Jewish declaration of the OUN-B (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera faction). While calling Jews 'the most faithful support of the ruling Bolshevik regime', the OUN-B defines its struggle with the Communists as paramount and attacks Jews exclusively in this context.<sup>25</sup> Even Shmuel Spector, who generally has a more

20 TA, 75.5879.

21 TA, 22.1781.

22 The most accurate statistics available indicate that the Red Army perpetrated some 9 per cent of pogroms, far fewer than the Whites (17 per cent) or the Ukrainian Directory and its affiliates (40 per cent). A comprehensive discussion of the statistics and graphic presentation are available in my doctoral dissertation, 'Jews and Ukrainians in revolutionary times: Autonomy, statehood, and civil war, 1917-1920', scheduled for defence in the summer of 1994 in the Department of History, University of Toronto.

23 See Zvi Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917-1930* (Princeton 1972), 165; Baruch Gurevitz, *National Communism in the Soviet Union 1918-1928* (Pittsburgh 1980), 49.

24 See D. Neufeld, *A Russian Dance of Death: Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine* (Winnipeg 1977).

25 The Ukrainian text is presented in Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish relations . . .', 265.

critical view of Ukrainian attitudes towards Jews than Friedman, notes that the OUN-B opposed Jews 'at least' as they were alleged supporters of Communism.<sup>26</sup> The xenophobic assertion, formed twenty years previously, that Jews were the prime advocates of Communism was deepened during the interwar years and contributed to Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis. While it resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Jews, this hatred nevertheless does not conform to what Langmuir identified as chimerical negative assertions or antisemitism proper. Jews were perceived improperly as Communists, Ukrainians were at war with Communists, and this was essentially how the massacre of innocents was justified.

### The notion of Jewish Ukrainophobia

Shimon Redlich has identified the Ukrainian-Jewish conflict as a triangular phenomenon, with a further nationality occupying the third position.<sup>27</sup> During the seventeenth century Jews together with Poles opposed Ukrainians. In the revolutionary era Ukrainians opposed the Jews, whom they conflated with Russian Communists. During the Holocaust Ukrainians joined Nazis against the Jews—the former for largely political reasons, the latter on more pathological grounds.

In all these periods Ukrainians and Jews tend to regard themselves exclusively as victims and members of the other group exclusively as victimizers. This popular self-perception adds to the bitterness of the animosity between the two groups, who demand recognition of their respective claims on each other. While Jews accuse Ukrainians of antisemitism, Ukrainians cite Jewish abuse of their positions as arendators in the early modern period and their participation in the Soviet regime in the twentieth century. The term 'Jewish Ukrainophobia' therefore has real meaning for many Ukrainians. Zvi Gitelman has statistically examined this anti-Ukrainian tendency and refers to it as 'a historical myth [that has] been created and effectively transmitted . . . there is a readiness to believe in Ukrainian anti-Semitism, a historically shaped mind-set that can understand and interpret Ukrainian actions and characteristics.'<sup>28</sup>

The author of one recent pamphlet (a classic example of xenophobic negative assertions) complained, for example, that the Ukrainian terror-

26 'The attitude of the Ukrainian diaspora to the Holocaust of Ukrainian Jewry' in Yisrael Gutman and Gideon Greif (eds.), *The Historiography of the Holocaust Period*, Proceedings of the Fifth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, Jerusalem, 1983 (Jerusalem 1988), 276.

27 Shimon Redlich, 'Sheptytsky and the Jews during the Second World War', *Shvut* (Tel Aviv), no. 13, 1988, 7.

28 Zvi Gitelman, 'Contemporary Soviet Jewish perspectives of Ukrainians: Some empirical observations', *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations . . .*, 454-5. Gitelman is using the word 'myth' here in terms of a theoretical construct and not in the sense of fable or untruth.

famine of 1932-3 was being ignored in favour of the Nazi mass murder of Jews.<sup>29</sup> Both groups have strong feelings of exclusivity and use extensive martyrologies as props for the national identity. Where these martyrologies conflict, there is bound to be tension. The trial of John Demjanjuk on war crimes charges in Israel, for example, prompted a complaint in a Ukrainian newspaper that Jews, and in particular Stalin's henchman Lazar Kaganovich, bore responsibility for the mass murder of Ukrainians in the famine and later purges, and claimed that '... all Israelis, and all Jewish organizations in the states of the world must remember this.'<sup>30</sup>

### Possibilities for the future

In Rabbinic tradition Amalek remains an academic concept only. The Talmud states (Yoma 52a) that the Amalekite nation was scattered among all the other peoples of the world and no longer exists as a single entity. Similarly, there seems to be some room for cautious optimism for the future of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. For every normal conflict, there is always the possibility of a normal resolution. During the dissolution of both the Tsarist and Soviet empires Jewish and Ukrainian political intelligentsia found themselves on the same side of the triangle, allied against the rapidly dissolving regime. In the case of the pre-Soviet period this struggle was in vain and ended in great tragedy for both peoples. In recent years another connection between the Ukrainian and Jewish intelligentsia has been formed. This grew largely out of the dissident movement when, if only out of sheer expediency, the Ukrainian-Jewish conflict was abandoned in the context of the much larger struggle against the Communists. With few exceptions, the relationship between Ukrainians and Jews during and following the collapse of the Soviet Union has been exemplary—something which cannot be said for Jewish-Russian affairs.<sup>31</sup> This is not to say that the newly independent state will be able to bring about a reconciliation between these two peoples, occupied as it is with preserving the most basic elements of the social fabric in these exceptionally difficult times. Indeed, there are some signs of a growing tension.<sup>32</sup> It remains to be seen how anti-Jewish attitudes in Ukraine will be affected by the deepening economic crisis.

29 Yuriy Chumatskyj, 'Why is one Holocaust worth more than others?' (Baulkham Hills, Australia 1986).

30 'Za vilnu Ukrainu' (For a Free Ukraine), 1 April 1993, cited in Leonid Finberg, 'The Jews of Ukraine in 1993', *Yehudei Brit ha-Moatsot be-Ma'avar* (Jews of the Soviet Union in Transition) (Jerusalem), vol. 1, no. 16, 1994, 118.

31 See, for example, my article 'Standing up for Ukrainian Jews', *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 4 May 1990. Ukrainian-Jewish relations are also surveyed in Ludmila Dymerskaya-Tsigelman, 'Sovereign Ukraine and the Jews', *Yehudei Brit ha-Moatsot*, no. 15, 1992, 71-83.

32 See Finberg, 'The Jews of Ukraine in 1993'.